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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
 
1.1  The Puzzles: How Do Entrepreneurs Evolve Their Strategy 
During Institutional Change? 
In the last three decades, transitional economies like Russia, Eastern-Central 
Europe, and China have been undergoing fundamental and comprehensive 
institutional change as the formerly centrally planned economies transition toward 
market-based economies (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000; Newman, 2000; 
Tan, 2007; Tan & Litschert, 1994). The existing institutions?“including political 
systems, laws, regulations, financial markets, and underlying assumptions about the 
purpose of economic activity” (Newman, 2000: 602)?were significantly changed 
within a short period of time. 
The effects of the institutional changes were rather tangible as they implied 
changes within everyday life and economic activity (Feige, 1997; Swader, 2008; 
Welter & Smallbone, 2011). Stimulated by such a big shift, scholars have devoted 
much attention to the understanding of strategic choices during this fundamental 
transition (Hoskisson et al., 2000). The roles and functions of new rules, resources, 
and opportunities presented in the new institutional environment and the legacy of old 
institutional beliefs, values, and practices are evaluated differently in scholarly work, 
thus obscuring the overall picture of strategic action during the period of institutional 
change.    
Two streams of scholars have contributed theoretically and empirically to this 
focal research theme. However, because of the divisions in theoretical assumptions 
and focus, these two streams continuously produce competing and contradictory 
accounts. One stream of scholars argues that these unprecedented changes facilitate 
organizational transformation and strategic adaptations. When the existing rules of the 
game were significantly destroyed and changed, new rules of the game began to 
emerge and impose pressures on organizations and entrepreneurs to follow and 
engage in the co-evolution process (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2010; Peng, 2003; Peng & 
Heath, 1996; Tan & Tan, 2005). This school emphasizes that firms and entrepreneurs 
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are motivated and able to move beyond institutional constraints to pursue competitive 
advantages (Lewin, Long, & Carroll, 1999; Oliver, 1991). Scholars have conducted 
empirical studies demonstrating that firms and entrepreneurs developed strategic 
decision making (Soulsby & Clark, 1996) and market learning skills (Jefferson & 
Rawski, 1995), initiated innovative responses and imitated successful strategies 
(Keister, 2002a), developed the willingness to take proactive strategies, and were 
committed to future growth (Tan, 2007).  
Another stream of scholars appeals for more research attention to be devoted to 
strategic inertia during the institutional change phase. This school of thought argues 
that firms’ and entrepreneurs’ adaptational patterns are largely influenced by the 
imprinting effect of founding institutional environments and the existing institutional 
realities in transitional economies (Hoskisson et al., 2000). When new rules of the 
game are still not completely known, actors display strategically confused behaviors, 
and they still likely draw upon and rely on existing rules, norms, routines, and 
practices, thus demonstrating resistance and an inability to change (Kim, Shin, Oh, & 
Jeong, 2007; Newman, 2000). Numerous empirical studies reported extensive 
strategic inertia during the phase of institutional change. For example, firms and 
entrepreneurs continue to behave in ways that reflect the enduring influence of 
socialist institutions despite the implementation of market-oriented reforms, thus 
demonstrating the imprinting effect of founding institutions that impede technological 
capabilities from developing (Kogut & Zander, 2000) and limit the adaptation of 
operational knowledge to meet new demands (Kriauciunas & Kale, 2006). Other 
studies showed that radical institutional transformations did not lead to major shifts in 
enterprise structures and strategies (Czaban & Whitley, 2000), and relational and 
cultural constraints still restrain a firm’s ability to adapt (Child & Yuan, 1996). 
These competing and contradictory theoretical arguments and empirical findings 
do not provide a clear picture of strategic choice during the fundamental 
environmental shift. Both schools do not specify who is actually affected during the 
institutional change phase or explicitly investigate how firms and entrepreneurs with a 
distinctive institutional history might respond differently, and yet, they have not 
uncovered the underlying mechanisms that lead to strategic change and inertia. These 
critical research gaps stimulated this research endeavor to seek answers to these 
intriguing puzzles: How do entrepreneurs make strategic choices during the phase of 
institutional change? Do they adapt to fit the changing institutional environment or do 
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they exhibit strategic inertia? If inertia is pervasive, why do we still observe 
adaptations? If change is pervasive, why do we still notice inertia?  
To describe the puzzle in terms of which scenario (i.e., strategic change or inertia) 
is more likely to happen may seem too simplistic. Both strategic change and inertia 
might be demonstrated during the social change phase. The more intriguing puzzles 
are: Who is involved in these processes of strategic change and inertia? What are the 
underlying processes and mechanisms? How does change and adaption become 
possible in transitional economies? I seek to shed light on these theoretical and 
empirical puzzles by focusing on network strategy. The rationales for concentrating on 
network strategy to reflect on strategic choice are as follows: First, scholars have 
widely recognized network strategy as a critical organizational and entrepreneurial 
strategy for business success. Drawing on external resources through networks is an 
effective strategy to overcome the liabilities of newness and smallness (Baum, 1996; 
Stinchcombe, 1965). Utilizing the network strategy itself requires strategies such as 
selecting the right partners (Dacin, Oliver, & Roy, 2007), cultivating trust 
relationships (Smith & Lohrke, 2008), developing appropriate governance structures 
(Gulati, 2007; Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997), and managing network dynamics 
overt time (Gulati, 1998).  
Second, examining “how networks evolve and change over time” (Nohria, 1992: 
15) can help to illuminate environmental influences. Similar competing and 
contradictory arguments exist in the literature. Some studies have argued that 
environmental shifts cause changes in network size, structure, and tie strength (Baker, 
Faulkner, & Fisher, 1998; Koka, Madhavan, & Prescott, 2006). Other studies have 
demonstrated that the initial conditions of organization, alliances, and the 
environment imprint on a network structure and lead to inertia (Doz, Olk, & Ring, 
2000; Marquis, 2003; Milanov & Fernhaber, 2009). Therefore, focusing on a 
network’s evolution can delineate the relative effect of a founding environment and 
the changing environment on network patterns.  
More importantly, network strategy is an especially valuable strategy in 
transitional economies (Peng & Jiang, 2005; Peng, 2004; Xin & Pearce, 1996). Its 
existence and evolution are closely related to the development of regulative 
institutions and the transformation of informal institutions such as norms, values, and 
beliefs (Peng, 2003; Peng & Zhou, 2005). By scrutinizing networks, we can gain more 
insight into how specific institutional elements led to a network’s construction and 
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how the changes of institutional elements affect the network’s evolution. This means 
that we can better examine the relative influence of the founding and changing 
institutional environment and solve the puzzles regarding how entrepreneurs evolve 
their strategy during the institutional change phase.   
 
1.2  Research Purposes and Approach 
Research purposes  
This study investigates the evolution of network strategy during conditions of 
institutional change. The objectives of this study are as follows: First, use the 
empirical data to explore how entrepreneurs construct and evolve their networks 
(network configurations and networking styles) during the period of institutional 
change, examine whether they demonstrate network change or network inertia, and 
specify who is more likely to demonstrate which scenario. Second, unpack the 
processes and mechanisms of network evolution (network inertia and network 
change). Third, draw theory from the data by examining effects of the founding 
institutional environment and the changing institutional environment on network 
evolution, and specify how exposure to the different founding environments might 
alter network configurations and networking styles.  
A start-up cohort comparative approach 
 Investigating the evolution of network strategy during the institutional change 
phase requires examining the relative effect of the founding and changing institutional 
environment in one research setting. Unfortunately, the extant literature has failed to 
do so. It does not link firms and entrepreneurs with their specific founding 
environments and fails to specify how different groups of firms and entrepreneurs 
responded to the changing institutional environment. Life course theorists?have 
suggested that a cohort of people is embedded in similar structures of an economy and 
society (Mannheim, 1970) and that “each cohort has a distinctive composition and 
character reflecting the circumstances of its unique origination and history” (Ryder, 
1965: 845). According to life course theorists, historical changes impact cohorts and 
the succession of cohorts make social change and innovation possible (Ryder, 1965). 
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This perspective offers a rich source of inspiration and guidance for designing and 
carrying out this comparative study concerning strategic responses of entrepreneurial 
cohorts during the period of institutional change. Another source of inspiration for this 
research came from organizational study, especially from organizational ecology 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Hannan & Freeman, 1984). According to organizational 
theorists, organizations entering the market at roughly the same time consist of a 
cohort which demonstrates similar characteristics (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; 
Romanelli & Tushman, 1986). 
Borrowing the cohort concept from life course and organizational theorists, I 
developed a start-up cohort comparative approach to achieve the research goals. The 
cohort comparative approach is an appropriate strategy to investigate and explain the 
relative effects of history, environmental changes, and strategic choices (Child, 1972; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Romanelli & Tushman, 1986; Stinchcombe, 1965). In this 
research, I define a start-up cohort as a group of entrepreneurs who begin their 
business venture during the same institutional period. It is a well suited grouping 
strategy, because it is based on the characteristics of an initial position with respect to 
the different founding institutional conditions during the institutional transition 
(Romanelli, 1989; Romanelli & Tushman, 1986: 610). 
This approach has two advantages. First, it can manifest the initial link between a 
population of firms and entrepreneurs and its founding environment. Second, since the 
“adaptational patterns vary systematically in accord with differences in contextual 
origins” (Romanelli & Tushman, 1986: 613), using the cohort comparative approach 
can reveal the relative influence of the founding conditions and the changing 
environment, and help make sense of entrepreneurs’ strategic responses.  
 
1.3  Research Questions 
From the economic sociology perspective, entrepreneurs are seen as economic 
actors embedded in continuing networks of social relationships (Aldrich & Zimmer, 
1986; Granovetter, 1985). This research reconciles scholars’ appeal for examining the 
causes and consequences of network embeddedness during the entrepreneurial process 
(Hoang & Antoncic, 2003a) by contextualizing it in the institutional change 
conditions. It primarily investigates two critical constructs of networks: network 
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configurations and networking actions.   
Network configurations 
Network configuration refers to the characteristics and patterns of networks 
(Samaddar, Nargundkar, & Daley, 2006), such as a network’s structure and content 
(Burt, 1992; Hoang & Antoncic, 2003a; Reagans & McEvily, 2003), tie strength 
(Granovet.Ms, 1973; Moran, 2005), proximity (Reagans, 2011), diversity (Reagans & 
McEvily, 2003), and duration (Lee, 2007). Firms operating in different environments 
achieve business success by constructing a network with different forms of relational 
and structural embeddedness (Rowley, Behrens, & Krackhardt, 2000: 370). The 
network configuration depicts a snapshot of its features at a given time. In this study, I 
focus on three important dimensions of network configuration: network type, tie 
strength, and diversity.  
The way an entrepreneur utilizes different network types can be used to examine 
how the relevance of different network types have evolved in the context of 
institutional change (Ma & Cheng, 2010). In this study, I focus on the evolution of 
three types of networks?social-cultural networks, political networks, and market 
networks?as a reflection of entrepreneurial reactions to the environmental change.    
Under a certain degree of environmental uncertainty and munificence (Uzzi, 
1996), and governed by specific relational norms, actors establish different tie 
strengths (Chen & Chen, 2004; Wang, 2007; Xiao & Tsui, 2007). As the phase of 
institutional change unfolds, a strong-tie based network is expected to shift to a 
weak-tie-based network (Peng & Zhou, 2005). Firms and entrepreneurs are expected 
to forge diverse ties and evolve from cohesion to structural holes (Peng & Quan, 
2009). However, only limited empirical work has been conducted to confirm these 
proposals, and even less is known about the characteristics of different start-up 
cohorts’ network configurations and the underlying mechanisms that lead to plausible 
differences. Accordingly, I seek answers to the first set of research questions regarding 
network configurations:   
(1) What are the characteristics of different start-up cohorts’ network 
configurations?  
(2) How might different start-up cohorts differ in their network configurations? 
What are the underlying processes and mechanisms? How do start-up cohorts’ 
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exposures to different founding institutional environments influence their 
network configurations during institutional changes?  
Networking actions 
A network configuration only captures a snapshot of network characteristics. If 
the network configuration evolves, it should first be reflected in its networking actions. 
To date, little theoretical and empirical work has been devoted to investigating 
networking actions (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003a; Jack, Dodd, & Anderson, 2008; Jack, 
Moult, Anderson, & Dodd, 2010; Ring & Van De Ven, 1994). The concept of 
networking action distinguishes itself from a network in that it emphasizes process 
and dynamic dimensions. As a network plays a significant role in the success of 
entrepreneurial goals, it is crucial to know how ties are initiated, established, governed, 
and changed. 
A clear research focus on networking actions is much needed in studying 
network evolution in transitional economies. Previous studies mainly focused on the 
necessity and benefits of networks and stressed strategic shifts of networks during the 
transition. However, the actual process of networking and the how networking style 
might change during the institutional change period are far from clear. Therefore, I 
aim to fill this important lacuna by exploring two critical dimensions in networking 
actions: tie formation and trust development (Elfring & Hulsink, 2007; Podolny & 
Page, 1998; Smith & Lohrke, 2008; Vissa, 2010). Linking the start-up cohort 
approach, I seek to answer a second set of questions: 
(3) How do different start-up cohorts establish ties and develop trust relationships 
during the phase of institutional change?  
(4) What are the underlying mechanisms that lead to possible differences? 
1.4  Chapter Layout  
Chapter two reviews the literature of environmental effects on corporate and 
entrepreneurial strategies, with a special focus on network strategy during the period 
of institutional change in transitional economies. After evaluating the underlying 
theoretical debate and contradictory empirical findings, it offers three critiques and 
proposes theoretical orientations. This chapter continues to familiarize the reader with 
the history of Chinese institutional change and the development of private 
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entrepreneurship.  
Chapter three presents the research methodology. It comprises two parts. The 
first part describes the mixed method design, sampling, data collection and analysis 
procedures, and research validity and reliability. Part two describes the characteristics 
of respondents’ profiles with a comparison of two start-up cohorts’ industrial 
engagement.  
Chapters four and five report the empirical findings. Chapter four begins with the 
description of the distinctiveness between two cohorts’ network configurations in 
three dimensions: network type, tie strength, and diversity. It continues to unpack the 
underlying processes and mechanisms that led to such differences. Based on these 
findings, the third section generates the testable propositions for a future test and 
explorations.  
Moving from network configurations to networking actions, chapter five delves 
deeply into how different start-up cohorts form ties and develop trust relationships 
during the institutional change period. The analysis of networking actions centers on 
three types of networking activities: team formation, political networking, and market 
networking. This chapter shows that two start-up cohorts demonstrate distinctive 
networking styles: The old cohort’s network style is characterized by network 
deepening, while the younger cohort’s is characterized by network broadening. This 
chapter ends with testable propositions.  
Chapter six concludes the dissertation. It begins with a summary and then offers 
implications for institutional theory, organizational population ecology, and network 
theory. This final chapter also discusses the limitations, practical applications, and 
proposes directions for future study.      
 
 
CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH BACKGROUND AND THEORETICAL 
ORIENTATION
 
2.1  Introduction 
This chapter provides the theoretical background for this research project and 
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outlines three critical gaps in the existing literature that will be taken into account in 
this study. The review sheds light on how the founding and changing environments 
affect corporate and entrepreneurial strategies, with a special focus on network 
strategy during the phase of institutional change in transitional economies. It begins 
with a review of two competing perspectives concerning what impacts environmental 
effects have on strategic evolution: strategic adaptation and strategic inertia. This 
discussion points out that existing research has only focused on the task environment 
in developed economies where “a market-based institutional framework has been 
taken for granted” (Peng, Sun, Pinkham, & Chen, 2009: 66). Thus, an 
institutional-based perspective that scrutinizes interactions among institutions, 
entrepreneurs, and strategic choices can contribute new insights. Following this 
assessment, the second section is devoted to reviewing existing institutional studies on 
strategies employed by firms during the institutional change period in transitional 
economies. Similarly, the review is structured around the debate of strategic evolution 
with a focus on network strategy.  
The third section offers a critical view of previous research on institutional 
change and network evolution by highlighting three important gaps: First, institutions 
have three pillarsregulative, cognitive, and normative; however, the current 
literature has not examined the combination of institutional pillars at a specific period 
and has failed to investigate how a particular combination impacts networks. Second, 
previous studies mainly examine or propose the evolution of network structure; yet, 
they have not closely examined the actual networking action and its evolution during 
the institutional change phase. These two critiques lead to the third one, that is, there 
is insufficient attention paid to cohorts and divergent adaptational patterns during the 
period of institutional change. The final section outlines the institutional change phase 
and the development of private entrepreneurship in China, providing the relevant 
background for this empirical study. 
 
 2.2  The Debate on Environmental Effects 
Environmental change and strategic adaptation 
How firms and entrepreneurs respond to environmental changes has been a 
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prominent research topic for strategy scholars. However, within the management and 
organizational literature, there is considerable debate and controversy on this issue. 
This debate can be categorized into two perspectives: strategic change and a tendency 
toward inertia (Boeker, 1989b; Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 
1997; Van de ven, 1993). The first stream of scholars emphasizes strategic adaptation 
to environmental change (Baum, 1999: 71; Kraatz & Zajac, 2001; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). The main arguments are as follows.  
First, as the environment changes over time, firms need to make strategic moves 
to realign themselves with new environmental demands (Zammuto & Cameron, 1985). 
A shift in their resource supply changes firms’ resource needs and organizational 
structure (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). When new 
opportunities arise, firms and entrepreneurs need to recognize and learn innovative 
skills to achieve high performance (Carley & Lee, 1998; Shane & Venkataraman, 
2000). The emergence of a new environment also devaluates previous legitimate 
structures and behaviors while demanding new ones (Davis, Diekmann, & Tinsley, 
1994) that are realigned with the new environment and avoid illegitimacy (Glynn & 
Marquis, 2004: 152; Kraatz & Zajac, 1996; Ruef & Scott, 1998).  
Second, making strategic changes are not only necessary and beneficial for a 
firm’s survival and performance enhancement in the altered conditions, they are also 
achievable. Scholars from this stream emphasize the roles played by entrepreneurs, 
managers, and management teams in monitoring changes and evolving their strategies 
to fit the new environment (Hrebiniak & Joyce, 1985) or even to reshape their 
environment (Child, 1972; Miles & Snow, 1978). In short, scholars in this vain state 
that strategic change is the joint outcome of environmental effects and “intentional 
strategic adaption” (Lewin & Volberda, 1999); it is necessary, beneficial, and 
achievable.  
Environmental change and network adaptation  
The external environment shapes the nature and direction of corporate and 
entrepreneurial activities over time (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). As firms and 
entrepreneurs strive to catch up with the changing environment, they alter and adapt 
their networks to realign themselves with the new environment. Drawing upon the 
transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1975), the resource-dependence theory (Pfeffer 
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& Salancik, 1978), and the strategic management perspective (Gulati, 1998; Kraatz, 
1998), scholars from the “environment change” angle stress the benefits of network 
change and suggest that networks are flexible enough to be created, adapted, and 
dissolved as a strategic reflection on the environmental change (Kim, Oh, & 
Swaminathan, 2006; Lang & Lockhart, 1990; Madhavan, Koka, & Prescott, 1998).  
In their comprehensive review, Koka et al. (2006) summarized that changes in 
two environmental dimensions—environmental uncertainty and resource 
munificence—affect opportunities (the potential array of inter-firm relations) and 
resources available for the networks of firms. They worked out a matrix to illustrate 
how the decrease and increase in these two dimensions lead to corresponding patterns 
in network changes: network expansion, network churning, network strengthening, 
and network shrinking. These changes are often necessary and beneficial (Hite & 
Hesterly, 2001; Koza & Lewin, 1998; Kraatz, 1998). Scholars from this stream also 
widely acknowledge that network changes are of a strategic nature such as rational 
calculation, effective monitoring, and strategic adaptation (Bourgeois, 1984; Child, 
1972; Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Kim et al., 2006). As Kim et al. (2006: 706) stated, this 
rational model assumes that if the cost of retaining old ties exceeds the benefits, firms 
will dissolve these ties and form new ties without much difficulty.   
Abundant studies have examined how environmental changes impact differences 
in network size, structure, tie strength, and tie components. For example, Baker et al. 
(1998) studied the inter-firm networks between advertising agencies and their clients 
and found that increasing competition and changing norms increase the rate of tie 
dissolution. When firms experience high uncertainty, they are likely to strengthen 
their existing ties to cope with change and uncertainty (Granovetter, 1983; Krackhardt, 
1992; Uzzi, 1997). An alternative view suggests that market uncertainty and 
technological innovations make organizations more likely to form new and diverse 
ties with others who have marketing and technological capabilities (Khanna, Gulati, & 
Nohria, 1998).  
Scholars from this camp have paid insufficient attention to the constraints of 
network changes. As Kim et al. (2006: 706) pointed out, organizations still experience 
difficulties in network change even if they recognize the need for change. Therefore, 
we still need to pay more attention to the tendency of network inertia. I review this 
perspective in the following sections.  
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Founding environment and imprinting effect 
In contrast to the strategic adaptation perspective, the strategic inertia perspective 
suggests that firms and entrepreneurs are constrained in their ability to adapt to 
changing conditions and that firms actually demonstrate a tendency toward preserving 
their initial strategies and resist changes (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Huff, Huff, & 
Thomas, 1992; Miller & Chen, 1994; Ruef, 1997). Although different reasons can 
account for strategic inertia, scholars have devoted much attention to the imprinting 
effect of the founding environment on subsequent organizational behaviors and 
performance (Dobrev & Gotsopoulos, 2010; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; 
Kimberly, 1979; Mintzberg & Waters, 1982; Zyglidopoulos, 1999). 
In his seminar work, Stinchcombe (1965: 168-169) first proposed that 
organizations founded in a given environment “must construct their social systems 
with the social resources available,” and that organizations in subsequent trajectories 
tend to maintain those systems because “traditionalizing forces, the vesting of 
interests, and?ideologies may tend to preserve the structure.” This idea has been 
theorized as the organizational imprinting theory. It argues that the founding 
environment exerts an enduring influence on the present structures, strategies, and 
operating practices, thus leading to the inertia (Kimberly, 1979; Kraatz & Zajac, 2001; 
Schein, 1983). The imprinting effect occurs mainly for the following three reasons.  
First, the founding environment imparts certain resources and opportunities that 
firms can draw upon for their survival and growth (Carroll & Hannan, 2004; 
Zyglidopoulos, 1999). The resources required during the initial founding period have a 
lasting influence on firms. For example, Saxenian (1994) compared the historical 
development of two regional computer company clusters—Silicon Valley and Route 
128 near Boston  Massachusetts—and discovered that the initial difference in social 
structure and industrial resources created two different industrial systems. In Silicon 
Valley, many start-ups generally demand technology/engineering-oriented recruits. In 
their later recruiting, they still continue to emphasize the technology/engineering 
skills, despite the equal and increasing importance of administrative and marketing 
skills (Kriauciunas & Kale, 2006).    
Second, newly founded firms need to follow the strategies, practices, and 
legitimate behaviors that are rewarded by the initial conditions. Boeker found that U.S. 
semiconductor firms established during the 1950s and 1960s emphasized the 
13 
 
enhancement of their R&D capabilities when the U.S. Department of Defense was their 
largest buyer. In a later period, the private commercial market became the main buyer, 
and firms founded in this period placed more emphasis on cost controls and efficiency 
improvements (Boeker, 1988; Boeker, 1989c; Kriauciunas & Kale, 2006). Dobrev and 
Gotsopoulos studied U.S. automobile manufacturers and discovered that firms founded 
under the condition of a legitimacy vacuum invested finite resources to develop 
routines and processes, but later “become obsolete and generate external misalignment 
once [the] legitimacy vacuum dissipates” (2010: 1170). Johnson (2007) documented 
that the political and artistic conditions during the founding of the Paris Opera were 
imprinted on its organizational trajectory. ?
Finally, founders exhibit the imprinting effect on a firm’s structure and behavior. 
The type and duration of a founder’s prior work experience, ability, and network 
position imbue the nascent organizations with resources and opportunities that impact 
their later trajectory (Dobrev & Gotsopoulos, 2010; Kimberly, 1979). The founders’ 
ideas, values, and philosophy also shape and model organizations, and these initial 
blueprints tend to impact the culture and practices that follow, even after the founders’ 
departure (Carroll & Hannan, 2004; Hannan, Burton, & Baron, 1996; Pennings, 1982). 
In the formative period, founders seeking to align their firms to fit into the existing 
environment (Dobrev & Barnett, 2005) causes the imprinting effect and leads to a 
misalignment with the new environment (Dobrev & Gotsopoulos, 2010).  
Founding environment and network inertia 
Realizing the imprinting effect of initial conditions, scholars have challenged the 
strategic network change perspective by highlighting that organizations’ original 
relationship with the founding conditions influences the initial network patterns, 
which are remarkably persistent over time. Drawing on the organizational imprinting 
theory (Stinchcombe, 1965) and the structural inertia theory of organizational ecology 
(Carroll & Hannan, 1989; Hannan & Freeman, 1984), scholars from these camps have 
developed network imprinting and network inertia arguments by asserting that 
previous ties established during the founding period influence subsequent network 
trajectories and impede network change (Kim et al., 2006: 705; Marquis, 2003; 
Milanov & Fernhaber, 2009). From the structural inertia perspective, inertia is not a 
symptom of “bad management,” rather, it is a result of establishing the well-adjusted 
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organizational architecture (Barnett & Carroll, 1995; Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Kim 
et al., 2006). Organizational identity plays a role in constraining rationality, leading to 
conformity and inertia (Hannan, Pólos, & Carroll, 2007). Therefore, inertia is 
regarded “as a by-product of the previously successful management of networks that 
generate synergies for the participating organizations” (Kim et al., 2006: 705). 
Within the current literature on network inertia, scholars have conducted 
empirical studies to understand both how the initial network structure impacts the 
persistence of network structure over time and how difficult it is to change the 
network structure. For example, Walker, Kogut, and Shan (1997) demonstrated that 
because of mutual resource dependence, biotechnology start-ups create a stable 
network structure at the initial venture stage and that this structure creates a path 
dependence tendency in later partner networks. Similarly, Gulati and his colleagues 
(Gulati, 1995; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999) also found that an organization’s existing 
partners create a path dependent environment which shapes the formation of 
subsequent partnerships. Uzzi and Spiro (Uzzi & Spiro, 2005) found that the structure 
of a small world network in the Broadway musical industry has remained the same for 
over 90 years despite major changes in the musical industry. Milanov and Fernhaber 
(2009) demonstrated that the network size and centrality of a new venture’s initial 
alliance partner impact the subsequent network size. 
Although these studies demonstrated the perseverance of network structure over 
time, research on the antecedents of network evolution still faces substantial 
challenges (Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve, & Tsai, 2004). Notably, knowledge regarding 
the influence of the founding environment on network inertia is very limited (Elfring 
& Hulsink, 2007; Marquis, 2003). Marquis criticized that “no one has examined either 
why this persistence occurs or how network structures reflect the social conditions at 
founding” (2003: 682). In his study, Marquis (2003) tried to fill this gap by examining 
the lingering effect of the founding conditions on network structures. In his 
comparative study of U.S. community network structures in 1986 and 2002, he 
showed that social technology available during the founding period imprints on the 
community-based interoperate networks and that the network structure still persists 
despite corporate environmental change.  
Taken together, the network inertia perspective derives its arguments from the 
imprinting effects that founding environments have on new ventures and the initial 
network partners of organizations. As network partners are also embedded in the 
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specific environment (Dacin, Ventresca, & Beal, 1999; Uzzi, 1997), it could be an 
intriguing research agenda to link the founding environment with the initial network 
partners in order to understand how the initial networks are constructed and how this 
initial link affects the subsequent trajectories during environmental changes. Marquis 
(2003) noted that to uncover the mechanisms that lead to the persistence of 
historically imprinted patterns, a study needs to investigate the institutional structures 
and the legitimate template of networking actions that are shared by network actors.     
  
2.3  Institutional Change and the Evolution of Networks 
Although the investigation into how firms and entrepreneurs evolve their strategy 
during environmental changes has been a historical theme, studies on institutional 
change and strategy evolution in transitional economies from an institutional 
perspective have only been a recent focus. In this section, I first provide the 
definitions for key concepts and then review competing arguments and outline critical 
research gaps in the extant literature centering on institutional analysis. 
Concepts: institutions and institutional change  
North (1990: 3) defines institutions as: “the rules of the game in a society or, 
more formally, are the human devised constraints that shape human interaction.” In
his view, institutions consist of formal frameworks such as “constitutions, laws, 
property rights” and informal frameworks such as “sanctions, taboos, customs, 
traditions and codes of conduct” (North, 1991: 97). Scott categorized North’s two 
types of institutions into regulative, cultural-cognitive, and normative elements or 
pillars (Scott, 1995; Scott, 2008). These categorizations have also been enriched and 
extended by other scholars. The regulative pillar arises from government legislation, 
industrial agreements, and standards (Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Li, 2010; Scott, 2008). The 
cognitive pillar includes the taken-for-granted beliefs and values that are based on 
subjectively constructed and internalized rules and meanings (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1991; Scott, 2008). The normative pillar introduces prescriptive and obligatory 
dimensions that comprise values and norms defining what is considered as proper 
(Scott, 2008: 54-56). These three institutional pillars provide related but distinctive 
bases of behavioral legitimacy. The regulative pillar stresses conformity to rules, the 
16 
 
normative pillar emphasizes the deeper and moral basis, and the cognitive pillar 
underlines a common frame of reference (Scott, 2008; Veciana & Urbano, 2008).  
Noting North’s contribution, Nee and his colleagues bring actors back into the 
institutional framework, arguing that organizations and individuals pursue their 
interests in concrete institutional structures (Nee, 2005; Nee & Ingram, 1998). They 
regard institutions as a system of “choice-within-constraints” (Ingram & Clay, 2000; 
Nee, 2005; Nee & Ingram, 1998). According to Nee (2005: 55), an institution is 
defined as “a dominant system of interrelated informal and formal elements—custom, 
shared beliefs, conventions, norms, and rules—which actors orient their actions to 
when they pursue their interests.” Following this definition, institutional change not 
only requires rebuilding formal institutions, but also requires the alignment of norms, 
interests, and networks to coordinate behaviors (Nee, 2005; Nee & Ingram, 1998).  
Institutional theory has been criticized for putting more emphasis on explaining 
the persistence and homogeneity, and as a consequence, institutional change is not 
well understood (Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott, 2002). North emphasized that “to 
proceed, we must understand what institutions are and how they evolve” (North, 1997: 
495). However, his understanding of institutional change is “overwhelmingly an 
incremental one,” because it “consists of marginal adjustments to the complex of rules, 
norms, and enforcement” (North, 1990: 83).  
Hargrave and Van de Ven (2006) defined the institutional change as “a difference 
in form, quality, or state over time in an institution,” and they suggested that changes 
can be identified by observing noticeable differences in the arrangement at two or 
more points in time on a set of dimensions (e.g., frames, norms, or rules). Peng (2003) 
pointed out that although institutional change has gradually emerged as a research 
focus, scholars have only paid scant attention to the wide-ranging changes in 
transitional economies. He appealed for more research attention to be devoted to 
transitional economies, which have been undergoing a shift from central planning to 
market economies (e.g., China, Russia, East and central Europe). According to Peng, 
institutional transition is defined as “fundamental and comprehensive changes 
introduced formal and informal rules of the game that affect organizations as players” 
(2003: 275). He then asked a critical question: In transitional economies, how do 
organizations make strategic choices during the time of institutional transitions?  
Following Peng’s influential work, a growing body of research has devoted 
attention to answering this fundamental question. However, studies still seem to 
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produce competing arguments and results. Similar to the debate outlined in the 
preceding text, one strand of research states that institutional change leads to strategic 
adaptation. Another strand of research, however, asserts that strategic inertia is 
predominant during institutional change. The following section begins with a review 
of these two research strands in terms of strategy evolution with a focus on networks 
and then highlights three important research gaps.  
Institutional change and strategic adaptation 
Many institutional studies were conducted in developed economies. They 
typically examined how organizations co-evolve with a changing task environment, 
such as new market demands, technological changes, and varied industrial conditions 
(Barr, 1998; Dess & Beard, 1984; Doz, 1996; Lewin et al., 1999; McDougall & Oviatt, 
1996; Romanelli & Tushman, 1994). In these contexts, “a market-based institutional 
framework has been taken for granted, and formal institutions (such as laws and 
regulations) and informal institution (such as norms and cognitions) have been 
assumed away as ‘background’ conditions” (Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008: 922). 
Although political scientists have examined the variety of capitalism and institutional 
differences across nations (Hall, Soskice, & Press, 2001; Howell, 2003), most of these 
comparisons are still focused on developed economies, without giving much attention 
to radical and intense institutional changes. More recently, scholars began to look 
beyond the task environment to explore how organizations make strategic choices 
during periods of institutional change, especially in the context of transitional 
economies (Narayanan & Fahey, 2005; Peng, 2003; Peng et al., 2008).   
Within the existing literature, one strand of scholars believes that these 
unprecedented changes prompt firms to change and co-evolve. Drawing on the 
co-evolution perspective (Lewin & Volberda, 1999), they argue that co-evolution is 
the joint outcome of institutional change and intentional strategic adaptation. Changes 
in the political, economic, and social sphere have brought about two major shifts. First, 
changes in the institutional environment generate new resources, opportunities, and 
demands (Sine & David, 2003; Tang, 2009). An increase in the scale and scope of the 
economy facilitates the transactions that engage more parties and requires more 
coordination (Tan & Tan, 2005: 145). Those changes also alter the logics for 
legitimate behaviors (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2010; Gilley, 2008). Second, transitions 
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from centrally planned economies to market-oriented economies bring about new 
roles for the state government to play and new rules of the game in which firms and 
entrepreneurs must seek success (Kornai, 1997; Lin, 2001a; Peng, 2000). Therefore, 
firms operating in these conditions must attempt to adhere to those changes, respond 
effectively, and fit into the new environment if they want to survive and grow 
continuously (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983; Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Meyer & Rowan, 
1977; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
A good number of studies have documented strategic adaptation during the 
institutional change phase. However, most of these studies focused on state-owned 
enterprises. For example, Boisot and Child’s (1988) research discovered that in the 
initial reform period, the government shifted its focus from administrative control 
toward market coordination. This shift urged state-owned enterprises to be more 
proactive and pushed them to “join the system” and co-evolve with it. Nee’s early 
study also found that, under the conditions of partial reform (from 1979 to 1991), 
collective enterprises efficiently transformed into a hybrid organizational form, 
because these firms could “double dip in the redistributive and market sectors of the 
economy” (Nee, 1992: 13). Subsidized by the local government, cadre-entrepreneurs 
became more oriented toward growth. Using a stage model of transition, Tan and Tan 
(2005) compared the strategies of state-owned enterprises at two different time 
periods (1990 and 2002). They confirmed that firms’ strategic adaptations co-evolved 
over time and that these adaptations (e.g., future orientation, proactive and innovative 
orientation, willingness to take risks) improved their performance.  
Institutional change and network adaptation 
As an important strategy for organizational and entrepreneurial success, networks 
have attracted significant research attention from organization and management 
scholars. Transitional economies provide natural laboratories for scholars who wish to 
better understand network evolution in the context of institutional change (Danis, 
Chiaburu, & Lyles, 2010). Scholars associate pervasive network behaviors with the 
following institutional characteristics: an insufficient legislative framework and 
unstable policies (Guthrie 1998), a shortage economy and the state allocation of 
resources (Walder 1986), as well as immature market institutions and insufficient 
market competition (Guthrie 1998). These problems make market transactions 
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uncertain and costly. Entrepreneurs and firms, therefore, develop personal networks as 
a substitute for the absence of formal institutions (Xin & Pearce, 1996). These 
personal networks are also noted as guanxi in the Chinese context, although guanxi 
has been defined at different levels by different scholars (Bian, 1997; Jacobs, 1980; 
Tsui & Farh, 1997; Yang, 1994). It is generally viewed as interpersonal connections 
with strong cultural norms. Chen and Chen’s (2004: 306) definition provides a 
concrete definition of guanxi. They view guanxi as:  
?An?indigenous Chinese construct… as an informal, particularistic personal 
connection between two individuals who are bounded by an implicit 
psychological contract to follow the social norm…such as maintaining a 
long-term relationship, mutual commitment, loyalty, and obligation. 
Although guanxi has deep-rooted cultural elements, some scholars still tend to 
link the prevalence of the guanxi practice to the absence and insufficiency of 
regulative institutions. Scholars who follow this line believe that the enforcement of 
regulative institutions in those economies could lead to network adaptations during 
the phase of institutional change in three dimensions: network intensity, tie strength, 
and network type.  
Network intensity. Scholars under this vain believe that the enhancement of the 
legal system and market institutions, as well as the integration into the global market 
would remarkably diminish the reliance on networks, resulting in a further decline of 
network intensity as the transitional process progresses (Danis et al., 2010; Guthrie, 
1998; Peng, 2003). Peng (2003) developed a two-stage model of the market-oriented 
institutional transition and proposed that when an institutional transition evolves from 
an early phase to a late phase, the network-based strategy will move to a 
market-centered strategy (a rule-based, impersonal exchange). Using his empirical 
study from Shanghai, Guthrie (1998) claimed that the importance of guanxi is 
declining during the course of China’s economic transition. Their arguments are based 
on the assumption that transitional and emerging economies will “eventually converge 
with developed economies” (Peng & Zhou, 2005: 331). These arguments are very 
controversial (Carney, 2004; Djelic & Quack, 2003) given the fact that other scholars 
still showed evidence of networking behavior persisting during the institutional 
change phase in Russia, Central and Eastern Europe (Batjargal, 2006; Ledeneva, 1998; 
Ledeneva, 2008), and China (Batjargal, 2007; Keister, 2002b; Potter, 2002; Wank, 
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2002a, b; Wank, 1996).  
Tie strength. Based on the convergence assumption, scholars predict that the 
strength of ties is also likely to shift from strong-tie-based networks to weak-tie-based 
networks. Realizing that Peng’s (2003) two-stage model fails to capture the 
heterogeneity of both the institutional transition and network strategies, Peng and 
Zhou (2005) integrated an intermediate phase into Peng’s two-stage model and 
proposed the evolution of network strength and network content in Asian countries. 
They argued that in the early institutional period, strong ties serve as a substitute for 
formal institutions by providing particularistic-based trust and lowering the risk of 
opportunism and cost. In the intermediate phase, the government’s resource control 
and intervention are decreased and the uncertainty of regulatory policies is reduced. 
Meanwhile, incentives for firms and entrepreneurs to explore new and diverse ties that 
could provide various resources and opportunities increases (Madhavan et al., 1998; 
Rowley et al., 2000). The institutional force and strategic intentions would jointly lead 
to a shift from strong-tie-based networks to weak-tie-based networks.  
Network type. Scholars emphasizing the network adaptation thesis also suggest 
that different types of networks co-evolve with institutional changes. The existing 
literature has mainly examined three types of networks?social-cultural networks, 
political networks, and market networks or business networks (Ma & Cheng, 2010)??I 
review them respectively in the following text.   
The social-cultural network, also known as an in-group network, refers to ties 
with family members, relatives, and people with the same cultural background (Fei, 
[1949] 1992). Under the conditions of high environmental uncertainty and an 
underdeveloped market, social-cultural networks play a significant role by mobilizing 
financial resources and providing property protection and labor power (Li, 1996; Peng, 
2004). Peng (2004) argued that during the early stages of market reforms, when 
formal property rights laws were ineffective and market institutions were 
underdeveloped, kinship networks played an important role in protecting the property 
rights of private entrepreneurs and reducing transaction costs. He expected that, with 
the establishment of effective property rights and market institutions, the effects of 
kinship networks will decline somewhat. Peng and Quan (2009: 15) also suggested 
that cohesive networks are likely to decline, because they do not provide novel 
opportunities and resources. Instead, they generate normative and conformity pressures 
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for cohesion and weaken the ability to adapt to a new institutional environment.   
A political network refers to ties with government officials, state-owned 
enterprise leaders, and government entities (Sheng, Zhou, & Li, 2011). A political 
network offers protection against institutional uncertainty, provides a substitute for the 
weak legal system and law enforcement (Child, 1994; Peng & Heath, 1996), 
facilitates access to scarce resources (bank loans, subsidies, land, and timely 
information) (Sheng et al., 2011), and secures political legitimacy (Ahlstrom & 
Bruton, 2001; Peng, Tan, & Tong, 2004; Tsang, 1996).  
Scholars identify the establishment of political networks as a unique strategy in 
transitional economies where institutional uncertainty is high (Li & Atuahene-Gima, 
2002; Welter & Smallbone, 2011). They believe that when the level of institutional 
uncertainty and dysfunctional competition are low, the significance of political 
networks will decline. Nee (1989) has argued that increasing market competition 
leads to a substitution of vertically structured political networks to horizontal 
networks with other firms. Li and Atuahene-Gima (2001) found that political 
networks did not play a role in a new technology venture’s product innovation, and 
they indicated that this may be due to the transaction costs associated with 
establishing these ties. Recent studies also suggested that using political ties may not 
improve the performance or “could even become a liability in certain institutional and 
market conditions” (Sheng et al., 2011: 11) and impede the motivation to compete and 
adapt (Li, Zhou, & Shao, 2009). Peng and Zhou (2005) proposed that enhancing 
regulative institutions also have a positive effect in transforming government 
networks from strong-tie-based into weak-tie networks. 
A market network refers to corporate ties with business entities, such as buyers, 
suppliers, customers, and other market collaborators and organizations (Luo, 2007; 
Sheng et al., 2011). Plenty of studies have demonstrated that in transitional economies, 
unfavorable institutional conditions and the underdevelopment of market factors 
reinforce the importance of market networks (Keister, 2001; Peng, 2003; Peng & 
Heath, 1996). Firms and entrepreneurs cultivate business ties to alleviate institutional 
constraints, obtain critical resources and opportunities, and secure legitimacy 
(Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2001; Luo, 2003; Park & Luo, 2001).  
As it is often closely related to a firm’s performance, the evolution of market 
networks has attracted increasing attention from both Western and Chinese scholars 
(Luo & Chen, 1997; Park & Luo, 2001). The extant literature suggests that there are 
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different scenarios concerning the evolution of market networks. First, as some 
scholars pointed out, the role of informal business ties will diminish during the 
transition (Guthrie, 1998; Peng, 2003). Li and Atuahene-Gima (2001) found that 
government institutional support enhances the effectiveness of new technology 
ventures’ product innovation strategies while business alliances appear to impede the 
positive effect of product innovation on a firm’s performance. Second, given the fact 
that empirical studies repeatedly confirmed the persistent role of business networks in 
transitional economies and even in developed economies (Gulati, 1995; Rowley et al., 
2000), scholars began to direct their attention to the transformation of business ties. 
Some scholars identified that business networks play more important roles than 
political networks in improving performance (Sheng et al., 2011), leading to a shift 
from political networks to business networks (Tan, Yang, & Veliyath, 2009).  
Third, firms may be more interested in establishing ties with a more diverse set of 
organizations to explore new opportunities. As the market develops and transactions 
involve more market entities, managers are able to build networks with disconnected 
organizations. Brokers also like to bridge disconnected people and obtain a benefit for 
this service (Lin, Peng, Yang, & Sun, 2009). These could transform strong-tie-based 
networks into weak-tie-based networks (Peng & Zhou, 2005), shifting from cohesive 
networks to a network rich in structural holes (Peng & Quan, 2009).      
Taken together, the previous literature mainly focused on regulative institutional 
conditions (their absence or improvement) and provided insights into the incentives 
and functions for establishing or adapting networks during the institutional change 
phase. Most of these arguments, however, arise from a theoretical framework instead 
of  empirical testing. It still remains unclear what the actual network evolution 
process is during the period of institutional change (Ma & Cheng, 2010). Questions 
still remain as to what extent, in what areas, and to whom networks still matter or 
evolve. The following section reviews competing theoretical arguments and empirical 
findings in this regard.  
Founding institutions and inertia 
Institutional theorists typically view institutions as relatively stable and difficult 
to modify (Brint & Karabel, 1991; DiMaggio, 1988). The institutionalization process 
and competing institutional logics lead to the resistance of institutional change 
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(Boeker, 1989a; DiMaggio, 1991; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007; Scott, 2008: 128). 
According to Johnson (2007), the founding institutional arrangement, especially 
informal institutions (e.g., beliefs, norms, and values) “appear… not only in the form of 
resources that can be strategically mobilized but also in the form of schemas and 
discourses” that have a long-lasting effect on subsequent trajectories.   
Previous studies with a particular focus on the founding environment mainly 
concentrated on the imprinting effect of the task environment (e.g., resources, 
technology, the market) and the industrial specific environment (Beckman, 
Haunschild, & Phillips, 2004; Madhavan et al., 1998; Marquis, 2003; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). In those contexts, both formal (e.g., laws and regulations) and 
informal institutions (e.g., cultures and norms) are taken for granted and less 
examined (Peng et al., 2009). Therefore, the effect of founding institutions on firms’ 
strategy choices during the institutional change phase has received little research 
attention (Marquis & Huang, 2010; Peng, 2003). There are, however, some notable 
exceptions contributed by two individual studies showing that when there is a shift 
from a socialist environment to a market-oriented environment in transitional 
economies, a firm’s socialist imprinting impedes its subsequent development and 
adaptation.  
Kogut and Zander (2000) traced the technological contributions of two Carl Zeiss 
companies in the GDR (German Democratic Republic) and the FDG (Federal  
Republic  of Germany). By comparison, they demonstrated that the founding 
institutional environment was important in impeding the development of technological 
capabilities of the East German firms during the transition: Firms exploited 
technological opportunities under the socialist context; during the transition to market 
capitalism, the technologically viable firms failed as their deficiency in technological 
innovation created pressures on innovation “by plan.” Kriauciunas and Kale (2006) 
revealed that the imprinting effect of the previously socialist institutional and market 
environment negatively impacted the capabilities of Lithuanian firms to adapt their 
operating knowledge. Socialist values, norms, thought styles, and practices were 
anchored into their regular thought and practices; therefore, these firms continue to 
behavior in ways that reflect the enduring influence of socialist institutions.  
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Founding institutions and network inertia 
The current literature about network inertia and the knowledge gap, which exists 
in founding institutions, still lacks a consolidated framework that could examine the 
underlying processes and mechanisms. Studies have indicated that a possible network 
inertia exists during the institutional change period. Although Peng and Zhou 
provided this “ner-grained framework that emphasizes a possible intermediate 
weak-tie phase” and proposed the evolution of network strength and network content 
in Asian countries, their propositions haven’t received strong support from empirical 
testing probably because they recognized that this strategic shift may exhibit an 
enormous time lag (Carney, 2004; Peng & Zhou, 2005).  
The institutionalization of relationship norms in the early period impedes the 
transforming to weak ties (Beverland, 2005). Schmelzer (2005) studied the influence 
of institutional changes (before and after 1989) on the tie strength of social networks 
in East Germany. The result suggested that ties arising on the basis of a scarcity of 
goods before 1989 led to social relations governed by the norms of reciprocity. 
Therefore, in the course of the market transition, strong ties and weak ties are not 
interchangeable, and old relational ties were not adjusted to new market rules.  
Ledeneva (1998) and Rose (1999) studied the networks in Russian and Central 
and Eastern European countries. They suggested that dense networks established to 
cope with difficulties during the socialist period have continued as means for coping 
with the present. The interpersonal trust networks established among close kin or 
ethnic group members during the socialist period might serve to reduce trust in 
outsiders because transactions rarely occur across group boundaries. Therefore, it 
might be difficult to break out of the closed trust network to generate a more open 
network that requires trust in strangers (Rose-Ackerman, 2001a: 436). 
 
2.4  Critiques and Theoretical Orientation 
The preceding sections introduced the existing research on environmental effects 
and network evolution. This section offers a critical review of the existing literature, 
outlines three research gaps, and establishes the theoretical orientation of this study.   
25 
 
The missing combination of institutional pillars 
Institutions are composed of various combinations of elements or pillars, and 
these pillars vary over time (Scott, 2005). However, different strands of scholars tend 
to privilege one or another pillar (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Scott, 2005). The 
missing combination of different institutional pillars in one research setting has led to 
contradictory arguments in the previously described literature. For example, scholars 
focusing on the regulative pillar tend to advocate network change. The regulative 
pillar arises from governmental legislation and industrial agreements and standards 
(Scott, 2008: 422). When this formal institutional support is weak, strong 
interpersonal networks are used as a substitute in transitional economies like China 
(Xin & Pearce, 1996). Scholars argue that the establishment of more supportive 
regulative institutions would cause firms and entrepreneurs to transform from a 
network-based strategy to a market-based strategy (Danis et al., 2010; Guthrie, 1998; 
Peng, 2003), from strong-tie based networks to weak-tie-based networks; and promote 
their interests in diversifying networks, bridging structural holes, and developing 
strategic alliances (Hitt, Ahlstrom, Dacin, Levitas, & Svobodina, 2004; Park & Luo, 
2001; Peng & Quan, 2009; Peng & Zhou, 2005). Their framework suggests that 
enhancing regulative institutions and the continuing globalization would erode old 
normative and cognitive institutions and facilitate new ones (Guthrie, 1998; Peng, 
2003). However, they haven’t scrutinized all of the pressures and the continuous 
influence engendered by old normative and cognitive pillars.  
Scholars favoring normative and cognitive pillars tend to emphasize constraints 
that impede change. The normative pillar introduces prescriptive and obligatory 
dimensions that comprise values and norms defining what is considered proper (Scott, 
2008). The dissolution of old ties and the formation of new ties are assumed to be 
difficult and costly, because they are infused with mutual expectations and anticipated 
obligations from existing partners, especially in a society like China where there are 
strong guanxi obligations (Chen & Chen, 2004; Luo, 2007). The cognitive pillar
includes the taken-for-granted beliefs and values that are based on subjectively 
constructed and internalized rules and meanings (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Scott, 
2008). The prior social-historical context exerts an enduring influence on current 
styles of thought concerning networks (Hofstede, 2001; Inglehart & Baker, 2000; 
Johnson, 2007). Community culture is also crucial in legitimating network behaviors 
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where imprinting occurs (Marquis, 2003). These scholars stress that changes are path 
dependent and that the cultural heritage leaves an imprint effect that endures 
transitions.  
In short, the literature identifies how different institutional pillars influence the 
construction and evolution of networks. However, the literature suffers from three 
major limitations. First, scholars tend to privilege one or another pillar and no 
empirical study has explicitly explored the effect of the specific combination and 
interactions among pillars. Second, institutional pillars are reshaped and contested in 
times of institutional change (Scott, 2008: 58). Yet, to date, the literature has not 
closely examined how the three pillars are changing in nature during the institutional 
change phase and how the specific combination of pillars at different periods shapes 
networks. Third, previous studies mainly examined or proposed the evolution of 
network structure. They have not closely examined the actual networking action and 
its evolution during the period of institutional change.  
Because of the failure of the contemporary literature to give equal consideration 
to the three pillars and to examine the responses in one research setting, the following 
question arises: How do entrepreneurs interpret and respond to institutional change 
when both formal and informal institutions are considered? The competing 
perspectives in the literature alert us to the fact that different institutional pillars do 
co-exist in a given period; equally important is that, in rapidly changing conditions, 
the nature and contribution of the three pillars may also vary (Scott, 2008). What are 
the specific combinations of institutional pillars at different periods? How do they 
affect firms and their founders? These questions urge us to further identify research 
gaps in the literature and to outline the theoretical orientation in two more aspects: (1) 
What is the actual process of networking? How do the styles of networking evolve 
during the institutional change phase? (2) Do entrepreneurs respond to institutional 
changes in similar ways, or do entrepreneurial cohorts with different institutional 
origins respond in different patterns?  
Institutional change and the evolution of networking actions 
The existing literature provides some insight into the effects of institutional 
environments on network configurations, however, most of the studies devote less 
attention to the actual process and networking actions. While those studies emphasize 
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the necessity and benefits of establishing personal connections and stress the strategic 
adaptation of network configurations during the transition, we must ask the following 
question: How do firms and entrepreneurs establish connections and develop trust 
relationships? 
This inquiry is crucial to our understanding of institutional effects on networks. 
Here, a critical gap needs to be filled in linking environmental effects and network 
configurations. As the network configuration only captures a snapshot of network 
characteristics, we need to know not only its institutional antecedents but also the 
actions and strategies that lead to the focal network configurations. If the adaptation 
or inertia of network configurations occurs, this should be first reflected in networking 
actions. Thus, it is crucial to know how ties are initiated, established, and governed. 
The current literature identifies tie formation and trust development as two 
critical dimensions of networking actions (Child & Möllering, 2003; Elfring & 
Hulsink, 2007; Möllering & Stache, 2010; Podolny & Page, 1998; Smith & Lohrke, 
2008; Vissa, 2010). In transitional economies, confronted with higher uncertainty and 
volatility, firms rely on strong commitments and personal trust with pre-existing ties 
and particular ties to access critical resources and opportunities (Hoskisson et al., 
2000; Radaev, 2002; Stark, 1996). For example, Guseva and Rona-Tas (2001) found 
that banks rely on personal trust and that they tend to use and extend their existing 
social ties by issuing credit cards to family members and friends of top bank 
executives.  
Scholars hold different opinions about how institutional change can transform tie 
formation propensity and a trust developing orientation. Child and Möllering (2003) 
found that when the institutional foundations for trust remain underdeveloped in 
China, managers of foreign investment firms actively develop and foster trust among 
their Chinese partners and staff, such as establishing a personal rapport with Chinese 
staff, locally recruiting managers, and transferring their own business practices to 
local operations. These strategies are already different from the strategies that simply 
emphasize developing guanxi with Chinese partners, because even Chinese regulative 
institutional environments still remain weak and the ways that trust is developed is 
likely to be different from 30 years ago. For example, Hitt et al. (2004) found that 
with the development of more stable and supportive institutional environments, 
Chinese firms emphasize their international partners’ technological and managerial 
capabilities more, suggesting that competence is more important in developing a trust 
28 
 
relationship. Tan et al. (2009) found that the new Chinese institutional environment 
leads to the establishment of a trust system and reshapes business behaviors, while 
particularistic trust (guanxi) has become less important.  
Other scholars drew attention to the inertia tendency in tie formation and trust 
development during the insitutional change period. Powell and Smith-Doerr (1994: 
392), for example, noted that “ties that bind may also turn into ties that blind.” 
Rose-Ackerman questioned whether reciprocal trust established in the early period 
could be transformed to “trust in rules” in Russia and Central and Eastern European 
countries. She noted that because of lacking confidence in formal institutions, buyers 
and suppliers are locked into the existing mutually reinforcing relationships and are 
reluctant to trade with outsides (Rose-Ackerman, 2001a, b). After reviewing studies 
on trust formation in Russia, Cook, Rice, and Gerbasi (2004: 207-208) pointed out 
that moving from closed networking to open networking is “complex and may rely on 
the kinds of institutions that arise to manage defaulting.”  
Given these competing arguments, the following questions need futher 
investigation: How do entrepreneurs form ties and establish trust relationships during 
the time of institiutonal change? Do networking actions adopted during the earlier 
period impact current networking? How do older cohorts and younger cohorts with 
different institutional origins differ in their networking activities?  
Divergent adaptational patterns: cohorts and their origins  
Cohort and cohort effect. Entrepreneurs and their firms are not equally endowed 
with resources and networks during their entry into different institutional periods 
(Baum & Oliver, 1992; Peng, 2003). It is very important to ask: Who is affected 
during the institutional change phase and how do they respond? Do entrepreneurs and 
organizations with different institutional backgrounds respond to the environment in a 
different way?  
Although not directly pointing to entrepreneurial studies, life course theorists 
provide insights into human’s different response patterns during social change. In the 
1920s, Karl Mannheim (1970) noted that a generation (birth cohort) is embedded in 
similar structures of the economy and the determining influence of this early 
impression remains predominant throughout one’s life course. Ryder (1965:845) 
defined a cohort as “the aggregate of individuals who experienced the same event 
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within the same time interval.” Alwin and McCammo (2003) also shared this 
definition and presented examples of cohorts such as the “college entering cohort” 
and the “marriage cohort.” Cohort membership, therefore, has been used to “index the 
unique historical period in which a group’s common experiences are embedded” 
(Alwin & McCammon, 2003:26); and “each cohort has a distinctive composition and 
character reflecting the circumstances of its unique origination and history” (Ryder, 
1965: 845). With this concept, life course theorists examined how historical changes 
impact different cohorts and suggested that the succession of the cohorts makes social 
change and innovation possible (Ryder, 1965). 
Borrowing the ideas from life course theorists and historical demographers, 
organizational scholars incorporated history in analyzing social change and 
organizational transformation (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006: 179; Isaac & Griffin, 1989). 
Romanelli and Tushman (1986) proposed that in order to examine the relative effects 
of history, environmental change, and strategic choice, scholars need an 
organizational cohort approach? a systematic, comparative, and longitudinal 
analysis?to specify the characteristics of the organizations at different founding 
periods and investigate how the differences in environmental origins might lead to 
systematic differences in adaptational patterns. In organization studies, scholars define 
a cohort as a group of organizations or individuals who experience organizational 
entry and field entry within the same time frame (Joshi, Dencker, Franz, & 
Martocchio, 2010; Romanelli & Tushman, 1986). Romanelli and Tushman (1986) 
proposed to study organizational cohorts, because they believe that “adaptational 
patterns vary systematically in accord with differences in contextual origins.” For 
organizational scholars, the concept of a cohort manifests the initial link between a 
population and its founding environment (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006; Carroll & Hannan, 
1989; Romanelli & Tushman, 1986). 
Life course theorists use the period effect concept to show the relatively uniform 
impact of social change across different cohorts and they use cohort effect to manifest 
different response patterns among cohorts during social change (Alwin & 
McCammon, 2003; Bengtson, Cutler, Mangen, & Marshall, 1985; Elder, 1977; Elder 
& Johnson, 2002; Glenn, 2003; Ryder, 1965). In an organizational context, the period 
effect “affects all organizations within a population regardless of their ages,” while the 
cohort effect “occurs when events within a period differentially affect organizations 
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within successive founding cohorts” (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006: 174).   
From the organizational ecology perspective, the initial environment influences 
organizational birth rates and organizations of the same cohort share a similar 
environment and destiny. Organizational life changes increase as organizational 
density (the number of organizations of a particular type) increases, however, at 
certain high-density levels, the survival rates decline because of the increasing 
competition (Carroll & Hannan, 1989). Empirical studies have also shown that 
adaptational patterns vary systematically according to a cohort’s origins, suggesting 
that environmental changes have a cohort effect on organizations. For example, 
changes in governance structures and political regimes weaken the relations between 
an old organizational cohort and political elites; when a younger cohort enters into 
this environment, they enjoy more benefits (Stinchcombe, 1965). Legal regulative 
changes have different effects on younger and older organizations (Marx, 1976). 
During wartime, the shortage of essential resources undermines younger organizations 
but has little effect on older ones (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006). When a technology 
breakthrough increases environmental uncertainty and munificence, a new cohort of 
firms breaks with tradition and initiates the competence-destroying innovation; 
whereas incumbent firms still heavily rely on traditional sources to enhance their 
existing competence (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). 
Zajac, Kraatz, and Bresser (2000) also showed that incumbents who are more deeply 
rooted in previous conditions are less likely to initiate strategic transformations during 
phases of environmental change.  
Institutional changes and divergent adaptational patterns. Transitional 
economies associated with a punctuated phase transition provide excellent 
opportunities to study cohort effects. However, only a handful of studies have been 
conducted to investigate cohort effects in individual life chances (Zhou, 2004; Zhou & 
Moen, 2001), consumer values and choice behaviors (Hung, Fang Gu, & Chi Kin, 
2007), and managerial and entrepreneurial orientations (Egri & Ralston, 2004; Tan & 
Tan, 2005; Zajac et al., 2000). Ralston et al. (1999) found that a new generation of 
Chinese managers are converging on Eastern and Western values. Egri and Ralston 
(2004) also found that in China’s state-owned sector, the recent generation of 
managers demonstrate more individualistic and entrepreneurial orientations, and they 
are more likely to act independently.  
Tan’s studies evidenced that entrepreneurs of different cohorts demonstrate 
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different adaptational patterns during China’s political, economic, and cultural 
transition. He (Tan, 2001) showed that changes in the Chinese regulatory environment 
have a different impact on managers from large state-owned enterprises and 
entrepreneurs from small privately-owned enterprises: The former ones are less 
innovative and less willing to make risk decisions than the latter ones. Later, he (Tan, 
2005) compared strategic adaptations of newly founded state-owned enterprises 
(founded after 1990) with those of incumbent state-owned enterprises (founded before 
1990). He found that managers from new state-owned enterprises have inherited 
neither advantages nor liabilities from the past, thus, they are more proactive and 
innovative and assume more risks than old state-owned enterprise counterparts when 
faced with a changing institutional environment. Although other scholars did not 
explicitly compare the adaptational patterns between old and younger cohorts, they 
argue that new institutional environments facilitate the emergence of new 
organizational forms and provide new ventures with unique resources and 
opportunities (Keister, 2009; Luo, 2002; Pang, Shen, & Li, 2011).   
Although scholars have examined cohort differences in general entrepreneurial 
strategic orientations, they have rarely explored how entrepreneurial cohorts might 
differ in their network configurations and networking actions. In his theoretical 
framework, Peng (2003) proposed that in later institutional periods, the old 
entrepreneurial cohort needs to sustain its competitive positions; therefore, this group 
tends to focus on market-based capabilities instead of networks. In contrast, regardless 
of the institutional environment, the younger cohort still needs a certain level of 
networks and this cohort is likely to compete on both networks and capabilities; 
furthermore, its networks focus less on ties with government officials and more on 
managerial ties.  
Peng’s theoretical framework and propositions are influential but controversial 
(Carney, 2004; Djelic & Quack, 2003). It should be noted that Peng himself and other 
scholars have not explicitly tested his propositions. Danis and his colleagues (2010) 
offered an exception by comparing an old cohort with a younger cohort of small- and 
mid-sized enterprises during the Hungarian transition. They found that the younger 
cohort’s market-based strategy is more important and the managerial networking 
intensity is considerably lower than that of the old cohort. Their study implies a 
strategic inertia among the old cohort in adapting to institutional changes. Butler and 
Purchase (2008) offered another empirical study and affirmed cohort differences in 
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networking action during Russia’s institutional transition. With little exposure to the 
socialist system and as the formalized legal systems become stronger, a new 
generation of managers conduct their businesses and operate their networks in new 
ways: Trust and capabilities become important components and reputation becomes 
critical for developing trust relationships. The old managers from the communist 
generation, however, still focused on hierarchical relationships rather than developing 
a partnership with other companies. Their study also confirms the existence of 
network inertia among old cohorts in adapting to the changing institutional 
environment.  
Empirical studies that apply the cohort comparative approach can help us verify 
the competing perspectives on strategic evolution during the institutional change 
phase and answer the question of who is actually influenced during the time of 
institutional change and how do entrepreneurs with different institutional origins 
evolve their network configurations and networking behaviors. In the following 
section, I briefly review the transition phase in transitional economies and lay out the 
background for researching Chinese private entrepreneurship during the transition. 
 
2.5  Institutional Change and Private Entrepreneurship in China 
Phase transitions in transitional economies  
The large-scale, unprecedented changes in transitional economies provide 
opportunities to study how organizations respond and make strategic choices during 
the period of institutional change. North noted that institutional change is 
“overwhelmingly an incremental one” because it “consists of marginal adjustments to 
the complex of rules, norms and enforcement that constitute the institutional 
framework” (1990: 83). Other researchers state that although institutions evolve 
through relatively long periods of stability (quasi-equilibrium) during which 
incremental changes take place, institutional change is also likely to occur through a 
punctuated equilibrium (Gersick, 1991; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985)discontinuous 
transformations that demarcate distinct evolutionary stages (Peng, 2003; Tan, 2007: 
2).  
According to Peng, institutional transitions “seem to be crossroads whereby the 
33 
 
deep structure of old institutions gradually gives way to new ones, thus leading to 
initially ambiguous but increasingly identifiable points of inflection” (2003: 278). 
Scholars believe that by bracketing the institutional change into different stages, we 
can better examine how institutions and strategic choices co-evolve over time (Danis 
et al., 2010; Zaheer, Albert, & Zaheer, 1999). Peng (2003) first provided a two-phase 
model of institutional transitionan early phase and a later phase. Following this, he 
and his colleague (Peng & Zhou, 2005) developed “a more complex and more 
realistic model” by adding an intermediary phase. The phase transition model became 
the important theoretical foundation and time framework for studying the evolution of 
firms and entrepreneurship in transitional economies (Tan, 2007).   
Phase transitions and entrepreneurship 
Scholars have commonly emphasized the significant role of institutional change 
in shaping the development of entrepreneurship in transitional economies (Peng & 
Jiang, 2005; Smallbone & Welter, 2001; Smallbone & Welter, 2009). Smallbone and 
Welter (2009:64) roughly differentiated entrepreneurial behaviors by two periods?
the socialist period and the transition period. In their comprehensive review, Estrin et 
al. (2005) divided the transition process into three stages which gave rise to different 
types of entrepreneurship. In the first stage, the planned economy leads to the 
disruption of the previous resource allocation and opens up opportunities for Kirznian 
type of entrepreneurs (Kirzner, 1997): Entrepreneurs discover and pursue 
opportunities that are reflected within the adjustment of a relative price system during 
the transition. Resources and opportunities are channeled through networks 
(Smallbone & Welter, 2001). In the second stage, the macro economy has been 
stabilized and the price mechanism has been used to convey the supply and demand of 
information. These increase the incentives for Schumpeterian entrepreneurs 
(Schumpeter, 1934). These type of entrepreneurs exploit an opportunity outside of the 
economic sphere and bring it into the market (Alvarez, Barney, & Young, 2010: 26). 
They develop longer-term projects and unmask needs for new projects and 
technologies. In the third stage, Schumpeterian entrepreneurship becomes more 
feasible because market institutions are more developed and provide better 
mechanisms for resource coordination, information gathering, and contract 
enforcement. Estrin et al. stated that “changes in environment and opportunities over 
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time in the transition economies are likely to lead to differences in entrepreneurial 
endeavor, strategies and personal characteristics” (2005: 698). 
Although the phase transition model illustrates the nature of institutional change 
and its dynamic influence in entrepreneurship in transitional economies, few studies 
have provided a precise time for each stage and suggested which years mark the 
turning points. Moreover, the evolutionary model of entrepreneurship also confronts 
challenges with the inertia argument that the forms of entrepreneurship emerging in 
the early stages may be anchored and entrenched (Estrin et al., 2005). 
Phase transitions and private entrepreneurship in China 
A growing body of literature has devoted research attention to China’s 
institutional change and the development of entrepreneurship. Yang and Li (2008) 
reviewed the literature published over the course of 26 years from 1980 through 2005 
and then extended Peng’s two-stage model and proposed a three-stage model of 
China’s market transition and entrepreneurship development. They defined Phase I as 
“the beginning of market transition,” which is characterized by high institutional 
uncertainty, underdeveloped markets, and the dominance of network-based strategies. 
They defined Phase II as the “early stage of market transition”?a period when the 
relationship-based, personalized transaction structure transforms into a more 
rule-based and impersonalized transaction model. Phase III is defined as “the 
completion of market transition,” in this period, a rule-based and impersonalized 
transaction mode begins to dominate the market. 
Some scholars bracketed the Chinese institutional change into two or three 
phases and specified the periods. Tan divided the Chinese institutional transition 
process into two phases: 
[T]he first phase beginning in 1978 with the start of the reform and ending in 
1990 with economic sanctions and the Tiananmen Square incident, and the 
second phase covering the economic transition in the following twelve years 
leading up to China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
December of 2001 (Tan, 2007: 88).
 
Tan examined these “configurational transitions” (Meyer, Brooks, & Goes, 1990) 
and revealed that from the first phase to the second phase, entrepreneurs of 
state-owned enterprises responded with more entrepreneurial strategies aimed at the 
growth of their firms rather than at satisfying state planners. Bian and Zhang (2006)’s 
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review specifically focused on private entrepreneurship in China and their 
demarcation of institutional change roughly corresponds with Yang and Li’s (2008) 
time framework. Bian and Zhang pointed out that although the initial boom of the 
private sector occurred in the 1980s, private businesses were an anomaly and 
vulnerable to ideological attacks and economic constraints (Hershkovitz, 1985). Deng 
Xiaoping’s 1992 south China tour gave new life to the development of private 
entrepreneurship. Since then, the growth of the private sector has accelerated. In 2001, 
private entrepreneurs gained the right to join the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 
which marked the dividing line between the second and third stages of the market 
transition. In the same year, China entered the WTO, which accelerated the 
marketization process and its integration into the world economy.  
In short, despite the different stage models (two-stage or three-stage), and despite 
the different focuses (general Chinese entrepreneurship, state-owned enterprise 
entrepreneurship, or private enterprise entrepreneurship), scholars more or less have 
come to agree on the following points: (1) China’s phase transition provides the 
opportunity to examine the influence of each stage and how firms and entrepreneurs 
make strategic choices; and (2) state-owned enterprises and private enterprises share a 
similar time framework regarding Chinese institutional change.  
In terms of private entrepreneurship, the latter two stages are more important. By 
the 1980s, most socialist countries began to relax restrictions on private 
entrepreneurship. However, the government still “restricted entrepreneurs’ access to 
raw materials, enacted prohibitive taxes, and continued to control prices.” (Keister & 
Zhang, 2009: 392) Because of the ideological attacks and economic constraints in the 
1980s, private entrepreneurship expanded dramatically during the 1990s and early 
2000s (Peng, 1997; Peng & Jiang, 2005). The year of 1992 and 2001 mark the 
significant turning points for private enterprise. 
Comparing these phases facilitates a close examination of strategies and it also 
“enables the explicit examination of how actions of one period lead to changes in the 
context that will affect action in subsequent periods” (Langley, 1999: 703). This 
comparative strategy can help us understand how firms and entrepreneurs respond to a 
radically changing institutional environment, thus, putting the theoretical debate and 
competing arguments??between the influences of environmental change and the 
founding environment and between strategic change and strategic inertia) under a 
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closer and deeper empirical examination.   
The development of the private economy in Shanghai  
The central characteristic of China’s institutional change from a planned 
economy to a market-oriented economy is the development of the private economy 
led by an emerging class of entrepreneurs (Yueh, 2009). The development of 
Shanghai’s private economy also echoes China’s “phase transition” (Tan, 2007). 
Although there is no specific document detailing the institutional transition in 
Shanghai, the development of its private economy can be used to represent its 
transitional history.  
The development history of Shanghai’s private economy can be bracketed into 
three stages: stage one from 1978 to 1991, stage two from 1992 to 2001, and stage 
three from 2002 until now. Before 1978, the centrally planned economy dominated 
Shanghai, as the private economy only accounted for 1% of GDP. During the 1980s, 
the private economy entered into its early stage of development. Because of the 
ideological barrier and rudimentary market mechanisms, the scale of private business 
was very small. In 1989, there were only 1,071 registered private enterprises with a 
gross output of 50 million RMB (Shanghai private economy yearbook 2008). The big 
ideological breakthrough took place in 1992, when the party first endorsed the 
“socialist market economy” as China’s reform goal at the Fourteenth Communist 
Party Congress (Qian, 1999). The registered number of private enterprises increased 
from 2,288 in 1991 (with 33,128 employees) to 4,213 in 1992 at a growth rate of 
84.1%. In 1994, the number surged up 6.5 times, reaching 17, 214 (with 180,044 
employees) (Shanghai statistic yearbook 1994).  
At the Sixteenth Communist Party Congress in 2002, the Party modified its 
constitution not only to “encourage, support, and guide the development of the 
non-public sector of the economy” but also to “allow advanced individuals from other 
social strata” to join the Party (Jiang, 2002). After 2003, the Shanghai government 
endorsed preferential policies towards entrepreneurial activities at various levels and 
in related departments, including financing services, site support, tax concessions, and 
entrepreneurship training (Wu, 2010; Ye & Yan, 2007). The number of private 
enterprises increased from 224,662 in 2002 to 498,900 in 2007, and the private 
economy accounted for 17.5% of GDP at that point. Shanghai’s integration into the 
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global economy accelerated after 2002 when China obtained WTO membership. 
Some 300 global multinational corporations made investments in Shanghai and 30% 
of them were thinking about making Shanghai their regional headquarters (Huang, 
2008: 179). These multinational corporations also fostered the emergence of agents 
and developed partnerships with private enterprises (2008). 
This brief overview of the development of Shanghai’s private economy shows 
that it resonates well with China’s reform of its political and economic systems. 
Although the Shanghai model?substantially state-controlled and state-led?has been 
criticized by some scholars (Huang, 2008), the Shanghai government’s recent 
entrepreneurial endeavor to boost its marketization and globalization has also been 
recognized (Fulong, 2003). A recent study (Ye & Yan, 2007) applied the model from 
the Globe Entrepreneurship Monitor and analyzed Shanghai’s entrepreneurial 
environment. The result shows that the entrepreneurial environment in terms of 
infrastructure, entrepreneurial opportunity, market openness, financial support, and 
government programs are better than the world’s and China’s average. The 
government is actively designing preferential policies and measures to encourage the 
youth to undertake business ventures (Zhu, 2007). In short, it is worthy to note that 
the institutional change may have a selective effect on different start-up cohorts: The 
younger cohort enjoys more benefits than the old cohort when initially entering into 
the market. But, how initial exposure to the different institutional periods impact 
entrepreneurial strategy (e.g., networks) still remains as an open question.    
2.6  Summary 
The main purpose of this chapter was to review the theoretical and empirical 
literature related to the environmental effects on network evolution. It began by 
reviewing the debate on the environmental effects on strategic evolution, with a 
special focus on network evolution (network change and network inertia). Then it 
shifted to the institutional study of network evolution during the institutional change 
period in transitional economies. Which scenario of network evolution is more likely 
to happen, network change or network inertia? Asking this question may seem too 
simplistic since both scenarios are evidenced in empirical studies. The more intriguing 
puzzles are: Who is involved in these processes of strategic change and inertia? What 
are the underlying processes and mechanism? How do change and adaption become 
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possible in transitional economies? 
I then further critiqued the current literature for failing to answer these questions 
because of three critical limitations: There is a missing combination of institutional 
pillars at the specific period, there is less attention paid to the networking actions 
during the institutional change, and there is insufficient notice given to cohorts and 
divergent adaptational patterns. This review seeks to provide readers with a deep 
understanding of the limitations existing in the current literature and points out the 
theoretical orientation of this study to remedy these limitations and to build further 
knowledge. A short overview of phase transitions and entrepreneurship during the 
institutional change period helped to familiarize readers with the research background 
and the time framework that is adopted in this study.   
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CHAPTER 3. OBSERVING START-UP COHORTS’ NETWORKS 
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter comprises three parts. The first part presents the research site that 
was selected, the rationale for a mixed method design, and the selection of samples. It 
also briefly describes the characteristics of the respondents’ profile, with a comparison 
of two start-up cohorts’ industrial engagement. The second part details the data 
collection procedure, the coding procedure for the data analysis, and the methods 
utilized to enhance the reliability and validity. The third part offers the 
conceptualization and measurement of key constructs.  
     
3.2  Research Setting 
This study selected Shanghai as the research site. This has two rationales. First, 
as the “epitome” of China’s socio-economic transition (Huang, 2008: 174), Shanghai 
has been experiencing fundamental institutional changes, and start-up cohorts are also 
likely to be exposed to different founding conditions (Romanelli & Tushman, 1986). 
Second, competing institutional pillars are likely to coexist within Shanghai. On the 
one hand, the norms of guanxi, which are deep-rooted in traditional Chinese culture, 
still remain pervasive (Chen & Chen, 2004; Luo, 2007) in Chinese metropolitan cities 
like Shanghai and Beijing (Phan, Zhou, & Abrahamson, 2010; Watkins-Mathys & 
Foster, 2006; Wong & Slater, 2002). On the other hand, new norms, values, and 
beliefs are likely being diffused during the marketization and globalization process 
(Guthrie, 1998; Peng, 2003), which places more emphasis on competence, capability, 
and strategic partnering (Luo, 1997; White, 2001). The comparisons between start-up 
cohorts’ responses to these competing institutional elements can better reflect the 
effect of founding institutional environments? Therefore, Shanghai provides an ideal 
research site for examining the response patterns that are based on the cohorts’ 
exposure to these competing pressures, depending on their founding conditions.  
Although institutional change is an incremental process, it is likely demarcated 
by different phases (Peng, 2003; Tan, 2007). China started its reform process in 1978. 
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However, the period from 1978 to 1991 is not optimal for a start-up cohort 
comparison because of the hybrid ownership, which makes the identification of 
start-up behavior difficult to analyze (Nee, 1992). The years 1992 and 2001 mark the 
significant turning points. In 1992, Deng Xiaoping’s “southern China tour” reaffirmed 
policy support for the private economy and entrepreneurship, and entrepreneurial 
behavior increased dramatically thereafter. Yet, concrete regulative support is still 
very weak at this point, while new cognitive and normative pressures to engage in 
market-based strategies are moderate (Peng, 2003). The year 2002 also marks the 
beginning of another epoch for private entrepreneurs as the Communist Party of 
China (CPC) opened party membership to private entrepreneurs and China entered 
into the WTO (Li & Yang, 2006; Tan, 2007). From 2002, regulative institutions are 
assumed to be more favorable, and the new cognitive and normative pressures 
facilitated by the marketization and globalization are also likely more diffused 
(Carney, 2005; Peng, 2003). A review of the history of Shanghai’s institutional change 
and the development of private entrepreneurship also confirms such a division in the 
institutional transition phase (2003; 2008). 
 
3.3  Mixed Method Design 
Two sets of research questions (framed in the introduction chapter) guided this 
research; these questions can be reframed as follows: What are the characteristics of 
different start-up cohorts’ network configurations and networking actions? Why are 
there such differences? What are the underlying processes and mechanisms? In other 
words: How do start-up cohorts’ exposures to different founding institutional 
environments influence their network configurations and networking actions during 
the institutional change phase? In order to answer these questions, I employed a 
mixed method approach because combining qualitative and quantitative methods in 
this context results in a better understanding of the problem being investigated (Clark, 
Creswell, Green, & Shope, 2008; Coviello, 2005; O'Donnell & Cummins, 1999).   
Qualitative inquiry 
First, I treat the qualitative inquiry as my primary methodological focus, because 
it can help us better understand the evolution of network configurations and 
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networking actions over time. Scholars have reviewed network-based research in 
organization and entrepreneurship studies and critically pointed out that few 
process-oriented studies have been conducted to understand the actual process of 
network construction?especially the networking actions, such as tie formation, 
maintenance, and dissolution (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003a; Jack, 2010; Neergaard, 
2005; Parkhe, Wasserman, & Ralston, 2006). Hoang and Antoncic (2003a) pointed 
out that we need more integration between process- and outcome-oriented research to 
understand how network content, governance, and structures emerge and evolve over 
time. Therefore, in this study, I adopted an inductive approach to generate the rich, 
deep, and process-oriented data on network configurations and networking actions 
(Coviello, 2005; O'Donnell & Cummins, 1999). 
Second, a qualitative exploration can facilitate the emergence of new theoretical 
constructs and lay a solid foundation for the understanding of relationships among 
constructs such as networks, entrepreneurial processes, and enabling or constraining 
institutional factors (Jack, 2010; Kim et al., 2006; Peng, 2003). I took suggestions 
from Hoang and Antoncic (2003a) and employed a qualitative design to understand 
the impact of entrepreneurial processes on networks and to explore the environmental 
contingencies on network development. As confirmed by other studies, I believe that 
semi-structured interviews can provide rich information on the initial founding 
conditions and explore how different entrepreneurial processes (obtaining resources, 
spotting opportunities, and securing legitimacy) influence the actual networking 
actions and network configurations (Elfring & Hulsink, 2007; Jack et al., 2008; Jack 
et al., 2010).   
Third, with the benefits of generating new constructs and building theory, a 
qualitative historical analysis can advance the understanding of the relationship 
between institutional changes and network evolution (Nee, 2005; Washington, 2004). 
The strategic process is sensitive to environmental changes and sequences of events 
and actions (Gephart, 2004; Pettigrew, 1990). Therefore, I used a 
longitudinal-retrospective qualitative method to study the research questions through 
the eyes of respondents and used their perceptions and interpretations to understand 
institutional changes (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994: 2) and explore how their initial 
conditions and their perceptions of institutional changes influenced their network 
evolutions (Beckert, 2010; Doz, 1996; Kim et al., 2006).      
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In short, scholars believe that many substantive issues in entrepreneurship and 
network studies can only be asked and analyzed through qualitative methods (Gartner 
& Birley, 2002; Hoang & Antoncic, 2003a, b; Jack, 2010). This study attempts to 
develop theory about the way different start-up cohorts construct and evolve their 
network configurations and networking actions during the institutional change period; 
therefore, using cases that address “how” and “why” questions in an unexplored area 
can respond to competing theories and stimulate new theory that is accurate, 
interesting, and testable for future explorations (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). 
Quantitative inquiry 
The longitudinal-retrospective and qualitative approach examining the network 
configurations, networking actions, and their evolutions can be enhanced by 
quantitative techniques. The benefits of quantitative techniques include: providing 
quantified information about network content and counts of contacts; highlighting 
structural features of networks such as density, centrality, and tie strength 
(Johannisson, 2000); and illustrating correlations and facilitating their comparisons 
(Jack, 2010).  
Realizing these advantages, I embedded the quantitative method within the 
qualitative research inquiry. The embedded design, according to Creswell, is applied 
“when one type of data provides a supportive, secondary role in a study based 
primarily on the other type of data” (Clark et al., 2008: 374; Creswell, Plano Clark, 
Gutmann, & Hanson, 2003). In this study, I used the quantitative data to support and 
triangulate the qualitative data. In terms of the specific quantitative techniques, I 
adopted Burt’s (1992) name-generator procedure to collect detailed information on 
respondents’ ego-centered networks. I asked respondents to identify a maximum of 
five important persons in their business venture to ensure the accurate recall of their 
alters which might be mentioned during the semi-structured interview. This generated 
the network data?network type, tie strength, the function of ties, and repeated ties?
that were used to cross check, triangulate the qualitative data (Creswell, 2003: 195), 
and facilitate the accurate comparison of two cohorts’ network configurations.  
To sum up, the data collection of this study is mainly qualitative driven, 
accompanied by quantitative techniques. I integrated both methods to examine the 
network configurations and networking actions during the context of institutional 
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change, respond to competing theories and arguments, and stimulate new theoretical 
elements for future explorations.  
 
3.4  Sample  
After reviewing the Chinese institutional change phase and the development of 
private entrepreneurship, I sampled two start-up cohorts based on their entry into the 
founding institutional period. Cohort A (CA) consists of start-ups that began their 
ventures during the 1992-2001 period, the period of early stage of market transition 
(P1), whereas cohort B (CB) consists of start-ups that began their ventures during the 
2002-2009 period, the period of deepening of market transition (P2).  
The start-ups were selected across industries. This selection was based on three 
reasons. First, focusing on one industry may reduce potential variations. However, 
sampling respondents in only one industry who have remained viable over two 
decades is practically difficult. If there were such respondents, their industries might 
be limited to some traditional industries, such as manufacturing and clothing that 
younger start-ups are less likely to engage in, which may make the comparison less 
plausible.   
Second, this study reconciles researchers’ appeal for cross-industrial studies of 
network evolution during the environmental change (Elfring & Hulsink, 2007; 
Madhavan et al., 1998). From the perspective of organizational ecology (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1984), start-up cohorts and their industrial engagement are likely to 
co-evolve with the institutional change. It is a natural process that the old cohort 
engages in certain industries while the younger cohort engages in certain others. 
Third, to reduce the potential contribution of industrial variation to the networks 
and to enable more rigorous comparisons, I focused on the concrete entrepreneurial 
process?obtaining opportunities, accessing resources, and gaining legitimacy?that 
are universal for start-ups across industries (Elfring & Hulsink, 2007) and then 
examined how start-ups constructed their networks to manage these processes during 
the institutional change period. Using this strategy, I gained an understanding of the 
relationships among the thematic constructs and was able to reveal new theoretical 
insights.  
Previous studies considered the entrepreneur’s age and organizational stage as 
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potential variations for entrepreneurial behavior and network configuration (Au & 
Kwan, 2009: 10; Kessler & Frank, 2009). Therefore, I selected respondents from both 
cohorts who started their business between the ages of 20-35 years, based on the 
concern that age could be a factor influencing start-up behavior, which might affect 
the entrepreneurs’ networking behavior. The entrepreneurial or organizational life 
stage can also correlate with the network evolution (Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Kim et al., 
2006); therefore, this sample only includes those respondents whose firms have 
already experienced emergence and growth (at least early growth).  
 Following the above-mentioned criteria, I used personal contacts and 
organizational sources and attended business conferences to identify potential 
respondents. Ultimately, 33 respondents were identified and interviewed. Table 3.1 
provides basic information about the respondents from the two start-up cohorts. In this 
sample, CA consists of 16 respondents with one female respondent, while CB consists 
of 17 respondents with three female respondents. The mean age of the old cohort is 
42.2 years; for the younger cohort, the mean age is 33.2 years. The younger cohort 
started their business one year earlier than the old cohort (mean of start-up age for 
younger cohort is 29; for old cohort it is 30). The education level for both cohorts is 
high: for CA, 14 respondents have a college or above degree, the other two have a 
senior high school degree; for CB, all respondents have a college or above degree.  
All respondents are engaged in small- and mid-sized enterprises. The number of 
employees and the value of assets varies widely within both cohorts. A noticeable 
difference is that more younger cohort respondents (N=6) described their companies 
as an “asset-light company:” there is less desire for tangible assets such as factories 
and machinery, and more emphasis on human resources and the business model. This 
is also related to two of the cohort’s industrial engagements. The old cohort members 
are mainly engaged in manufacturing (N=6) and the service industry (N=6), while the 
rest are engaged in IT services and electronic production (N=4), as well as commerce 
and trading (N=2). For the younger cohort, the service industry is the major industrial 
engagement (N=9), followed by IT services and electronic production (N=5). Only 
three respondents are involved in manufacturing businesses. 
From the perspective of organization ecology (Hannan & Freeman, 1977), the 
differences in the cohorts’ industrial engagement reflects the evolution of industry and 
business organizations in Shanghai. Historically, Shanghai was an important industrial 
city in China. With the fast development of its service industry after 1998, Shanghai’s 
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industrial structure transformed from “2-3-1” to “3-2-1.” From 1990 to 2000, the 
service industry grew 13.8% a year. In 1997, the ratio of the service industry was 
73.5%; however, the private economy was mainly concentrated in trading, catering, 
transport, and warehousing industries because of the dominance of the public 
economy in communication, financial services, scientific research, and technology 
services, etc. In the beginning of the 21st century, private business began to widely tap 
into modern service industries?IT services, financing, advertisement, consulting, and 
so on (Shanghai private economy yearbook 2005). In short, the industrial involvement 
of the two start-up cohorts is congruent with the industrial development in Shanghai.  
  
3.5  Data Collection 
This study was carried out in Shanghai from May 2009 through October 2009. 
Before conducting the interviews, I talked to knowledgeable informants and asked 
them to view the research questions and design from different perspectives 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). The first knowledgeable informant works as a 
consultant in the Shanghai Science and Technology Consulting Center. He talked 
about the history of economic transformation and industrial development in Shanghai. 
He also used his personal experience and stories to explain the differences among 
entrepreneurial cohorts and their behaviors. The second expert works as a 
management professor and a practitioner in a Shanghai business school. He discussed 
his observations and advised my research design. Invited by the sociology department 
of a local university, I presented my research design to the sociology faculty and 
g r a d u a t e  s t u d e n t s .  A f t e r  r e c e i v i n g  t h e i r  
Table 3.1 
Basic Information of Respondents 
 
 CA Start-up year Gender 
Start-up 
age Age  Business Employees 
Assets 
(million RMB)
WJS 1992 Male 30 47 Safety manufacturing 370 100 
MM 1992 Male 33 50 Home utilities manufacturing 80 1-2 
WM 1993 Female 28 45 Logistics 10 1-2 
ZRQ 1994 Male 25 40 Electronic equipment production 
 and sale 
100 20-30 
WJY 1995 Male 25 39 Stone export (1995),  
venture capital (1999) 
20, 6 5, 500 (under 
management) 
CCL 1995 Male 28 42 Printing 100 20 
LZQ 1995 Male 34 42 Law firm 50 50 (revenue) 
HDS 1996 Male 34 47 Advertisement 10 3-4 
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DHC 1996 Male 26 39 IT, multimedia device 
 sales and service 
50 20 
FPX 1997 Male 35 47 Communication equipment design 30 7 
CFB 1997 Male 28 40 Electronic device installation 3 ??
CL 1997 Male 29 41 Electrical machinery production 300 50 
YJ 1999 Male 34 44 Calling center 180 120 
CB Start-up year Gender 
Start-up 
age Age Business Employees 
Assets 
(million RMB)
FC 1999 Male 35 45 Clothes production and trading 150 46 
XJF 1998 Male 22 31 Machine building 700 300-400 
XMH 2001 Male 28 35 Healthcare products sale 30 4-5 
ZQ 2002 Female 28 35 Real estate 450 2500 
NXD 2003 Male 25 32 Machine building 600 30-40 
WB 2003 Male 35 39 Financial outsourcing  400 150 
YBQ 2003 Male 26 32 Furniture production 40 Asset-light 
ZD 2003 Male 34 42 Metal casting  900 200-300 
YX 2004 Male 24 29 Technology, media,  
telecom 
200 25 
ZAM 2005 Male 28 32 Private equity 6 2600 (under 
management) 
HDT 2005 Female 35 37 Marriage consulting 4 Asset-light 
YZD 2007 Male 31 33 Private equity 300 200 (under 
management) 
YMP 2005 Male 22 26 Smart kids tutoring 60 Asset-light 
WY 2006 Female 26 30 Voice training 8 Asset-light 
JXJ 2007 Male 22 25 Education 4 0.2 
YYB 2006 Male 31 34 Catering management and 
consulting 
25 Asset-light 
QCH 2006 Male 29 35 Business management software 
design 
15 Asset-light 
XXT 2007 Male 35 37 Taxation consulting and training 30 2 
LXZ 2006 Male 31 34 Electronic communication design 17 0.5 
DHY 2008 Male 31 32 IT, MBA membership services 8 0.1 
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comments and suggestions, I revised and enhanced the designs for the data collection 
and the interview guidelines.    
The data collection was mainly an interview-driven approach. I conducted four 
pilot interviews in Shanghai and Jiangsu.1 This step helped me understand some 
practical aspects of establishing access, making contacts, and conducting interviews 
(Seidman, 2006: 39). Using these interviews, I obtained preliminary codes in Atlas.ti 
and I sought to understand the relationship among them. This step also helped me 
refine the interview guidelines and sensitize myself to the following interviews. These 
interviews were not included in the final analysis.  
I conducted all 33 face-to-face interviews. In most cases, the interview was 
conducted alone between me and the interviewee; in two cases, the primary researcher 
was accompanied by a researcher and a student assistant, respectively. The interviews 
typically lasted between 90 to 120 minutes (See Appendix for interview guidelines in 
Chinese and English). The interview agenda was as follows: 
Phase 1. A profile sheet was filled out which detailed the respondent’s birth date, 
gender, ownership type, industry and sector, firm size, education, membership, 
part-time job, and father’s job. 
Phase 2. The semi-structured interview began with open-ended questions to 
elicit information about respondents’ venture history and their perceptions of the 
social, political, and market environment. To address a potential retrospective bias and 
to yield more accurate information, I employed “courtroom questioning” and “event 
tracking” interview techniques (Eisenhardt, 1989; Huber & Power, 1985). For 
example, I asked respondents which problems they confronted during the venturing 
process, how they solved them, and to whom or to which organization they turned for 
help. All respondents referred to networks.  
Follow-up questions were raised to inquire about the characteristics of 
networking actions ? for example, how they form ties and develop trust 
relationships?and to identify the features of network configurations. When the 
information was vague, the respondents were asked to be more specific (e.g., “Please 
describe in more detail when you say ‘friends’ in business.”).  
The interview questions were adapted for the two cohorts. For CA, they were 
asked questions to help understand the relationships among institutions, 
                                                        
1 Jiangsu is an industrial province, which borders Shanghai to the south. Jiangsu ranked the second highest GDP 
per capita of all Chinese provinces in 2009. 
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entrepreneurial processes, network configurations, and networking in both 
institutional periods (P1 and P2). They were asked the additional questions to 
determine whether they changed their networks, and why or why not. For CB, the 
interview questions were focused on the current institutional period (P2).  
Phase 3. After the semi-structured interviews, quantitative data was collected by 
the name-generator method (Burt, 1992). Respondents (ego) were asked to list a 
maximum of five names (alters) who were helpful in their venture during the 
institutional change phase (for CA, P1 and P2; for CB only P2), and then they were 
asked for information on the communication frequency, closeness, alter background, 
and the type of help and its importance. This step facilitated re-collecting and 
cross-checking the network information mentioned during the semi-structured 
interviews.  
Interviews were recorded with the permission of interviewees. Two interviews 
were partly recorded due to technical problems, thus, I took notes during the 
conversations, closely paraphrasing the conversation and abbreviating words to keep 
up. I immediately wrote up the conversations and impressions after the interviews 
were finished. I also collected company flyers whenever possible as they convey 
information about a firm’s business model, market position, target customers, and 
networks. The 33 in-depth interviews resulted in approximately 550 pages of 
transcription. Interviews were transcribed with the help of eight Chinese student 
assistants. Excerpts of the interviews were translated from Chinese into English as 
closely as possible. 
 
3.6  Data Analysis 
Writing a research diary in the field  
Roberts (2007: 67) suggested that the research journal is an essential aid to 
reflect on past, present, and future experiences. Writing the research journal involves 
“choices, decisions, reflections, insights and observations within the research process” 
(Roberts, 2007: 68). During the fieldwork (including the pilot interviews), I wrote in 
the research diary after each interview was conducted. Referring to Burgess’ (1982) 
typology of field notes, I mainly wrote two types of field notes:  
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Substantive field notes. These include a description of the context in which the 
research was conducted: (1) the ways that connections with informants were 
established; (2) names, places, and events associated with these activities; (3) 
observations of the research site; and (4) the major content of the conversation beyond 
the interview questions.  
Methodological field notes. I kept records of my personal impressions of 
situations and my personal involvement. I took notes of emotional relationships and 
the communicative atmosphere. These notes include: (1) voices, attitudes, gestures, 
and reactions of informants; (2) my self-reflection on the conversation flow, 
understanding of the informants, and development of the interview skills. 
Given that these two types of field notes overlap and co-occur somewhere in the 
text, I didn’t write them separately, but rather in a combined text. These diaries helped 
me to reflect on my own “journey” through the research and they are very revealing in 
terms of the research process, informants’ reactions, and my feelings towards these 
aspects.       
Analysis procedures  
In this start-up comparative study, I adopted a systematic and constant 
comparative strategy (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) and analyzed the qualitative data with 
Atlas.ti?a qualitative data analysis program. Step one, three, and four refer to the 
coding procedure for the qualitative data analysis. I embedded the quantitative data 
analysis (ego-centered network analysis)? step two? in the analysis process 
(Creswell, 2003). I elaborate the four steps as follows. 
Step 1: Combining thematic coding and open coding to identify themes and 
categories. Thematic coding allows a better focus on the research questions. Thematic 
coding is an “analysis strategy by which qualitative data are segmented, categorized, 
summarized, and reconstructed in a way that captures the important concepts within 
the data set” (Ayres, 2008: 867). In this coding strategy, codes may come from an 
initial conceptual model, review of the literature, previous studies (Ayres, 2008), and 
reading of the transcripts or other documents such as field notes and printed 
documents (Gibbs, 2007: 45; Lewis & Ritchie, 2003). 
Since this study aims to provide new theoretical insights to the understanding of 
the relationship among institutional environments, entrepreneurial processes, 
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networks, and networking actions, I partly used the thematic coding strategy to 
maintain the research focus. I categorized respondents’ accounts of the environment 
(political, market, and socio-cultural) into perceptions of regulative, cognitive, and 
normative institutions (Scott, 2008). I categorized three entrepreneurial processes: 
obtaining opportunities, accessing resources, and gaining legitimacy (Elfring & 
Hulsink, 2007). These categories served as a “receptacle” for promising insights 
(Ayres, 2008: 867) into the relationships among these constructs.  
I also remained open to new theoretical concepts, elements, and meanings, and 
amended the list of codes during the analysis as new ideas, new relationships, and 
new ways of categorizing were detected in the text (Gibbs, 2007: 45). By applying 
this open coding strategy (Strauss & Corbin, 1998), I identified codes such as 
“network dependence,” “network opportunity,” “network inertia,” “network change,” 
and so forth.  
Thematic coding and open coding are not exclusive (Gibbs, 2007: 46). 
Synergizing these two approaches not only allows a better focus on the research 
questions but also remains open to new categories, meanings, and possible theoretical 
directions for the next stage of the analysis. Applying this strategy, I identified codes 
such as “network type,” “tie strength,” “tie formation,” “trusting types,” and so on.  
I moved back and forth between both sources of inspiration (the existing 
literature and my own data) during the analysis, conceptualizing categories, 
discovering properties and dimensions, and developing initial hierarchical structures. 
In this initial step, network differences between the two cohorts began to emerge.   
Step 2: Examining the ego-centered network data. I analyzed the ego-centered 
network data with SPSS and illustrated network configurations of the two cohorts 
with an ego-centered network visualization tool?Vennmaker. The quantitative 
analysis consisted of examining the two cohorts’ networks in the following aspects: 
network type, tie strength, and the function of weak ties. These analyses generally 
confirmed cohort differences. 
Step 3: Using axial coding to relate and contextualize the core categories.
Axial coding puts the exiting codes together in new ways by connecting subcategories 
and combining them into categories, by specifying the relationships among codes and 
delineating a core category around which the other codes revolve (Goulding, 2002: 78; 
Strauss & Corbin, 1998: 123). I re-assembled the qualitative data and related 
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categories and subcategories. In this step, I formed a picture of the network 
configurations and networking actions demonstrated by the two start-up cohorts, and I 
obtained richer and more precise explanations about these differences. To consolidate 
and systematically relate the categories, I constantly asked questions like: What? 
Where? When? How? Why? Digging deeply into these questions helped me to 
scrutinize the context, networks, and causal conditions and consequences (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998: 127).  
Step 4: Selective coding and building theory. Selective coding involves 
identifying the central categories as the vehicle for integrating the other major 
categories, thereby building and refining theoretical constructs (Benaquisto, 2008: 
805). In this step, research needs to show why the phenomena studied works, establish 
the process behind it, and explain why the theoretical constructs operate together. 
Richards (2005: 132) phrases it as “show the music not the dance.” 
 Upon this step, I discovered that founding institutions comprise a specific 
combination of three pillars?regulative, cognitive, and normative. Entry into the 
market at different institutional periods imprints on start-up cohorts’ an initial 
relationship with the founding conditions. It led to network inertia for CA and a 
distinctive network configuration for CB (compared to CA). In analyzing the 
evolution of network actions, I discovered that combinations of different tie formation 
propensities and trust development types led to different networking styles during the 
institutional change: CA demonstrates the style of network deepening. CB 
demonstrates the style of network broadening. Therefore, I organized the categories 
and relationships around the central explanatory concepts of “founding institutions,” 
“alignment effect,” “network configurations,” and “networking styles,” and further 
developed theoretical frameworks and propositions for future testing.  
I illustrate the core coding categories and relationships in Appendix A and 
Appendix B. A complete list of contextual codes can be found within Appendix G. 
Reliability and validity  
In order to enhance both the reliability and validity, I adopted different 
techniques. To enhance the reliability, I used the following three techniques: First, I 
documented the analysis process by writing memos and notes (Lewis & Ritchie, 
2003), which were later used to aid in data interpretation and theoretical formulation. 
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Second, I constantly used comparisons to check the consistency and accuracy of the 
coding (Gibbs, 2007: 96). For example, I compared the codes within each cohort to 
ensure that text coded the same way was actually similar; I compared the codes 
between the two cohorts to ensure that they are consistently comparable; I also 
re-coded three transcriptions and compared the codes with the previous ones to ensure 
their consistency. Third, I also looked for variations within the two cohorts to ensure 
“outliers” were not ignored or forced into certain categories but instead used as 
important sources of adding and enriching the theoretical claims (Lewis & Ritchie, 
2003: 275). These processes reduced the potential bias during the data analysis.    
To produce an accurate interpretation of the research phenomenon, I used the 
following techniques to enhance the validity: First, I used both qualitative and 
quantitative data to triangulate and confirm the findings of network differences 
between the two start-up cohorts. Second, I also compared complimentary data 
sources (company flyers), which also confirmed such differences. Using these 
techniques, I reviewed the data back and forth to check the internal logic and 
consistency until I achieved a close match between the data and the theory (Eisenhardt, 
1989).  
Conceptualization and measurement
The conceptualization and operationalization of key constructs might look quite 
complicated because, for example, the concept of a network can be defined and 
measured in many ways (Jarillo, 1988; Marsden, 1990; Park, 1996; Wasserman & 
Faust, 1994). However, several aspects are commonly regarded as important to 
investigating the  networks. In the following content, I first elaborate the 
conceptualization and the measurement of network configurations, followed by those 
of networking actions. These will correspond to two empirical chapters?chapter four 
and chapter five.  
Network configuration. As it was defined in the introduction chapter, this 
concept refers to the characteristics and patterns of networks. In this study, a network 
configuration includes three sub-categories that are analyzed in chapter four: network 
types, tie diversity, and tie strength.  
Network types. The use of certain network type(s) in a certain institutional 
context reflects the degree of institutional uncertainty and resource munificence 
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(Koka et al., 2006; Ma & Cheng, 2010). Based on the nature and exchange content, I 
identified three types of networks: (1) the social-cultural network, referring to 
connections with family members, relatives, friends, classmates, and the people who 
share a common social-cultural background; (2) the political network, which includes 
connections with government officials and organizations; and (3) the market network, 
describing connections with other market individuals and organizations. 
Diversity. This describes how diverse the market network is across different 
industries (Goerzen & Beamish, 2005). In the qualitative data, I coded ties 
concentrated within the same industry as “homogeneous” or as “diverse.”    
Tie strength. Referring to the measures of tie strength (Burt, 1992: 125; Marsden 
& Campbell, 1984), I coded “strong” when respondents mentioned frequent contact 
and close emotional attachment, and otherwise “weak.” In the quantitative data, 
frequency was rated on a scale of “several times a week,” “several times a month,” 
“several times a quarter,” “several times a year,” and “once a year or even less” (from 
1 to 5). Closeness was rated on a scale of “very close,” “close,” “so-so,” “not so close,” 
and “distant” (from 1 to 5). 
The following section elaborates the conceptualization and measurement of 
networking actions that are analyzed in chapter five. 
Networking action. This describes the activities that actors undertake to establish 
networks during the venturing process. In this context, I identified three types of 
networking actions: (1) team formation, the actions and processes of selecting 
founding team members and key management team members; (2) political networking, 
the actions of establishing and maintaining political networks; and (3) market 
networking, the actions of establishing and maintaining market network.  
Pre-existing ties. These are ties that existed before start-up members began their 
business, such as family members, relatives, classmates, and former colleagues.  
Old ties. This concept is applied to CB members. It infers the ties that are 
reported in P2 but that had already existed before P2. 
Trust development. Different forms are identified in the literature based on the 
content and nature (Luhmann & Davis, 1979; Zucker, 1986). Here, I followed the 
convention and categorized trust along two dimensions: (1) The first is general trust 
and particularistic trust. The former encompasses trust in non-specific others. In this 
study, respondents might trust a stranger, because the latter is acting in accordance 
with the dominant norms and standards which are safeguarded by institutions (Tan et 
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al., 2009). Particularistic trust is the trust between specific others. (2) The second is 
cognitive trust and affective trust. The former is based on individual beliefs about peer 
reliability and dependability and competence (McAllister, 1995). The second one is 
grounded in reciprocated genuine care and emotional bonds (Lewis & Weigert, 1985; 
McAllister, 1995).  
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CHAPTER 4. THE EVOLUTION OF NETWORK CONFIGURATIONS
 
4.1  Introduction  
How do entrepreneurs make strategic choices (i.e., evolve their network) during 
the institutional change phase? This primary research puzzle leads to a series of other 
puzzles that are outlined in the introduction chapter (pages 2-3). In order to answer 
these puzzles, I outlined two sets of questions that are testable for empirical inquiry 
(pages 6-7). This empirical chapter is devoted to answering the first set of research 
questions: What are the characteristics of different start-up cohorts’ network 
configurations? What are the major differences? Why are there such differences or 
similarities? What are the underlying processes and mechanisms?  
As defined in chapter one, a network configuration refers to the characteristics 
and patterns of networks (Samaddar et al., 2006). Appropriate network configurations 
and strategic adaptations are particularly valuable for private entrepreneurial success 
in transitional economies. However, as reviewed in chapter two, the literature 
provides contradictory theories and arguments about network evolution (network 
change and network inertia) during the period of institutional change. To date, no 
specific empirical attempt has been made to understand the actual configuration of 
private entrepreneurial networks and to examine how entrepreneurs with different 
institutional origins construct and evolve their networks during the institutional 
change phase. 
This chapter takes readers away from the theoretical debate for a while and 
brings them into the Chinese context. Section 4.2 describes the differences in network 
configurations between two start-up cohorts in three dimensions: network types, tie 
diversity, and tie strength. The ego-centered network analysis uses qualitative data and 
further confirms these differences. Section 4.3 unpacks the underlying processes and 
mechanisms and provides a picture to explain why two start-up cohorts with different 
institutional origins demonstrate different network configurations during the period of 
institutional change.  
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4.2  Network Differences between Two Start-Up Cohorts 
CA: Network configuration in P1 
The data in table 4.1 shows that obtaining resources and discovering opportunities 
were the two primary entrepreneurial processes during the early stage of market 
transition P1. The social-cultural network provided vital help at the initial business 
stage. Family and relatives provided financial, labor, and emotional support. 
Acquaintances and friends provided human capital, business information, and 
opportunities. However, those cohesive networks were limited to accessing critical 
resources and opportunities. To acquire physical and financial resources, and to make 
deals and find business opportunities, more than half of the respondents (N=9) 
cultivated political networks. The majority of CA respondents (N=12) established 
market networks; however, these connections were mainly (8 out of 12) established 
with buyers, suppliers, customers, and peers within the same sector and within the 
same industry in which homogeneous ties were embedded.  
How are reliable networks secured? The data reveals that respondents primarily 
established strong ties (see also table 4.2). Respondents were often involved in social 
interactions (e.g., dining together, sending gifts, or visiting families) and developed 
emotional closeness to “hold close” and “strengthen the relationships” with their 
political and market connections. During P1, the government still controlled critical 
resources and officials had the power to allocate resources, but with the risk of 
disclosure and disciplinary action. Cultivating strong ties and interpersonal trust with 
officials was a reliable option for start-ups. CFB described the ties as “a very close 
relationship, … we have the common language and business exchange.” To reduce 
market uncertainties and transaction costs, and to gain privileged resources and 
opportunities, respondents also formed strong ties and particularistic trust with their 
market connections. XJF explained how he established and consolidated relationships 
with his business friends: “It’s like a relationship with your brothers and friends; you 
need to reciprocate. Behavior and conduct?in guanxi?are very important. ” ZRQ 
pointed out, “I accumulated a deep friendship with them [my connections]. At least, 
they recognized me as a good friend.”  
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Table 4.2  
Cohort B: Network Configuration in the Contemporary Institutional Period 
 
P2: Core codes Evidencea Examplesa
Obtaining resources 
Political/ 
Market/ 
Social-cultural 
7/12/8 Our firm is a technology supplier. We cooperate with consulting firms. They offer 
some advices, such as marketing strategies. We also go directly to the potential 
customers and know their demands. So we can improve our technologies. (QCH)
Discovering 
opportunity 
Political/ 
Market/ 
Social-cultural  
2/13/2 To develop the project, one approach is through our own research, or through our 
own partners' network. Another approach is through the professional agencies. 
Local governments also actively introduce some projects. Or through the 
industrial symposia. There are many ways. (ZAM) 
Gaining legitimacy 
Political/ 
Market/ 
Social-cultural 
3/6/1 I think the business model and market is not mature. I want to improve the market 
acceptance. So I went to IT firms and high-tech firms because there are many 
singles....I also collected and integrated the resources: people and gatherings. For 
example, cooperating with Baihe. net and other firms and opening a salon in 
Jinmao Tower, letting people know the marriage consulting service. (HDT) 
Political network 6  
Strong/weak  2/4 It's very difficult to obtain the land in Shanghai. It took us two years to study the 
market situation and we didn't make any contact with government. We just did it 
through the market and we got the land via bidding. After that, we communicate 
with the local government. They were surprised....We didn't get close to the 
government. I think it is the proper work relationship with the government. (ZQ)
Market network  17  
Strong/weak  6/15b Just as the cooperation with Beihe.net. From the beginning, we don't have any 
contact. But I think we can work together. So I made a cold call to ask if they also 
had such an intention. Then I visited their firm and discussed the business project. 
(WY).  
Homogeneous/diverse 2/15 Start-ups must manage four things: technology, capital, talents, and the market. You 
can’t stay in your circle, you must jump out to find those things….Those things 
are out there, they are not scarce. You need to deal with different persons, being 
active and selective, you will find those resource and opportunities.(YX) 
Social-cultural 
network 
Strong
10 I co-started up with a former colleague, a classmate from MBA school. I think our 
team is very stable because of our firm friendship. (DHY)  
a This figure lists the number of interviews (out of 17) in which the interviewee indicated the coding themes. 
Examples are illustrated for the main pattern in each theme. 
b The sum of the ties exceeding the number of interviewees mentioned in the coding theme indicates the mix of 
“strong” and “weak” ties. 
 
CA: Network inertia in P2 
Discovering opportunities and obtaining resources were still the primary 
entrepreneurial processes in P2??the period of the deepening of market transition (see 
table 4.2). But, the importance of the social-cultural network decreased. However, nine of 
the respondents still reported the presence of political networks. Among them, some (N=6) 
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maintained their old political connections and some (N=6) established new connections.2 
The market network increased in importance (N=15). However, the majority (N=11) of 
CA’s market connections were still nested within homogenous networks. Respondents did 
not take proactive steps to search for and form new connections with a more diverse pool 
of market entities.    
Respondents still largely relied on their old market connections. Some respondents 
(N=4) realized that their businesses were stagnating, or even declining, but they still did 
not attempt to expand their networks. Respondents (N=11) also relied on old market 
connections to bridge potential businesses and connections. As FC noted: “My 
relationship with the supplier … after a long time, it’s just like we sing the same song, we 
have become good friends.… I trust him; if he introduces a new connection to me, I trust 
him?the third party?.”  
During P2, respondents commonly still established and maintained strong ties. For 
the great majority of respondents (8 out of 9), political ties were strong ties. CFB 
described how he consolidated his old political ties: “We were very close during that 
period, and we are even closer now. Because we have emotional exchanges, our guanxi is 
very good. Many things have been integrated and we remain in frequent contact.” HDS 
maintained his particularistic trust with his government “friends” because “after we 
develop such trust, there are many opportunities. So I love to maintain these 
relationships.” Some (N=3) respondents maintained their old political connections and 
engaged in symbolic interactions with them even though they were not beneficial.  
Maintaining old ties and engaging in less proactive expansion consolidates the 
strength of market ties. In total, the majority (10 out of 15) of the respondents’ market  
networks are identified as strong ties. Telling examples are their relational actions during 
tough times, such as financial constraints, market decline, and after the financial crisis of 
2008. Respondents expressed their willingness to endure hard times and to overcome 
difficulties with their market ties. FPX described the situation: “We still keep in touch 
with each other. We want to be partners and friends, but the process is not easy. We need 
to consider many things…. When he [the partner] is in trouble, I give him a hand; when I 
                                                        
2 Respondents overlap in certain themes and codes, such as “maintaining old ties” and “forming new ties,” “weak ties” 
and “strong ties.” In this case, three respondents maintained both their old political networks and also established new 
political networks.   
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am short of money, he tries his best to help me.” For most of them, the “difficult times” 
provide opportunities to test their cooperative and relational loyalties. Their market 
networks appear to withstand these tests due to the long-term accumulation of 
interpersonal trust during the institutional change phase.     
 
CB: Network configuration in P2  
In contrast to CA, CB’s networks demonstrate the following characteristics (see also 
table 4.2): First, among the CB respondents (N=10) who used their social-cultural 
networks during the venturing process, fewer (N=4) reported that they received financial 
support from family members, relatives, and friends. However, alumni networks played a 
more important role, respondents (N=6) co-founded with, or invited, their alumni to form 
a management team. Second, fewer (N=6) respondents reported that they established 
political networks. Among them, some (N=3) were actively networked with the 
government. Half (N=9) of the respondents reported that they did not need or attempt to 
establish political networks to access resources and obtain business opportunities. They 
explained that because market resources and opportunities were dynamic, they preferred 
to focus on strengthening their own capabilities and on developing their market networks. 
As NXD explained, “I don’t like to have too much contact with the government; we only 
need to grasp the general direction where our state is heading. For example, I know there 
is increasing investment in railway construction. I target the major suppliers and we begin 
by contacting them.”  
Third, the great majority (N=15) of CB members preferred establishing networks in 
an open environment and they explored diverse market ties. Respondents (N=6) 
cooperated with professional agencies, such as consulting firms, financial services, 
industrial associations, and the media, to obtain expertise, opportunities, and legitimacy. 
Respondents (N=5) also used their diverse connections to win acceptance for their 
business models. Some (N=3) respondents introduced interlocking directorates into their 
firms. Respondents also criticized traditional Chinese business practices for being overly 
dependent on guanxi networks, and they were interested in establishing some new 
practices. YYB began in a traditional industry, the catering service, but according to him, 
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participating in a well-known national television program is a better and more effective 
way to promote his business: “I don’t rely on interpersonal guanxi networks because they 
are limited. Today, more and more people get to know your business via web sites and the 
media. This is why I value the media; it plays an important role in networking. I think in 
this new era, one needs some breakthrough thinking [in networking].” 
The great majority of CB’s ties are weak ties (see table 4.2). CB members prefer 
establishing diverse networks that are flexible and more useful for acquiring resources 
and exploring opportunities than building strong interpersonal connections. For CB 
members, the latter approach is both time-consuming and limits their ability to achieve 
their goals. YBQ collected over 3,000 business cards across different industries. During 
important holidays, he asked his secretary to send greeting messages to each of them as a 
sign of keeping in contact.  
For younger start-ups, gaining legitimacy is a more important entrepreneurial 
process. Building inter-organizational networks with government and business entities is 
an effective way to achieve this goal. YX had run a peer to peer broadcasting firm 
without a license for three years. Although the business ran the risk of copyright 
infringement, he described himself as a “technological revolutionary.” He spoke about his 
cooperation with government organizations: “We also coordinate with government 
organizations, and actively participate in projects. For us, it is a good opportunity to 
promote our public image.… We can make bold changes and innovations, and we can 
make sure that we are revolutionaries and not martyrs.” HDT typified an example of 
pursuing legitimacy via market networks. In China, many young white-collar workers 
face the problem of finding the right marital partner but they feel shy about seeking 
marriage counseling services. She tried to establish connections with IT firms and 
State-owned Enterprises labor unions, and she organized social activities that led to 
“recognition and promotion” of her business. It is through weak and formal networks 
with other organizations, rather than via strong interpersonal networks, that younger 
start-ups achieve market acceptance and organizational legitimacy.  
Ego-centered network analysis  
Difference 1: network types. Figure 4.1 compares the use of network types between 
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the two cohorts. For CA, although social-cultural networks decreased in proportion from 
P1 to P2 (from 20% to 10.6%), the proportion of market networks and political networks 
remained relatively stable (from 53.3% to 61.7% for market networks, from 26.7% to 
27.7% for political networks). In contrast, for CB, the market network (71.4%) 
significantly outweighed the social-cultural network (20%) and the political network 
(10.6%). In addition, for CA, almost half of the ties in P2 (22 out of 47) were repeated 
ties (i.e., also reported as alters in P1), suggesting that CA largely maintained old ties.  
 
Figure 4.1 
Comparison of the Use of Network Types 
 
 
 
Difference 2: tie strength. I used three measures to compare tie strength: the mean 
of frequency (test of F), the mean of closeness (test of C) (Burt, 1992; Marsden & 
Campbell, 1984), and the mean of combining closeness and frequency (test of FC) 
(Reagans et al., 2004). Table 4.3 reports descriptive statistics of tie strength for CA at P1 
and P2. Table 4.4 reports the inferential statistics from the t-Test. For CA, a paired-sample 
t-Test using three measures consistently shows that the difference between P1 and P2 is 
not statistically significant (e.g., t(13)= -1.01, p=.33, test of FC), suggesting that the tie 
strength of CA has not shifted during the institutional change period.  
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Table 4.3 
Paired Samples Statistics: Mean of Tie Strength of  
Cohort A a
 Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Pair 1 F in P1 1.882 14 .610 .163 
F in P2 2.136 14 .569 .152 
Pair 2 C in P1 1.657 14 .388 .104 
C in P2 1.618 14 .465 .124 
Pair 3 FC in P1 1.770 14 .339 .091 
FC in P2 1.877 14 .400 .107 
a. F=Frequency, C=Closeness, FC=(Frequency+Closeness)/2. 
Table 4.4
Paired Samples Test of Tie Strength: Cohort A a
 
Paired Differences 
t df 
Sig. 
(2-tailed)Mean 
Std. 
Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper
Pair 1 F(P1)–F(P2) -.254 .582 .155 -.589 .082 -1.631 13 .127
Pair 2 C(P1)–C(P2) .039 .376 .100 -.178 .256 .391 13 .702
Pair 3 FC(P1)– FC(P2) -.107 .399 .107 -.338 .123 -1.005 13 .333
a. F=Frequency, C=Closeness, FC=(Frequency+Closeness)/2.                        
Table 4.5 reports the result from the comparison of tie strength between the two 
cohorts. Table 4.6 reports the result of the Independent Samples Test. As is shown, the tie 
strength of CB is weaker than that of CA in P2 (e.g., CB: M=2.15, SD=.50; CA: M=1.88, 
SD=.40, test of FC); however, the difference is not significant (see table 4.6 sig. value in 
the first three rows). The difference between CB at P2 and CA at P1 is significant by a 
test of FC and a test of F (e.g., CB(P2): M=2.15, SD=.50; CA(P1): M=1.77, SD=0.34; 
t(28)=-2.43, p=.02, test of FC). It confirms that, compared to CA, CB tends to establish 
weaker ties during the initial institutional period. 
Difference 3: function of weak ties. Adopting Gargiulo and Benassi’s (2000) 
grouping strategy, I categorized all ego-alter ties into strong ties and weak ties by the 
mean FC value.  
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Table 4.5
Comparison of Tie Strength: Cohort A and  
Cohort B a
 Cohort N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
F in P2 Cohort A 14 2.136 .569 .152 
Cohort B 16 2.369 .627 .157 
C in P2 Cohort A 14 1.618 .465 .124 
Cohort B 16 1.940 .486 .121 
FC P2 Cohort A 14 1.877 .400 .107 
Cohort B 16 2.154 .499 .125 
F in P1 for Cohort A, F in P2 
for Cohort B 
Cohort A 14 1.882 .610 .163 
Cohort B 16 2.369 .627 .157 
C in P1 for Cohort A, C in P2 
for Cohort B 
Cohort A 14 1.657 .388 .104 
Cohort B 16 1.940 .486 .121 
FC in P1 for Cohort A, FC in 
P2 for Cohort B 
Cohort A 14 1.770 .339 .091 
Cohort B 16 2.154 .499 .125 
a. F=Frequency, C=Closeness, FC=(Frequency+Closeness)/2. 
 
 
Table 4.6
Independent Samples Test of Tie Strength: Cohort A and  
Cohort B a
 
Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-tailed)
Mean 
Difference
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval  
of the Difference
Lower Upper
F in P2 1b .000 .984 -1.060 28 .298 -.233 .220 -.684 .218
2b   -1.067 27.952 .295 -.233 .218 -.681 .215
C in P2 1b .002 .966 -1.846 28 .076 -.322 .174 -.679 .035
2b   -1.851 27.747 .075 -.322 .174 -.678 .034
FC in P2 1b .281 .600 -1.663 28 .107 -.277 .167 -.619 .064
2b   -1.688 27.816 .103 -.277 .164 -.614 .059
F in P1 for CA,  
F in P2 for CB 
1b .054 .817 -2.147 28 .041 -.487 .227 -.951 -.022
2b   -2.152 27.664 .040 -.487 .226 -.950 -.023
C in P1 for CA,  
C in P2 for CB 
1b .538 .470 -1.742 28 .093 -.282 .162 -.615 .050
2b   -1.768 27.801 .088 -.282 .160 -.610 .045
FC in P1 for CA, 
FC in P2 for CB 
1b .914 .347 -2.432 28 .022 -.385 .158 -.708 -.061
2b   -2.494 26.498 .019 -.385 .154 -.701 -.068
a. F=Frequency, C=Closeness, FC=(Frequency+Closeness)/2. 
b. 1=Equal variances assumed, 2= Equal variances not assumed. 
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Weak (strong) ties are identified when each focal FC value is above (below) the 
mean FC (M=1.93). By comparing the importance of the alters’ help (either “very 
important” or “important”), I examined the function of the tie strength. Figure 4.2 reports 
the results from the comparison of the function of ties between CA and CB. The results 
show that at P2, in ties which provided “very important” help, 56.5% belong to weak ties 
for CB; compared to 46.4% and 37.5% for CA at P2 and P1 respectively, suggesting that 
weak ties tended to be more important for CB than for CA in their business venturing.3  
Figure 4.2 
Comparison of the Function of Ties 
 
 
 
The differences in network configurations between the two cohorts are further 
illustrated in figure 4.3 via an ego-centered network visualization tool-Vennmaker. The 
small circle in the center of each plot stands for ego?start-up respondents. The two 
upper plots represent the ego-centric network of all CA respondents’ ties with their alters. 
The lower plot represents the ego-centric network of all CA respondents’ ties with their 
alters. Each plot has three sections: blue stands for political networks, green for 
social-culture networks, and light red for market networks. The distance between ego and  
                                                        
3 The chi-square test is not available in multiple response analysis Decady, Y., & Thomas, D. 2000. A simple test of 
association for contingency tables with multiple column responses. Biometrics, 56: 893-896.  
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alter measures the strength of ties. The longer the distance, the weaker the tie. As we can 
see from the figure, compared to CA, CB reported fewer political ties, more market ties, 
and those ties appear to be weaker. CA still persisted with some of their old ties, CB also 
used social-cultural networks during the venturing process, however, those ties are mixed 
with strong and weak ones.    
Overall, these results generally confirmed the findings that emerged from the 
qualitative data: (1) Market networks play a more important role for CB than for CA, as 
CA members still largely maintain their old ties and political ties. (2) CB is more likely to 
establish weak ties than CA and these ties play more important roles than strong ties in 
business venturing, compared to CA. Two points need to be mentioned: (1) Marsden 
(1990) noted that ego-centered network data may be biased toward strong ties, in that the 
respondents are less likely to mention their weak ties. Xiao and Tsui (2007) pointed out 
that if such a bias exists, it would operate in a similar way across all the respondents, and 
thus, it is still plausible for comparisons. In addition, I tried to reduce the potential bias 
and to gain more accurate information by triangulating it with qualitative data. (2) 
Scholars generally use a name-generator to examine personal networks. I noticed that 
during the name-generator interviews, information on organizational networks emerged 
(especially from CB as respondents received much more help from organizations instead 
of from certain individuals). Coding this information into quantitative data is challenging 
since it is difficult to identify single individuals and to measure the closeness. Therefore, 
I included this information in the qualitative data analysis. This probably explains why 
the tie strength at P2 is not statistically significant between CB and CA. The qualitative 
and quantitative data validated each other and provided more accurate information on 
network configurations.       
4.3  Unpacking the Processes and the Alignment Effect 
My research goal is to examine how two start-up cohorts with different institutional 
origins construct their networks and unpack the processes and mechanisms that lead to 
such constructions. I reported that old cohorts tend to establish strong interpersonal 
market and political ties, and they demonstrate network inertia during the institutional 
change phase. In contrast, younger cohorts tend to establish weak and diverse market ties, 
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and have fewer and formal political ties. I now provide explanations by analyzing how 
the three institutional pillars are incorporated to produce forces for these distinctions. 
Table 4.7 and table 4.8 summarize the underlying processes and mechanisms.  
CA: the processes and mechanisms of network inertia 
Network bonding. Founding regulative institutions mainly shape the degree of 
dependence on networks and the availability and openness of network resources. The 
common problems that CA respondents confronted were as follows: “policies were 
unstable and fluctuating,” “discrimination against private enterprises,” “difficulties in 
obtaining bank loans,” “barriers to accessing materials and channels,” “difficult to enter 
the market without the help of acquaintances,” and so forth. The liability of newness was 
exacerbated when the start-ups were operating in an unfavorable institutional 
environment with underdeveloped market conditions. This condition leads to a strong 
dependence on networks and a limited choice of network partners because of the 
inadequate resources and insufficient mobility in the market. To overcome these 
challenges, respondents cultivated strong interpersonal trust networks with their political 
and market connections. HDS described how he established such networks with 
government officials: 
 
When I was working in a state-owned enterprise, I tried my best to get to know 
people in the government. It helped me to understand them. When I started my own 
business, they could give me some projects.   
Establishing new political ties was beneficial for resource acquisition; however, it 
was also very challenging. To reduce the uncertainties inherent in informal exchanges and 
to avoid the risks of unwanted exposure, respondents tried to cultivate particularistic trust. 
After describing the difficulties in obtaining a bank loan, MM explained how he 
established particularistic trust with an official so as to receive the loan:  
   
At that time, no college students were doing business.... I told him that my parents 
were government officials as well. So he was a little bit relieved. And then he 
checked my background and found out that I had joined the party when I was in 
college, and that I had been a student leader back then. This also increased his 
personal trust in me. After we became familiar with each other, the loan was 
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approved…. There was no requirement for a mortgage.    
    
   Table 4.7 
Cohort A: Institutional Pillars and Network Inertia 
Mechanisms Evidence Examples 
1. The weak regulative 
institutional support 
and the 
underdeveloped state 
of the market create 
start-ups' strong 
dependence on 
networks. 
12 In the early stage [before 2002], all electronic products were imported from 
abroad, mainly via gray channel like intermediaries.... If you didn't work in 
this way, you couldn't survive. In our IT circle, everybody knew it. You can 
say it was an open secret or an unspoken rule; you had no choice, but that was 
the situations (DHC). 
2. The weak regulative 
institutional support 
and the 
underdeveloped state 
of the market also limit 
network opportunities 
and bond the start-ups 
to certain ties.  
 
11 
 
 
 
 
 
He gave me the [government]projects because he trusted me. He would have 
worried if he gave them to anyone else...I manage my business within a 
controllable scope: it is relatively small and there are no problems. If I want 
to develop, there will be a problem (HDS). 
The bosses from those companies were very brave. Actually they all had some 
backgrounds and they could solve the problems [import limitation]. However, 
I could not because I had no background and no resources. So I had to obtain 
the goods from them (DHC). 
3. Experiencing the 
institutional 
incoherence anchors 
guanxi networks as a 
coping strategy during 
the institutional change 
period.  
9 [After 2002] The policies became much tighter: for example, customs, taxes and 
the administration etc. From the perspective of the state, they became more 
standardized; however, the business became more difficult....Many things are 
parasitic appendages of the state system. If you still have old guanxi networks, 
they can still help you sometimes (DHC). 
 
4. Close coupling with 
traditional cognitive 
and normative 
institutional pillars 
confines network 
adaptation. 
10 Under China’s macro conditions, business relies on guanxi. As a start-up, if you 
don’t develop your guanxi, you might be thought of as incapable of doing so. 
This applies to everyone. Guanxi requires long-term cultivation (HDS). 
I show my enthusiasm and honesty and that I could do solid work. I have some 
clients who initially were not familiar with me. Eventually, they accepted me 
and trusted me. Slowly I developed guanxi....Actually, there is old Chinese 
saying: spur with long accumulation. Only by steady accumulation will 
people trust you (DHC). 
 
a The figure indicates the number of interviews (out of 16) in which the interviewee mentioned the theme. 
 
The institutional uncertainty and inadequate market resource flows also bonded the 
respondents with their market connections. To obtain critical resources and opportunities, 
respondents resorted to their existing ties. Previous interactions with old business partners 
fostered trust and commitment and when the respondents started their own businesses, 
the old business partners provided timely help. As FPX explained: 
  
We established mutual recognition. First of all, it was the recognition of each 
other’s merits. They felt that we wouldn’t screw up. Based on these foundations, we 
didn’t need to worry. If you don’t have these two things, you can’t get around. I felt 
that in that environment, we could rely on each other.     
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Forming ties with new partners can facilitate access to new resources and business 
opportunities; however, forming new ties requires much more effort. Start-ups mainly 
cultivate strong ties to foster trust and commitment, as a relational bonding against an 
uncertain environment and opportunistic behavior. DHC, an early start-up in IT services, 
confronted difficulties in obtaining IT devices. He explained how he established strong 
ties with powerful market intermediaries who were engaged in overseas imports:  
 
If you didn’t follow them to get the goods, your enterprise couldn’t survive. However, 
in this manner, you faced high potential risks, such as smuggling. Under such 
conditions, establishing and maintaining guanxi was very important…. So I sent 
them some gifts and invited them to dinner so as to establish a closeness..       
Experiencing institutional incoherence. The prevailing theoretical explanation of 
network change is that the development of regulative institutions leads to network decline 
and strategic change (Guthrie, 1998; Hitt et al., 2004; Peng, 2003; Peng & Zhou, 2005). 
However, actors’ perceptions of the institutional environment under changing conditions 
are influenced by their early institutional experiences; their responses are not always 
calculative and strategic. First, experiencing early unfavorable regulative institutions 
reinforces the perception of certainty and predictability provided by strong personal ties. 
Second, an incoherent perception of the regulative institutional development hinders 
network adaptation. CA’s evaluation of the institutional environment did not indicate a 
coherent picture that the regulative institutions had become significantly more favorable. 
Respondents shared the view that P1 was comparatively better than P2, because the early 
period had created some business opportunities (legitimizing entrepreneurial activity to a 
certain degree), although it provided less concrete support. Many respondents complained 
that during P2: “policies are constantly changing,” “policies have become tighter,” and 
“there are more regulations and restrictions.” 
The early experiences and unpleasant institutional journey reinforce perceptions of 
uncertainty and amplify the role of interpersonal networks. Thus, CA members clung to 
their informal political networks as protection against uncertainties. For them, exchange 
opportunities are latent and potentially troublesome issues can be resolved through 
political connections. For instance, FC continues the habit of chatting and dining with 
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officials from customs, commodity inspection, and the tax bureaus. As he noted: 
  
Q: So you still keep up these connections? 
FC: Yes. But they don’t offer any substantial help. They are mainly personal 
relationships. Like chatting without any business, or wining and dining in the 
evening. Last week, we dined together, and we talked about the swine flu…. 
However, when there are some problems, they can still help out.      
 
Respondents noted that during the period of institutional change, market institutions 
and mechanisms are developing, but the institutional change is also accompanied by 
intensifying competition and uncertainties. The informal market connections still provide 
some reliability and predictability in business exchanges. When confronted with business 
challenges and environmental turbulence, the respondents remained close and endured 
the challenges together. Some respondents realized that their businesses were stagnating 
or even declining, but they still did not attempt to expand their networks. As ZRQ 
remarked:  
 
If there is an opportunity [to find new partners], I will probably try, but I won’t try 
very hard to do that …. I feel very comfortable doing business with my old partners. 
There aren’t so many conflicts. After all, we know each other very well. 
 
For the majority of CA members, maintaining and establishing interpersonal 
networks was still a viable option and it became an anchored and re-utilized coping 
strategy during periods of institutional change. 
Close coupling. An early unfavorable institutional environment bonded start-ups 
with their specific ties and demanded the cultivation of closeness, trust, and commitment. 
In addition, this bonding relationship was consolidated by the relational pressures 
imposed by the traditional Chinese culture and norms. The networks of a majority (11 out 
of 16) of CA respondents did not evolve in a more calculating and strategic direction. 
Instead, the respondents emphasized building and maintaining harmonious relationships 
and improving the quality of their existing networks. They closely adhered to traditional 
guanxi practices that are deeply rooted in routines and scripts. Respondents often 
conducted business deals through expressive interactions and social events, such as 
wining and dining. Doing business was also a process of making friends that required 
following certain routines and etiquettes. As MM put it: “After becoming friends, you 
72 
 
have the capital to talk about it [business].” These cognitive elements are commonly 
codified and shared between respondents and their network partners. As CFB vividly 
described:  
 
Normally, when we were doing business, no matter whether with the leaders were 
from state-owned enterprises or the leaders from private enterprises, the most 
important thing was that we never talked about money; it was only about emotional 
communication. It was impossible to show the leaders the order form before the 
meal; otherwise they would not enjoy the meal. After the meal, the order was 
naturally approved. 
 
The majority of CA members also closely followed the traditional normative ways of 
establishing and maintaining guanxi networks, such as reciprocating in guanxi building. 
As XJF remarked:  
 
They provided you with some information. They are like your brothers and friends. 
However, you still need to reciprocate. They also value your manner of getting 
along with them. If you are stingy, they won’t recommend you for any 
projects ….You need to appreciate their help, for example, by giving them some 
rewards, [and] being generous to them. 
 
Respondents also attached great importance to the accumulation of long-term 
relationships and to nurturing mutual understanding, obligations, and assurance for 
continuous exchanges. As FPX stated: 
I want to be accepted by them. When we are together, I show them my sincerity. 
After a long time, personal guanxi is well nurtured. And there might be many 
opportunities. These opportunities might not be related to business. You can’t be too 
instrumental because it is a long-term process.   
 
Subtle, informal relational norms and rules were also established in the specific 
exchange relationships. During P2, respondents still conformed to these rules to secure 
trust and exchange relationships and to avoid disapproval by their old ties. For example, 
during P2, FPX was still doing business with a third party via an intermediary and he did 
not “cross the line” to directly connect with the business himself. He explained why:   
I follow the rules of the game, I entered the market by this channel [a referral], I 
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won’t break it … if you break it, you are not on the right track. Why would I do that 
just for some money?  
Close coupling with these traditional cognitive and normative institutions enables 
one to fit in well with the early institutional environment and ensures access to resources 
and opportunities. However, it creates an imprint effect in relational governance and 
impedes adaptation to the changing institutional environment. CA tended to regard 
environmental turbulence (e.g., a financial crisis) as a chance to show mutual 
understanding, support, and loyalty. As WJS remarked:  
This gives me an opportunity to look more thoroughly into people’s hearts. Then I 
can examine who are long-term and who are short-term?business friends?.
 
Under such strong and pervasive institutional pressures, deviant behavior can 
provoke some disapproval in the community. DHC reflected upon his unsuccessful 
attempt to operate his business without following the intricate guanxi practices: 
 
Actually, one year ago I tried with a friend to operate a business based on a new 
model, hoping that we could break away from the guanxi practice and we could run 
the business according to the market. However, after some actual practice, we 
found that it didn’t work. The business still relied on guanxi…. If you don’t act in 
that way, it seems there is no way out. Maybe there is a way out, but not everyone 
can find it.     
 
I also assessed the data to check whether some new norms and schemas might have 
been diffused and equally perceived by the two cohorts during P2. CA members shared 
the feeling that “market competition is intensifying” and that they need to “enhance their 
internal strength and market capabilities.” However, these pressures did not necessarily 
motivate them to dissolve their old ties or to forge new, diverse, and weak ties. Being 
embedded in homogenous and cohesive networks restricted an awareness of external 
institutional change and limited adaptations to the changing environment.  
Global linkages and within-cohort variations. I assessed the within-cohort 
variations and discovered that a linkage with international partners is a key factor in 
differentiating some respondents from their cohort peers in the network configuration. 
For example, at the beginning of the venture in 1997, CL positioned his business and 
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partners in the global market. As he explained: “I targeted my partners from foreign 
companies, such as Euro-American companies and Japanese companies. I felt 
communicating and dealing with them was much easier.” Partnering with international 
partners during the later institutional period renewed their network configurations. For 
example, in 2002 CCL cooperated with multinational corporations to expand his print 
factory. As a serial entrepreneur, WJY co-started a VC firm with returnees from the U.S. 
in 2007. The strength of these respondents’ ties was weaker than that of their cohort peers. 
More importantly, they gradually adjusted to international business standards and became 
strategic in partnering and alliance management. XJF and FC followed the normative 
way of doing business with domestic partners. However, when they dealt with 
international players, they followed a relational system that puts more emphasis on 
competence than on affection and they engaged in instrumental interactions more than 
expressive interactions. Those weak and formal global networks reduced the likelihood of 
network inertia and facilitated network adaptation during the period of institutional 
change. 
CB: the process and mechanisms of the distinctive network construction 
Network Releasing. Compared to CA’s unpleasant institutional journey, exposure to 
a relatively favorable regulative institution moderated CB’s dependence on networks and 
increased opportunities for networking. CB’s general perceptions were: “regulations are 
relaxed,” “more supportive policies,” and “less bureaucracy and more efficiency.” 
Beginning in 1998, the Chinese government accelerated the market economy and 
launched reform measures to improve their bureaucratic capacity (Pearson, 2007). On the 
one hand, resources and opportunities controlled and distributed by the government were 
gradually diminished. On the other hand, the Shanghai government started providing 
more support to new ventures (White, Gao, & Zhang, 2005). These reforms and this 
policy support appear to have had a selective effect: the younger cohort enjoyed more 
benefits than the older cohort. Technology-related start-ups reported that government 
agencies were directly involved in pooling funds, channeling resources, offering tax 
benefits, and providing administrative support. Others were actively connected by the 
government to join in cooperation to boost the local economy (ZAM, YZD) and to avoid 
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tax policies (XXT). JXJ explained how his venture was supported by government 
agencies:  
 
There are many?supports? . The local government and the center for the 
transformation of high-tech production. They are constantly helping us. I will move 
to a new office soon. This office is offered by the Yangpu Start-up Center…. It  
even found some projects and came to support me…. The college students’ 
innovation funds, technology venture capital, various start-up centers, etc. are all 
well-connected and supportive.  
Table 4.8 
Cohort B: Institutional Pillars and the Distinctive Network Configuration 
? ? Mechanisms Evidence Examples 
1. The relatively favorable 
regulative institutions and 
the development of the 
market moderate CB's 
network dependence on 
certain ties.  
16 State policies are more open and favorable to private enterprises. This 
expands the area of entrepreneurship. Earlier [After 2002], entering some 
high-ended field was difficult; now it is not that difficult....We are relying 
less on government connections, and it is a relatively pure market behavior 
(WB). 
 
2. The regulative institutional 
support creates more 
network opportunities 
with government entities. 
6 You need to cooperate with the government in some activities....For the 
government, it is its political achievements. For us, it is an opportunity to 
improve our public image....We went out [to the public] to help the 
Zhangjiang government. The Zhangjiang government also helped us....It 
was a reciprocal process (YX). 
3. The development of market 
institutions and 
mechanisms create more 
network opportunities 
with market entities. 
15 In the Intent industry, actually everyone has more or less contact with one 
another. We know that in the new economy, only cooperation can create 
opportunities. You come to me and I go to you. So I think in the IT 
industry, you can find everyone by three to four degrees (YX). 
 
4. Decoupling from and loose 
coupling with the 
traditional normative and 
cognitive pillars facilitate 
the departure from 
traditional networking 
behaviors.  
11 I think our [entrepreneurial] generation puts more emphasis on the market 
than on traditional guanxi. It [guanxi] requires much time and energy. That 
[elder] generation relies on guanxi for some certain reasons. But for us, 
capability is more important (WB). 
 
 
5. Coupling with new normativ
and cognitive pillars 
facilitates new networking
behaviors. 
 
12 At the beginning, we had no talent, no market, and no capital. However, we 
became accepted by venture capital because of our technology.... I then 
accumulated the users and reputation with the financial support from 
venture capital, then I negotiated with the content providers, and the 
chances [of cooperation] became greater (YX). 
a The figure indicates the number of interviews (out of 17) in which the interviewee mentioned the theme.
The development of market institutions and mechanisms increased the volume and 
speed of resource flows, providing CB respondents with an open networking environment 
when they entered the market. Respondents clearly perceived the tense competition, but 
they regarded it as a natural process for business ventures and they tried to leverage the 
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resources and opportunities?external funding, talent, knowledge, joint projects, etc.?
with their diverse market connections. Many respondents identified their network 
partners by spotting complementary needs and then contacted them via “cold calling.” An 
open network environment also encouraged resource sharing and network bridging. 
Respondents were connected to third parties via their network partners, accessing and 
exchanging resources and information. As WB explained:  
 
When I know some other companies are providing personal financial services, I 
call them directly. They also have such needs, so they won’t refuse me if I go after 
them.… It is a very equal relationship. But you can also find them by referrals. 
Decoupling and loose coupling. The sharp contrasts in the two cohorts’ network 
configurations call for a close investigation into the cognitive and normative institutions: 
Are the two cohorts subject to different institutional pressures, even during the same 
institutional period (P2)? The data indicates that CB members tend to decouple from 
traditional cognitive and normative institutions. For the majority of CB members, the 
routines, scripts, and schemas ingrained in guanxi building were complicated, costly, and 
inefficient. CB members were less engaged in social expressive interactions (e.g., holding 
banquets or sending gifts) than CA members, but they were more engaged in 
task-oriented interactions. Many business and joint projects were negotiated and 
established within their offices. ZAM described the problems with traditional guanxi
practices:  
Many things important in Chinese business traditions, such as tactics, mianzi 
?face?, and guanxi are not meaningful. How to build and how to manipulate are 
too complicated. I would prefer transparent market operations and cooperation 
based on trust.  
 
Younger start-ups also decoupled from the traditional relational norms and values by 
avoiding mixing business relationships with friendship, cooperating with loose 
obligations, and attaching less affective elements. As ZQ remarked: “Very few business 
relations can be transformed into friendships.” YYB noted how he repositioned his 
relationship with a previous friend who later became a business partner: 
I grouped people into three types: colleagues, friends, and business partners. 
People can be your good friends, but not your partners; people can be your 
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partners, but not your friends…. It took some time?like a trial period?to 
reposition ourselves….Then we decided whether we needed a long-term or 
short-term cooperation, or no cooperation at all.        
Loose coupling became a strategy when respondents perceived some traditional 
informal pressures but did not necessarily want to follow them. For example, NXD 
allowed his subordinate to build interpersonal relationships with government officials, 
while he focused on enhancing the firm’s competence and developing a strategic alliance 
with international partners. Loose coupling simultaneously generates flexible roles, 
securing appropriateness, and pursuing efficiency.  
Coupling. The acceleration of marketization and the integration of Shanghai into the 
global economy after 2002 facilitated the diffusion of new cognitive and normative 
elements. The need to strengthen market capabilities and competencies became the 
dominant beliefs and values that were internalized by CB members from the start when 
they entered the market. Emphasizing business innovation and value creation was the 
primary goal of forming ties. For instance, YMP offered elite education courses for 
“smart kids” at a very high price. His customers were reluctant to register their kids for 
the courses. To convince potential customers and to attract more customers via 
“word-of-mouth,” he explained the following: 
 
Our goal is not solely to improve our kids’ academic achievements. This can easily 
be achieved by the schools or the kids’ parents. However, we provide elite education. 
We provide added values and additional services….Our employees all graduated 
from domestic or overseas top-tier universities.     
 
Obtaining organizational legitimacy is an important entrepreneurial process for new 
venture start-ups. CB respondents tried to establish networks with prominent and 
powerful players to signal that they abided by social and institutional expectations. For 
example, ZQ strategically allied with a high-status firm and invited the director to 
become a partner, thereby securing bank financing. WB, the finance outsourcing business 
start-up, explained how he strategized to obtain organizational legitimacy:  
  
We are engaged in financial outsourcing. The foreign banks felt this was acceptable; 
however, the domestic banks were still cautious. So we adopted a strategy to 
cooperate first with foreign banks, and then when they [the domestic banks] 
realized this, negotiations became much easier.  
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Once they established strategic alliances with powerful players, new venture 
start-ups tried to use relational legitimacy to attract potential partners and to expand their 
networks. Coupling with new cognitive and normative elements was summarized by 
YZD as follows:  
 
Obviously, Shanghai has become a center where business rules have become more 
and more international; now you have to flow with the rules of the game. In 
establishing a network, our own capabilities are very important. I try to be selective 
in establishing ties because we must match resources; time and energy are limited, 
and one needs to find the right partners. 
 
As the new norms, values, and beliefs were internalized, CB members tended to 
view environmental turbulence more neutrally and objectively, detaching it from their 
personal relationships. YX explained: “We all knew it?the financial crisis?was a process, 
so we treated it objectively.” The firms in which ZAM’s company had invested lost asset 
value during the crisis; moreover, some of the early investors withdrew capital from his 
firm. Confronting these downturns and dissolutions of alliances, he remarked:  
Every crisis is a process of baptizing. After the crisis, the firms that remain in the 
market are the good firms. The market has baptized them. We feel reassured when 
we choose such firms.  
 
The majority of CB members also viewed environmental shocks as a chance to 
reflect and strengthen firm competence, and to adjust and improve alliances. As QCH 
remarked: 
 
Suddenly there was a crisis, and it was time to reflect on what I needed to do to 
catch up and how I should improve our product structure and rebuild and adapt our 
cooperation. 
The above analysis suggests that the new scripts, schemas, and norms were not 
equally perceived by the two cohorts. Even without the linkages with international 
partners, CB members perceived the need to enhance their market capability, to engage in 
instrumental interactions, and to adopt strategic elements in their network formation and 
management. These scripts and norms were commonly shared and practiced by the 
younger start-ups.   
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4.4  Institutional Change, Start-up Cohorts, and Networks: A 
Framework 
I have reported that two start-up cohorts demonstrate distinctive network 
configurations; I have also unpacked the underlying processes and mechanisms that led to 
such distinctions. Using these findings, I now propose a framework to offer insights into 
how founding institutions imprint on networks. The central theme has three components: 
First, founding institutions at a given period include a specific combination of the three 
pillars. Second, institutional pillars have different mechanisms in effecting networks and 
networking. Third, the exposure of start-up cohorts to their respective founding 
institutional environments impacts their initial network configurations and continues to 
affect subsequent network trajectories during the period of institutional change.  
A changing regulative institution cannot solely explain network dynamics. Previous 
studies focusing on regulative institutions primarily explain why entrepreneurs need (or 
need fewer) networks and why they need to adapt their network structures (Guthrie, 1998; 
Peng, 2003; Peng & Quan, 2009; Peng & Zhou, 2005). This study discovered that the 
regulative pillar during different phases of institutional change mainly accounts for the 
different scenarios of network dependency and network opportunity; however, the 
processes and mechanisms of tie formation, governance, and dissolution are subject to 
cognitive and normative pillars. These pillars define the appropriate norms, values, and 
practices under certain conditions. Once the networks have been established, they have 
their own lives. Thus, we need to examine the institutional pressures and the 
entrepreneurial responses in transitional economies that are experiencing an intersection 
of old traditions that are continued and a diffusion of new cognitive and normative 
elements. That is:    
Proposition 1. At different institutional periods, a) the regulative pillar creates 
different levels of network dependencies (e.g., high or low) and network opportunities 
(e.g., closed or open), b) the cognitive and normative pillars define and legitimate 
different (e.g., traditional or new) norms, values, practices, and procedures that govern 
concrete network behavior. 
This framework adds an “alignment effect” to our understanding of the combination 
of institutional pillars during a given institutional period (Scott, 2008). Exposure to 
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unfavorable regulative institutions has an imprinting effect by bonding entrepreneurs with 
specific interpersonal connections. This effect is reinforced by the normative and 
cognitive elements entrenched in traditional Chinese business culture, which emphasizes 
emotional closeness, strong commitments, and long-term orientations (Chen & Chen, 
2004; Luo, 2007) (see the upper left corner in figure 4.4, the joint force created by three 
institutional pillars). This alignment creates a tendency for network inertia. During 
institutional change, the more favorable regulative institutions increase the chances for 
networking. Meanwhile, new relational norms, values, and beliefs emerge and spread 
during the period of institutional change, requiring new ways of networking. Thus, these 
joint forces create the possibility for distancing from conventions and shaping new 
networking behaviors (see the lower middle corner in figure 4.4, the joint force created 
by three institutional pillars). Thus: 
Proposition 2. The alignment of an unfavorable regulative pillar with strong 
traditional normative and cognitive pillars creates a strong possibility of network inertia 
(Situation 1), whereas the alignment of a more favorable regulative pillar with new 
normative and cognitive pillars creates a strong possibility of a distinctive network 
configuration (Situation 2). 
The responses of entrepreneurs to the changing institutional environment cannot be 
assumed, but they are closely related to their initial links with the founding institutions. 
The initial link delimits the legitimate relational system. The latter, in turn, impacts the 
perception of institutional change that either enables or constrains the network dynamics 
(Beckert, 2010) (see the upper middle corner in figure 4.4). The founding institutions 
execute an imprinting effect during the entrepreneurs’ entry period, and the responses of 
the entrepreneurial cohorts are accompanied by different processes and patterns. Thus:   
Proposition 3. Founding institutions play a very important role in influencing initial 
networks and subsequent trajectories. An old cohort is more likely to experience Situation 
1, even during institutional change; a younger cohort is more likely to experience 
Situation 2.  
Proposition 4. Network inertia is likely to occur within an older cohort during the 
process and mechanism of network bonding and close coupling (with traditional 
cognitive and normative pillars).  
Proposition 5. Network differentiation (from the old network configuration) is likely 
to occur within a younger cohort during the process and mechanism of network releasing 
and decoupling and loose coupling (with traditional cognitive and normative pillars) and 
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coupling (with new cognitive and normative pillars). 
Acquiring resources, obtaining opportunities, and gaining legitimacy are all 
important entrepreneurial processes. However, some entrepreneurial processes may be 
particularly important during specific institutional periods, thereby contributing to 
different network configurations. As it is shown in figure 4.4, “?” represents the positive 
relationship with a certain network configuration. For example, when obtaining resources 
and discovering opportunities are the dominant entrepreneurial process, it is very likely to 
lead to network inertia, because these processes require cultivating strong interpersonal 
connections. When gaining legitimacy becomes a more prominent entrepreneurial 
process, it is very likely to lead to a distinctive network configuration since this requires 
establishing formal and organizational networks, rather than strong interpersonal 
connections. Thus: 
Proposition 6. A certain institutional period gives rise to a certain emphasis in the 
entrepreneurial process. An emphasis on obtaining resources and opportunities will likely 
lead to strong informal ties and will increase the possibility of network inertia within an 
older cohort; an emphasis on gaining legitimacy will likely lead to weak formal ties and 
will reduce the possibility of network inertia within the younger cohort. 
Domestic businesses and networks create a strong force for a homogenous and 
cohesive network. However, old start-ups with direct business links to global players 
establish fewer political networks and weaker and more formal market networks. As it is 
illustrated in figure 4.4, “?” represents the negative relationship between network inertia 
and global linkages. That is: 
Proposition 7. Respondents from the old cohort who have linkages with global 
partners are less likely to demonstrate network inertia during institutional change.    
 
Figure 4.4 illustrates the emerging theory that is extracted from the data. Although 
this empirical study focuses on two institutional periods, it suggests that networks 
established during the two periods (P1 and P2) are very likely to influence the networks 
in a subsequent institutional period (P3). This remains an intriguing question for a future 
inquiry. In the next chapter, I will shift the research focus from network configurations to 
concrete networking actions and examine how the two cohorts differ in their tie formation 
and trust development processes.  
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CHAPTER 5. THE EVOLUTION OF ENTREPRENEURIAL
NETWORKING STYLES
 
5.1  Introduction 
How do start-ups evolve their networks during the institutional change period? Do 
they adapt their networks to fit with the changing institutional environment or do they 
exhibit network inertia? In the preceding empirical chapter, I outlined the major 
differences in two start-up cohorts’ network configurations and described the underlying 
processes and mechanisms that lead to such differences. It was criticized in the literature 
review that knowing the difference of the network structure or a network configuration 
between two start-up cohorts is not enough, given that a network configuration is only a 
snapshot and it is determined by concrete networking actions. In this empirical chapter, I 
will go a step further to bridge the missing link between environmental effects and 
network configurations by highlighting two networking actions: tie formation and trust 
development.  
This empirical chapter is devoted to answering the second set of research questions: 
How do different start-up cohorts establish ties and develop trust relationships during the 
institutional change period? What are the underlying mechanisms that lead to the 
differences? This chapter helps readers to delve deeply into three concrete networking 
activities?team formation (section 5.2), political networking (section 5.3), and market 
networking (section 5.4). Each section elaborates how the two start-up cohorts differ 
regarding the process of tie formation and trust development with table illustrations. After 
describing the differences in their networking actions, I theorize two types of networking 
styles in section 5.5: The old cohort uses the strategy of network deepening while the 
younger cohort uses the strategy of network broadening. By uncovering these variations 
in networking actions, readers can gain an in-depth understanding of the differences in 
network configurations between the two start-up cohorts that were described in chapter 
four. This chapter further confirms the imprinting effect of the founding institutional 
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environment in networking styles and points out how institutional change leads to the 
evolution of networking styles from the societal level.   
5.2  Team Formation and Organization Emergence 
CA: team formation and evolution  
Teaming up. Social networks play an important role during the process of starting 
new ventures (Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986). When start-ups first begin to take serious steps 
toward creating their own business, seeking out “trusted alters” and forming a reliable 
team is a critical step (Aldrich & Kim, 2007; Ruef, Aldrich, & Carter, 2003). In the 
Chinese context, Deng Xiaoping’s south China tour (in 1992) stimulated a dramatic 
expansion of private business activities. CA respondents seized this good opportunity and 
started up their businesses. In P1 (the early stage of market transition), respondents faced 
problems and challenges spawned by poor property rights protection as well as the 
underdevelopment of market factors (e.g., raw materials, financial capital, and human 
resources). Respondents heavily relied on their pre-existing ties to overcome these 
threats. 
Table 5.1 illustrates the information about the propensity of tie formation and trust 
development when CA and CB formed (or did not form) their teams. Among 16 CA 
respondents, six respondents started up their business alone and four of them received 
significant help from their pre-existing ties. Respondents spotted and obtained venturing 
opportunities from their former colleagues, schoolmates and students, and friends. For 
example, HDS and CCL both worked in government departments before their start-up 
was founded; when the government launched reforms to separate the function of 
government administration from enterprise management, good personal relationships 
with government officials provided them with opportunities to take over the enterprises 
and transform those entities into private businesses. WJS helped his elementary 
schoolmate commercialize safety products when he was lecturing at a local public 
security college. His students who worked in the public security office helped him open 
the product market, and soon he embarked on his own business. Those respondents 
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shared one similarity: They didn’t strive to search and team up with other partners; 
instead, they spotted business opportunities via their pre-existing ties, which facilitated 
the firm to emerge. 
Table 5.1  
Team Formation and Trust Development 
CA  ?  ?  
P1 
(N=16) 
No management team (N=6) Obtained start-up opportunities from pre-existing ties (N=4) 
 Teaming with pre-existing ties 
(N=10)
Family members, relatives, former colleagues, friends and 
schoolmates 
 Trust type Particularistic trust and affective trust 
Strong commitment and obligation, providing financial, human 
resource, and emotional support 
P2 Team component and trusting 
type 
Maintain old team members, particularistic trust and affective trust  
Add new team members, particularistic trust and affective trust, and 
the emergence of cognitive trust 
CB ?  ?  
P2 
(N=17) 
No management team (N=5) Conflict with management team in previous work, decided to start-up 
alone (N=3) 
Teaming with pre-existing ties 
(N=3)
Former colleagues, business partners, and MBA classmates 
Trust type Particularistic trust, cognitive trust, and affective trust 
Familiarity and proven competence facilitated team formation 
Teaming with new ties (N=2) New industry peers 
Trust type General trust and cognitive trust 
Face-to-face negotiations, get the better match 
Mixing pre-existing ties and 
new ties (N=7)
New team members from market, former colleagues, alumni, family 
members, and relatives 
Trust type With new members: general trust, cognitive trust at the initial stage 
With pre-existing ties: particularistic trust, cognitive trust and 
affective trust 
Functional diversity, quicker teaming up, and relatively stable 
management team 
 
The majority of CA respondents (N=10) founded their business and drew team 
members from their pre-existing connections such as family members, relatives, former 
colleagues, and alumni?those ties also co-existed in the emerging business stage. 
Respondents did so mainly for two reasons. First, in P1, formal property rights protection 
was ineffective and market institutions were underdeveloped. The strong lineage ties?
characterized by high trust? provided solidarity and informal protections from 
opportunistic behaviors. Respondents complained that, “policies ?for private enterprises?
lack standardization,” “policies were inconsistent,” “there was discrimination against the 
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private enterprises,” and “there was less protection for private enterprise.” Confronted 
with these situations, respondents (N=7) turned to their family members, relatives, and 
former close colleagues to co-start the business, because they were less likely to take 
advantage of each other than outsiders.  
Second, pre-existing ties involving commitments and obligations facilitated access 
to resources and opportunities. Respondents complained that bank loans were extremely 
difficult to get during P1 and that they were in short supply of human resources. 
Therefore, some respondents (N=4) created a business together with family members and 
relatives, such as spouses, brothers, and brother-in-laws. For example, MM explained that 
at the time when he started up, not so many people were engaged in private business 
because the policies were unfavorable and not clear; only family members and relatives 
would take the risk to invest in the business and offer financial capital, human resources, 
and emotional support. Some respondents (N=4) started a business with close friends, 
former colleagues, and schoolmates. From their previous social interactions, respondents 
had developed particularistic trust with these individuals. With a common social identity, 
those close ties joined the new ventures and devoted their resources, abilities, and 
emotional support to the business in the initial stage.  
Trust development. Most of the CA respondents did not invest much effort to search 
for team members, but rather transformed their pre-existing ties into team members. 
Particularistic trust had been established with those who shared common social 
backgrounds. This prior familiarity equipped respondents and their team members with 
knowledge about each other’s trustworthiness, abilities, and benevolence. During the 
process of team formation and team governing, respondents emphasized the affective 
dimension in strengthening the relationship (table 2).  
Respondents who had co-founders and management team members primarily 
mentioned the following behaviors and activities in establishing and consolidating the 
relationships: matching the personal character and values, sharing joys and hardship 
together, and expressing personal care and concerns. Previous interactions with former 
colleagues and business partners also facilitated mutual understanding of each other’s 
characters, unique sets of resources, and knowledge and skills. During the firm’s 
emergence stage, respondents and their pre-existing ties tried to understand and 
87 
 
 
accommodate different working styles to maintain cohesive and harmonious relationships. 
Taking FC as an example, he cofounded his business with two “friends” (former business 
partners). Although these two “friends” were working in different industries, it was their 
good personal relationship that pulled them together and drove them to start up a business 
together. As he described his early venturing stage: 
At the beginning, it’s just like a couple of good friends wanted to do something. We 
never thought that our company was developing so fast and we never thought about 
our sales ?were so good?. We just thought that if we could survive for 6 years, the 
company would be matured. Then we can do whatever we want to do?laugh?. We 
had this idea at that moment.     
 
Back then, FPX was working as a dean of a state-owned research institute. He 
realized that the market reforms were drawing to a close and that this was going to affect 
his subordinates’ work and life. He felt a sense of calling to take care of his colleagues 
and provide a shelter from the massive reorganization and layoffs. He vividly described 
his team formation process:  
We ?with colleagues??discussed secretly: How large we wanted to make, how to get 
the money, and how to get the customers…. We wanted to make money all together, 
making profit alone is not interesting. We needed to overcome the difficulties all 
together. Then a group of younger men followed me. Our former head who was old 
and retired knew that we were doing our own business, he came and said to me: “I 
want to join in.”   
Team evolution in P2. This study strives to capture how two start-up cohorts form 
their teams and develop trust relationships, with a focus on the firms’ emergence stage. 
The data also provides some empirical evidence about the evolution of CA’s team 
components and governance.  
When the institutions evolved to the current period (the deepening of market 
transition), firms also developed from an early stage to a later stage (growth, maturity, or 
decline); some respondents (N=5) tried to update team members. ZRQ, for instance, was 
concerned about disagreements with his spouse on business ideas and operations; 
therefore, he asked his wife to stay out of the control. LZQ had conflicts with other team 
members. He thought that, “when an able person works with persons who lack 
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competence, it is very hard to get along well.” So he re-started a new law office with the 
people who share his “kindred spirit.”  
Other respondents tried to recruit new team members and they still underscored the 
importance of personality, matching the management philosophy, and personal 
familiarity. For instance, FC and his two friends managed their company fairly well, with 
the expansion of the business, they tried to recruit a new vice manager into their team, but 
the new managers did not fit into their mutually established working styles. He explained:  
   
During the development of our company, everyone takes care of his business. Our 
cooperation is very stable. However, a vice manager came, his operational 
philosophy was not harmonious with ours, so he went away after two or three years. 
Another vice manager also came and left because of the different management 
philosophy.   
 
CCL provided an example of following the principle of interpersonal relations in 
recruiting new team members?familiarity with pre-existing ties and referrals via third 
parties to make the relationship more relationally embedded and to facilitate better 
matching. He described how he recruited a vice manager into his firm: 
We are all in the same circle. Previously we had a cooperation; we are very familiar 
with each other. The way a management team is recruited is different from general 
recruitment. A friend’s recommendation adds another layer to the relationship. I had 
previous interactions with this vice manager and I know his capabilities.  
 
When firms developed from an early stage to a later stage, respondents had hard 
feelings when some team members left the firm. DHC had a strong emotional attachment 
to his team members. He was shocked when one of his team members left the firm and 
started up his own business: 
He had a car accident on the way back home and broke his leg. We went there 
immediately and sent him to the hospital, ?treating him? just like my family 
member. Another colleague and I carried him on the back and climbed six floors. We 
took good care of him. But after two months, he left and set up his own company. It 
heavily struck my emotions. Why was it like this? It was unacceptable and I was very 
sad.
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For DHC, this team member’s behavior betrayed his trust and probably negatively 
impacted his trust in other team members. Afterwards, he invited his family members to 
join the team, which relieved his anxiety:   
My brother and sister now joined me in this firm. To put it straightforward, it is for 
the safety reason. This is an important part. 
CB: team formation and trust development  
Teaming up. In contrast to CA, CB respondents demonstrate more diversity in team 
components (see table 5.1). First, five respondents started up their business alone; they 
didn’t receive much help from their pre-existing ties in their previous working units. LXZ 
and HDT had worked in foreign companies; when they had accumulated sufficient work 
experience, they decided to start up their own businesses. One of the reasons that other 
respondents (N=3) started their business alone is due to the work and interest conflicts 
with previous superiors and team members. During the time when these respondents 
worked as senior managers in their respective firms, NXD and ZD were aware of the 
prevailing superior-subordinate guanxi practices, which obscured their excellent 
performance and blocked promotional opportunities. NXD, who previously worked as a 
division manager in a state-owned enterprise, complained about how he disliked the 
particularistic relationship and guanxi practices:  
Because we were administrated by the organization department of Shandong 
province. If I couldn’t get promotion before 26, it would be more difficult later on. 
The promotion took place every five to six years. Additionally, the communication 
among state-owned enterprises was very difficult. People like me without any 
background really felt uncomfortable. Only those who had a good status and 
relationships received preferential treatment. We had a boss, he was the son of a 
director of a government bureau. We did the entire job; however, he was very good 
at pulling guanxi…(interrupted by a telephone call). I was not used to that culture.    
 
WY reflected upon conflicts among previous team members in a start-up firm:   
In the early stage, the team members didn’t know each other very well. Therefore the 
communication problem arose. Everyone’s way of doing things, management style 
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and values were actually very different. These impaired the cooperation really really 
a lot!     
 
A previous unhappy experience triggers start-ups to become more cautious in 
choosing team members and more prudent in developing trusting relationships with 
potential team partners. These respondents decided to start up a business alone. WY, for 
example, described the criteria of selecting a potential team member:  
It’s like “once bitten, twice shy.” I became very prudent. Is he really suitable for 
being a partner? What types of capabilities and networks does he have to contribute 
to the growth of my firms? I won’t make a decision until I think these things over. 
 
The great majority of respondents (N=12) reported that they co-founded the business 
or formed management teams during the firm’s emergence stage. Among them, some 
respondents (N=3) formed teams with their previous colleagues, business partners, and 
MBA classmates. Some respondents (N=2) searched and formed teams with new partners 
through a recruiting process. Other respondents (N=7) formed teams by mixing 
pre-existing ties and adding new ties. 
YBQ formerly worked in a furniture manufacturing company as a senior manager. 
When he moved to Shanghai and founded his own company, he staffed the team with his 
former colleagues. ZQ met Mr. Tian in a short-term joint project; she kept this connection 
and later decided to follow him, starting up a real estate company. Although ZAM and 
YZD worked in venture capital companies, their process of team formation shares a 
commonality. After they accumulated operational experience, they searched for 
opportunities to team up with industrial peers to start up their own VC companies. They 
found their partners through an open recruiting process. After the initial contact was 
made, they met face-to-face with potential partners and negotiated their respective 
investment philosophies. After that, they decided to join the teams and became the 
co-founder and key member of nascent VC firms.  
Respondents mixed pre-existing ties and new ties in their management teams. 
Start-ups co-founded firms and formed teams with former colleagues (N=4), alumni 
(N=3), and family members and relatives (N=2). They (N=7) also actively searched, 
selected, and invited new members from related industries and businesses. Teaming up 
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with pre-existing ties that they are familiar with can help to generate greater trust and 
stabilize the teams of nascent firms, reduce conflicts (Nelson, 1989) while increasing 
satisfaction and cohesiveness among teammates, and thus enhance coordination (Lazer & 
Katz, 2000; Mullen & Copper, 1994). The formation of younger start-ups’ teams and the 
development of trust relationships with their pre-existing ties are based not only on their 
liking and cohesiveness?which in part featured as particularistic trust and affective 
trust?but more importantly, but grounded in their knowledge regarding each other’s 
capabilities and resources. In the case of adding new team members, the capabilities and 
resources are even more important in team formation and trust development. I elaborate 
these in the following text. 
Trust development. CB respondents emphasized two primary criteria in forming 
teams and developing trust relationships. First, they considered potential team members’ 
diverse experiences, network resources, and technology and management skills as 
important factors for teaming up. Respondents obtained such knowledge and information 
through the following possible ways: prior interactions, other peoples’ knowledge of 
potential team members’ reputations, and face-to-face discussions.  
Teaming up with a partner they had worked with before or had previous social or 
economic interactions with could result in a quicker and more efficient development of  
a team. Although respondents formed teams with their pre-existing ties with whom they 
had developed particularistic trust and affective attachments, they still underlined the 
importance of capabilities and market experiences and they used individual competence 
as an important factor for developing the trust. Through past business experience and 
personal relations, they knew each other’s capabilities and trustworthiness pretty well; 
therefore, they went into business together. DHY, among many others, explained his 
team formation process:   
 
The component of a team, for me, the most important thing is its 
complementarity.…I met my partner in the previous company; another one is my 
MBA classmate. We thought that our team was very stable based on our firm 
friendship. He ?the first partner?has a strong management capability and a very 
good market sense. He is currently still managing an enterprise with over 
thousand employees. Another one?the MBA classmate? has worked in this 
92 
 
 
industry for many years and knows it pretty well. So we discussed and established 
our team, and then further developed our ideas.  
 
Without prior social and economic exchange relations, one major task that the 
nascent start-ups had to ensure is whether a potential team member is capable of 
providing external resources and expertise. Respondents obtained such knowledge from 
learning and observations in the market and/or from other industrial peers. YX, among 
others, provided an example of how younger cohort members valued these cognitive 
dimensions in searching for and developing a reliable relationship with new team 
members:  
This is why I invited Vincent to join our team. He previously worked as a senior 
executive at Microsoft. He also started up a business and had led a team. Actually, 
we share many similarities in ideas and vision. After we discovered these, we 
began to discuss the developmental strategies. Then we moved forward step by 
step.
 
Second, respondents stressed the importance of sharing common values and a 
collective vision in team processes. In teaming up with their pre-existing ties, respondents 
assessed these elements based on their past experience of interactions and observations of 
their work values and visions; hence, trust emerged over a period of time. After ZQ 
joined a short-term project with Mr. Tian, she reflected upon her formal position at a 
state-owned design institute. She then decided to leave the institute and to follow Mr. 
Tian to start up their own business: 
Because of that design institute, I thought I didn’t fit there from a long-term 
perspective. I am the person who wishes to have a pure working environment and 
do something consistent with my vision. That is to say, I was looking for such an 
environment, and then tried to achieve my goals. I am the person who seeks the 
ideal. I was very luck to know Mr. Tian.  
 
A similar background, joint experience, and shared perspective provide ground for 
common vocabulary and mutual understanding, which facilitates effective 
communication and collaboration. For example, WB formed a team with his former 
colleagues from Lenovo. The common perspective and vocabulary with these members 
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not only encouraged an effective working relationship, but also sent signals to the market 
entities and won their trust. As WB explained:  
We have been working with each other for many years. Everybody is talking in the 
same language. These people are very important to me, such as my partners, 
shareholders, and investors. They are all speaking the same language. The 
customers notice that, and they bestow the trust in our organizational and 
managerial team. In this aspect, we are all professional in corporate management 
and personal management. From the auditor's point of view, they recognize that 
our company is very professional and has standard governance structures.    
Forming partnerships with new potential members is likely to be challenging 
because of the lack of prior knowledge and familiarity. In order to find the right partner, 
respondents met face-to-face and discussed whether their values, beliefs, and attitudes 
could be a match for a shared vision and the expected benefits. ZAM specialized in the 
mergers and acquisitions business in a consulting firm for several years; after he became 
familiar with the operational process, he looked for an opportunity to work in a new 
platform. He found that a private enterprise firm was staffing their team. He then 
contacted a chief investment officer and received an invitation where they met and 
chatted with each other. They exchanged information about each others’ project 
experience and vision for future development. After this meeting, he felt that “it was very 
promising” and he decided to join the team. 
Almost half of the CB respondents’ teams are mixed with different ties: the mixture 
of pre-existing ties and new ties and the mixture of members from different backgrounds, 
such as technology, marketing, and management. In order to form a stable and reliable 
team, respondents emphasized a collective vision. YX is a good example of this. After 
describing the different functions of his team members, he emphasized that:   
First of all, we need to evaluate whether we have the same common background. I 
mean, for example, whether we have a common language, common vision in our 
career, or whether we are similar or close in the starting line and economic 
condition. In this case, we share the common view. I think it is the background for 
later cooperation.   
 
94 
 
 
5.3  Political Networking 
CA: tie formation and trust development in P1 
Tie formation. In the earlier institutional period, the government still had 
considerable power to allocate resources and approve projects (Li & Zhang, 2007). 
Establishing interpersonal connections with government officials is particularly important 
to enhance performance among new ventures when the institutional support is weak and 
resources and opportunities are largely controlled by the government (Sheng et al., 2011). 
Table 5.2 compares the CA and CB in their political tie formation and trust development. 
In this study, nine out of 16 respondents used political networks to gain access to 
resources and business opportunities. Some respondents (N=4) contacted their 
pre-existing ties who were government officials at that time, such as former students and 
colleagues. Other respondents (N=5) established new political connections with 
government officials.  
Trust development. Although political networks facilitate access to critical resources 
and business opportunities, and reduce risks and uncertainties in a turbulent environment, 
political networking itself is inherently risky. Lin noted that “guanxi-mediated favor 
exchange with officials is in large part a collusive act that breaks existing rules and thus 
involves a risk” (2001b: 163). Violation of the code of conduct could lead to adverse 
consequences, such as the dissolution of the connection and disciplinary action. To 
reduce the risk, CA respondents mainly cultivated particularistic trust and affective trust 
with government officials.  
In the earlier institutional period, and due to the prevalence of state ownership, 
banks mainly financed state-owned enterprises; private enterprises faced financing 
difficulties, because they lacked financial channels and credit records. Another major 
challenge confronting private enterprises was obtaining business contracts and deals since 
many of these opportunities were still controlled by top-down administrative orders. 
Pre-existing ties with people who were working in the government facilitated informal 
exchanges based on interpersonal ties and particularistic trust.  
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Table 5.2 
 Political Tie Formation and Trust Development 
 
CA ? ?  
P1  
(N=9) 
Using pre-existing ties 
(N=4) 
Former students and colleagues working in government entities 
 Forming new ties (N=5) Government officials 
 Trust type Particularistic trust and affective trust 
Follow the codes of conduct and avoid risks, engage in affective 
interactions 
Familiarization, build and enhance affections through expressive 
interactions 
P2  
(N=9) 
Maintaining and using 
old ties (N=6)
Ties accumulated and maintained until P2 
 Trust type Particularistic trust and affective trust 
Consolidate interpersonal connections and affection 
 Establishing new ties, 
using old ties to bridge 
new ties (N=6)
Government officials they didn't know before; old political ties bridge 
new political ties 
?  Trust type Particularistic trust and affective trust 
Follow the established codes, maintain and blend affective interactions in 
cultivating and consolidating personal relations 
CB ?  ?  
P2  
(N=7) 
Forming new ties (N=6) Networked or networking with government organizations 
?  Trust type General trust and cognitive trust 
Identify interests, demonstrate competence and innovativeness, and 
maintain work relationship 
WJS had taught in a public security college and some of his students later became 
officials at a public security office. They helped him open the product market and 
“smooth and ease the guanxi.” CCL had worked as a staff member in the Shanghai 
Quality Supervision Bureau, taking charge of the printing department. During the reform 
period, the bureau needed to eliminate the printing business. After the relocation order 
arrived, CCL was given the opportunity to take over the printing department and started 
up his private business. When I asked why he could get such an opportunity and how he 
developed relationships with government officials, he replied that during his three-year 
working period, he made a positive impression on his colleagues:  
They [officials] thought I was young, very hardworking and close to them. This 
young man was very nice, very hardworking and had a good personality. So they 
gave the printing department to me, and then I started up my business.  
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Particularistic trust had been established in previous interactions; however, when 
respondents started up their own businesses, they still needed to maintain and consolidate 
particularistic trust to make sure that those relationships were still secure: Both start-ups 
and government officials wanted to ensure that the informal exchanges and agreements 
were closed to outsiders. As this type of trust was built up in a cumulative process, 
respondents also needed to ensure the quality of their products and services to maintain 
the informal exchanges. For example, HDS cultivated the particularistic trust with 
government officials when he was working in a state-owned enterprise. He explained 
how he consolidated the relationship: 
We know each other pretty well. What’s more, we had a very good personal 
relationship. He trusted me when he gave the project to me. He didn’t trust other 
guys. He felt that I was very reliable….I am quite familiar with the government 
officials. For them, people would cause trouble if they are not familiar with the 
systems, and the cost is also high. They don’t need to worry about what we are 
doing…. I have worked in the government before. Those working experiences and 
resources can be used during the venturing process?for example, the project of 
advertisement in subway stations. They felt relieved when I took the business, the 
leaders were very satisfied.   
 
For the respondents who did not have pre-existing ties, establishing new political 
ties was more challenging and demanded more tactics in cultivating trust. To reduce the 
risks inherent in the informal transactions and avoid the high risk of unwanted exposure, 
respondents tried to cultivate particularistic trust by building upon mutual agreements 
concerning appropriate behaviors. MM is a good example of using a political background 
to avoid risks in the earlier period (see page 69). 
FPX’s case provides us with insights into the actions of establishing political 
connections and cultivating particularistic trust to avoid the risk of unwanted exposure. 
When he initiated his business in electronic production, which was quite different from 
his previous research job, he described it as “I have nothing.” He sought out work with a 
state-owned enterprise to open the market: Producing the products and delivering them to 
the military firms via state-owned enterprise. FPX described how he established a 
personal relationship with a leader of the state-owned enterprise and opened the market: 
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He was a director?of a state-owned enterprise? at that time. I contacted him and 
asked him to cooperate. So we ?my company and I? produced electronic 
products and distributed them to him. He then delivered them to the military firm. 
Actually, he helped me through such a connection. That is to say, we didn’t show 
up, but if there were some technical problems, we would definitely come to help. 
He provided a very important and timely distribution channel.  
During the early period, private enterprises were not allowed to sell products 
directly to the military firm; when further asked how this trust relationship was built, 
FPX emphasized both the interpersonal fit and the transactional security (see page 73-74). 
Such subtle rules were also shared by other respondents and their political connections. 
As CFB illustrated: 
 
The most important thing is to let them ?the leaders in the university?approve 
your principles of doing things. They don’t care about the products so much. They 
had no idea about them. But still they let me do the business, because they trust me 
to do it. One important thing is to leave a good image, no side effects. This is the 
minimal condition. Another important thing is to maintain the service, and 
maintain good guanxi. If those two things have been done well. It is done!      
 
In order to cultivate and maintain these guanxi networks, respondents were also 
engaged in developing affective trust, such as actively connecting, demonstrating genuine 
concerns, and sending favors and gifts, including in their personal life through activities 
such as dining and wining together, and so on. CFB provided an example of how he 
“pull[s] the guanxi close” by blurring the social/expressive interaction and 
business/instrumental interaction at the dinner table. As CFB vividly described his 
strategies, “we never talked about money; it was only about emotional communication”. 
Respondents often invited government officials to visit their companies to 
strengthen contacts, or they were also often visited by government officials. After CCL 
set up his private printing business, his firm was frequently visited by his “friends from 
the government:” 
 
A: We got friends from the government...they visited our firm to check what we 
need. They could help you. For us, it is a very good opportunity. We also hope our 
firm could rise to a new level. 
Q: Were those the people who you knew from the previous job? 
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A: Some of them. After I set up this printing company, they were very concerned 
about me. So they came very often. Some of them were promoted. But there were 
also some new people.      
 
Respondents were also engaged in exchanging favors and gift giving to generate 
interpersonal commitments with government officials. XJF, among others, provided an 
example of how he combined emotional closeness and reciprocal exchanges to produce 
the particularistic trust and affective commitment: 
Good guanxi doesn’t come naturally. It’s pretty elegant. Can you explain why 
there is so much cooperation between government officials and businessmen? Why 
they should help you? You need a special relationship with them, and you need to 
reciprocate them, don’t be so selfish. 
CA: tie formation and trust development in P2 
In chapter four, I reported that in the later institutional period (P2), respondents 
(N=6) who had established political connections in the early period (P1) continued to 
maintain and even consolidate those old political ties; respondents (N=6) also established 
new political ties. Digging deep into the data, three patterns seem plausible to account for 
such maintenance.  
First, the informal exchanges and rules that were established in the early period still 
function in the current period; the early particularistic trust still bonds entrepreneurs and 
officials in more recent social and economic transactions. For the government officials, 
the particularistic trust can ensure that government projects are still managed by reliable 
persons without any trouble. When I asked FPX why he still maintains old relationships 
with leaders from state-owned enterprise, he replied: 
 
There exists a problem, which is how to obtain trust. Especially like the military 
firms, we have had the cooperation for quite a long time. They wish this 
relationship can continue. If I couldn’t manage my firm well, it will be a big 
problem.  
He therefore noted that “I follow the rules of the game,” and continues to conduct 
the business via the intermediary (not by himself); he was unwilling to break the “rules” 
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because he thought “if you break, you are not on the right track. Why should I do it just 
for some money.”  
HDS shared his view why the personal relationships and particularistic trust with his 
political connections have lasted for 13 years: 
 
The people in the government agencies, can be categorized into two types. One 
type is the ordinary officials, another type is the people who trust you. They like to 
find people who are reliable. They are concerned that some things might go wrong, 
so they are very careful in choosing the people. However, once the trust 
relationship has been built, there are many opportunities. This relationship is very 
important.      
  
Second, the increasing instrumental orientation in guanxi cultivation makes old ties 
appear warmer than new ties. During the market-oriented reforms, the value of 
networking was directed at more instrumental objectives. Respondents felt an increasing 
cost in establishing new connections with officials. Compared to particularistic trust and 
connections established over the long term, some respondents prefer maintaining old 
political ties rather than adding new ties. MM provided an example of why he still 
preserves his old political connections in the current period:   
  
My parents are old now, most of the people from this circle?officials that my 
parents know? were retired. Now the government is just like a big enterprise. 
Before that ?in the early period?, they?the government officials? could do a 
special favor for you and one didn’t need to pay for it. But now, if they give you a 
deal, it involves  interests. Therefore renqing?favor? is becoming more difficult, 
it’s not like before any more.  
......  
Before that, if one had guanxi, he could do whatever he wanted. Now things are 
different. The leaders are smart. If one screws it up, they will lose their official 
positions. Now the leaders have high salaries, they won’t take such risk; therefore, 
they also evaluate the company itself.     
 
Similarly, XMH is still “hanging out, dining and chatting” with his government 
“friends.” When he needs some help to ease the bureaucratic red tape, he still prefers 
turning to his old connections. He does not trust government officials he does not know. 
For him, these officials are annoying and always want to get something from him: 
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I have a personal relationship with the district mayor, why should I send the gifts 
to lower officials?! Why should I give them a favor and flatter them?!   
     
Third, old political connections also bridge relationship gaps between entrepreneurs 
and other officials and/or business partners. The particularistic and affective trust 
cultivated with government officials have gone through the institutional change; officials 
would voluntarily bridge business connections and furnish the base for trust and 
commitment between two parties. As HDS explained:     
?
After I started up the business, I got many deals from the government. For 
example, the decoration projects of tubes in two Pudong districts. I did it 
beautifully. The district governor accompanied the firm leaders to visit our 
company. As you know, I know him very well and he also trusts me. They ?the
district government?invited several companies for bidding on the new project. 
However, they preferred me over others. So they talked to the tenderer and I won 
the bid much more easily.     
 
CFB’s case provides an example of when trust and commitment has been 
established, a small hint can facilitate guanxi bridging:  
 
Q: So you asked them to make recommendations for you?   
CFB: Right! I could pull guanxi with them. “The university next to you has a very 
nice decoration, but there are no monitors.” After hearing this, they said, “well, 
the university president is my friend, I will recommend you to them.” So the 
business came. We have such kind of chemistry.  
Similar to cultivating guanxi in the early period, affective interactions?such as 
keeping in frequent contact, attending social activities together, and including one’s 
personal life?are still common activities in maintaining the particularistic relationships. 
I was impressed by CFB’s story that his small hint could be well received and interpreted 
by his official friends, I became more interested to know how guanxi works. He 
continued to explain: 
Because we have emotional exchanges, our personal relationship is built very well. 
Many things have been mixed together and we stay in contact very frequently. 
Closeness has different meanings. One has to maintain it. Although there may be 
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no business involved, the guanxi is still very good. If I have free time, we talk 
about the past or anything. It is really mixed. ? ?
?
According to the two cohorts’ narrations, it appears that the old cohort members 
attach a higher value on the increasing instrumental orientation in guanxi cultivation. 
However, some old cohort respondents still blend this with affective interactions to 
cultivate and consolidate relationships. YJ expressed his view on why he persisted to 
utilize affective elements in cultivating guanxi relationships: 
 
In the West, things get done in a sound system; therefore, personal affection or 
social networks don’t play such an important role. But what happens here? We?
Chinese?are traditionally affectionate, and we stress mianzi ?the?face??a lot. 
These factors need to be considered. However, with the development of society 
and the establishment of a sound legal system; when the government’s market 
regulation develops more maturely, renqing ?affection and obligation? and 
mianzi, and so on, will become RELATIVELY weak. But, I don’t think the 
dissolution of these things will occur in our nation.  
 
CB: tie formation and trust development in P2 
Tie formation. As was described in chapter four, in contrast to CA, fewer CB 
respondents (N=6) reported that they had political connections. Among this group, some 
(N=3) were actively networking with the government; half of the respondents (N=9) 
reported that they did not need or attempt to establish political networks to access 
resources and obtain business opportunities.  
Trust development. The more favorable regulative institutions are laying the 
foundations for generating trust between the government and younger start-up firms. CB 
members mainly develop cognitive trust with government officials and agencies to 
establish formal networks and cooperation.  
CB members started their firms in a much more regulated and transparent 
environment. The Chinese central government has been creating an institutional 
environment that is increasingly conducive to entrepreneurship (Gao, Vega, White, & 
Zhang, 2008: 64). The local government has been playing a direct and active role in 
supporting new ventures (Blecher & Shue, 2001). According to CB respondents, 
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Shanghai government agencies?such as the Science and Technology Committee, 
High-Tech Zone Administration Departments, universities-based incubators, and 
government supported venture capital funds?all play active roles in supporting new 
ventures. By providing supportive platforms, the Shanghai government increasingly 
promotes a positive image among younger start-ups, which facilitates networking and 
developing trust relationships. This improvement lays the foundation for an enterprising 
society in which start-ups become confident in these institutions and trust the reliability 
of other players.  
Respondents expressed that they would like to comply with the law, support 
government initiatives, and maintain formal cooperative relationships without having to 
cultivate particularistic and affective trust. YX’s firm is regarded by the local government 
as a “superstar company.” He described the government support as follows:     
The government actively supports us. In the Zhangjiang district, our company is a 
superstar private company. Except for the Shengda company, which is a listed 
company, we are among the top. For the Shanghai propaganda department, 
“Youku in the north, Tudou and PPlive in the south.”4 Therefore, in Shanghai, we 
are the only one. We receive local government support.  ?
 
Not only the “superstar company” but also some other new ventures have received 
government support. As JXJ described, many government agencies are helping his new 
venture (see page 76). ZD’s firm formed a positive cycle with the local government, he 
described this as follows:  
 
We cooperate with the government. We are doing the business and complying with 
the domestic laws and regulations. Although I have had little interaction with 
people from the government, when something happens, I call them and they 
coordinate it quickly. They feel that I have few troubles, because I conform to the 
regulations. They feel relieved….This is a good interaction.    
When general trust exists, dealing with government officials becomes easier for CB 
respondents, compared to CA respondents. Some younger respondents skipped intricate 
processes of cultivating the particularistic trust and affective attachment, directly 
involved in negotiation. As ZQ explained: 
                                                        
4 Youku, Tudou and PPLive are Chinese well-known video sites.  
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In this region, like the Yangtze River Delt, the average quality of government civil 
servants is very high. So dealing with this group of people is relatively pleasant. 
We just talk about the business. If it works, then we do it. If it doesn’t work out, 
then ?we?don’t do it. 
The general trust, backed up by the favorable institutional environment, creates both 
accountability and norms on which CB members base some degree of trust in the 
government. It also enhances their willingness and expectations for developing a 
cooperative relationship with government agencies. For respondents who wanted to 
develop this kind of relationship, they needed to establish cognitive trust which mainly 
involves three activities: identifying interests, demonstrating competence and 
innovativeness, and maintaining work relationships.   
Cognitive trust is motivated by self-interest and is established on the basis of the 
assumption that it is worthwhile to trust one another with the expectation of economic 
benefits (Doney, Cannon, & Mullen, 1998; McAllister, 1995). In P1, the economic 
exchange took place between CA members and government officials. However, it was 
informal and even disgraceful, which should be kept in the closet. For CB members, the 
nature of political networking differs: They need some resources and opportunities from 
the government; the government is motivated to support local private enterprises that can 
generate more output and taxes, which increases fiscal revenue and speeds up local GDP 
growth. The exchange of these economic benefits operates at a more formal (organizational) 
level and less at an informal (individual) level. 
This transformation has led CB members and government agencies and officials to 
develop clear goals and expectations for networking and cooperation. ZD’s firm, for instance, 
made significant tax contributions to a local Shanghai government. He traced back why and 
how a local government official actively contacted and invited him to set up a new 
factory there:   
  
A deputy director from the Economic and Trade Commission of the Songjiang 
district tracked my firm. Why did he track my firms? It’s NOT because we had 
special guanxi, but because he had worked in this casting field before. So we were 
peers! After I moved here, I received great financial support from the commission 
department. Our firm grew from a small-sized to a mid-sized firm. This was a big 
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boost. 
 
ZAM and YZD’s successful private equity business attracted attention from local 
governments in provinces and cities that were neighbors of Shanghai. They described 
how they were actively networked by these local governments to engage in investing in 
local firms: 
 
ZAM: For the government, they want to attract investment and business. They 
recommend their good local firms to us. They ask us whether we are interested in 
investing in these firms.  
YZD: There is much cooperation?with the government?. The majority of this 
cooperation is concentrated on the Yangtze River Delt and the southern Jiangsu 
province. They act as brokers: They attract funds, coordinate firms, and then 
connect these two interests.  
Demonstrating business competence and innovativeness is another important action 
in building cognitive trust. YBQ believed that he could obtain business deals from the 
public sector by demonstrating his firm’s competence, rather than via connecting with 
government officials:   
 
Take the project of the Public Health Center, for example, everybody including the 
hospital director and the government all thought that our company was the first 
choice. Because we got the opportunity to demonstrate our capabilities. We didn’t 
have any guanxi with the government; however, after evaluating our company, the 
government thought they could trust us and they handed this project to us. I think 
it’s because of our comprehensive competence.  
 
Dealing with the government’s recommendations of their local firms as investment 
opportunities, ZAM and ZD insisted on the professional standards in selecting projects. 
ZAM pointed out the importance of following standards and being selective in choosing 
projects: 
 
We emphasize our active research on industries. We are doing this to make sure 
that these projects are those that you want. ... The projects recommended by the 
government may not be the ones we want to invest….So it is very important to 
learn about the company, to be insightful and judicious about the decision. 
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Demonstrating the innovativeness of a business and obtaining cognitive legitimacy 
is critical for developing cognitive trust. This legitimacy is especially critical for younger 
start-ups when they are developing novel business models that lack government and 
public endorsements (Dacin et al., 2007). Without widespread knowledge of their 
business and activities, start-ups have difficulties gaining support from constituencies. 
Younger start-ups, therefore, actively diffuse knowledge about their business and send 
signals to demonstrate that they are reliable and worth connecting with. Take YX as an 
example, by engaging in P2P business and online broadcasting, he described himself as a 
“technology revolutionary.” The online broadcasting of TV and movie programs was a 
hit among young audiences. However, previously he worried that this business model 
was illegal as it may infringe upon property rights. He expressed concerns about his firm 
and other firms alike: 
 
Essentially, I think those companies are not bad, we are innovative companies. 
Focus media, Google, they are all doing innovation. In this process, you inevitably 
break through something. Focus media operated the business without a license for 
quite a while. Is it appropriate to crack it down? I don’t think it is appropriate. We 
have operated in online broadcasting without a license for three years. How can I 
do that? 
After describing his concerns, YX continued to explain how he managed to gain 
government support and endorsements:  
First, the company should promote itself. For example, YX is a representative of 
entrepreneurs, he is also a local entrepreneur. They ?the government and officials?
need to promote their local enterprises. We also take advantage of nationalism: We 
are doing independent intellectual property innovation….We also enrich people’s 
entertainment and make their lives comfortable. The state needs harmony and 
stability. This is actually an important policy.    
... 
We need to cooperate with the local government and organizations, engage in some 
activities, and be ready to contribute….One needs to prepare for these actively. For 
them, they need self-promotion; for us, it is a good opportunity to promote our 
public image. I often go to different meetings….Our company also provides 
internship places for college students. 
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XXT, the tax consulting start-up, often invited finance and tax officials to give 
lectures at his company. This strategy was quite successful as it attracted many customers 
who were eager to know more about policy trends. He further explained how his firm got 
the support from these officials and got them involved in this consulting service.  
For the state and government, they needed to know about how the policies are 
implemented. They needed a platform. So we told them that we just have that kind 
of platform.  
They had a couple of trials. The government officials became interested in 
explaining?the policies?to us. Actually, policies are like productions, they need to 
be brought to the market. They became interested in knowing about whether they 
?policies?are accepted and popular in the market, and whether they could achieve 
their expectations. So after the policies were introduced, we invited them ?finance 
and tax officials? to explain them. We gave a lot of feedback to them and later on 
they improved them. We have built effective interactions.  
5.4  Market Networking 
CA: tie formation and trust development in P1 
Using pre-existing ties and trust relationships. Studies found that entrepreneurs 
tend to mobilize resources and support through their pre-existing ties (Aldrich & Zimmer, 
1986). Especially under highly uncertain condition, they turn to those ties and add ties to 
existing relationships to secure commitments (Beckman et al., 2004; Cook & Emerson, 
1984; Yamagishi, Cook, & Watabe, 1998). During the establishment of their business, 
CA members obtained information, financial support, and business opportunities and 
emotional support from family members and friends. Those social-cultural ties feature 
particularistic and affective trust that is not the specific focus in this section. This section 
focuses on market networking.  
Table 5.3 depicts the differences between CA and CB in market tie formation and 
trust development. CA Respondents who had worked in firms (before they started their 
own business) all reported (N=4) that it was through close relationships established and 
accumulated with former colleagues and customers that they obtained the following 
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resources and opportunities: customers, human capital, market knowledge, and business 
cooperation. Respondents established particularistic and affective trust and further 
developed these relationships into business partnerships mainly through three activities: 
knowing someone’s personality and capability, forming informal exchange relationships, 
and bridging new connections via old ties.   
 
Table 5.3  
Market Tie Formation and Trust Development 
 
CA ?  ?  
P1 
(N=12) 
Using pre-existing ties (N=4) Former colleagues, customers, and industrial peers 
 Forming new ties (N=11) Business connections 
 Trust type Mainly particularistic trust and affective trust 
Benevolence, sincerity, and emotional closeness 
Engage in expressive interactions and social events 
P2  
(N=15) 
Using old ties (N=12) Stick to mutual obligations and commitments 
 Forming new ties via referral 
(N=8)
Using existing ties to bridge new business ties 
 Trust type Particularistic trust and affective trust 
Maintain mutual commitments and obligations, conform to 
the established rules of informal exchange, mix instrumental 
and affective interactions, and transfer trust relationships 
 Forming new ties (N=7) International and domestic business partners 
?  Trust type The emergence of general trust and cognitive trust 
Emphasize fitness and competence, engage in instrumental 
interactions 
CB ? ?  
P2  
(N=17) 
Using pre-existing ties (N=4) Former colleagues and customers 
 Forming new ties (N=16) Business connections 
?  Trust type General trust and cognitive trust 
Actively search, negotiate, and create value, signal 
competence, build a reputation, leverage and bridge 
relationships 
 
If respondents’ personality and capabilities proved to be trustworthy as a result of 
previous interactions and cooperation with business partners, business opportunities were 
offered to the new ventures. As FPX explained, “We had the mutual recognition,” one 
was “the recognition of each other’s merits,” the other was “they felt that we wouldn’t 
screw it up.” 
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Respondents also formed informal exchange relationships and tactical rules with  
their pre-existing connections, which generated particularistic trust and personal 
commitments. XMH, for instance, described that in previous strategic partnerships, he 
could sacrifice money for cooperation. He formed an informal exchange and 
particularistic trust with his previous clients who later became his business partners: 
  
They came to me for cooperation because they thought this guy was nice, they 
were satisfied with my job. They just gave me partial money from the project. You 
know, if they cooperate with foreign investment firms, everything is standard and 
inflexible. They like my style. Some of them tried to cooperate with other firms, but 
they didn’t like that style, so they still came to me.   
 
Having particularistic trust relationships with pre-existing ties is also an 
intermediary step toward tie formation. Given the limited resource flows and the high 
uncertainty in the early period, CA members like to bridge connections through 
pre-existing ties. DHC’s former superior introduced a Hong Kong supplier to him when 
DHC started up his business. This supplier later became DHC’s good partner and friend. 
FC described that a referral through people in the same “circle” was a common way of 
recruiting and bridging business opportunities:  
 
FC: We are in the same circle, we all came out from the clothing factory. “This is 
my mentor,” “this is my mentee,” we all recommended people to each other.  
Forming new ties. In P1, the business infrastructure and related institutions were 
insufficient for underpinning market transactions. Although pre-existing ties provided 
timely help and reduced the risk of opportunistic behaviors, those cohesive ties were 
limited in accessing diverse resources and opportunities. The great majority of start-ups 
(N=11) tried to establish new ties to gain access to resources and opportunities. The 
common pattern of tie formation can be identified as a guanxi development process 
which involves particularistic and affective trust cultivation.  
Trust development. Under high institutional uncertainty, actors seek to establish a 
committed relationship to produce security and reduce opportunism. Honesty and 
trustworthiness, under this circumstance, are very important for new tie formation. In the 
initial stage of tie formation, respondents tried to demonstrate their trustworthiness by 
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showing that they are sincere, honest, and capable; and they always treated their potential 
business partners respectfully. XJF, for instance, described how he made an impression 
on his potential business partner and developed a trusting relationship:  
It depends on how you communicate with them. You need to make them happy and 
get along well with them. If they have a good impression of you, they can trust you 
and provide you with some market information. It strongly depends on how you 
deal with people.   
 
DHC launched his IT service in 1996, setting up multimedia devices for other 
companies. The business was initially confronted with small-scale market acceptance. 
Instead of explaining the implementation and techniques in great detail, he spent a lot of 
effort in showing his sincerity and enthusiasm to his customers, thus obtaining their trust: 
    
At that time, IT was not popular. So the market development was very very difficult. 
You needed to tell them what it?the multimedia service?was. I showed my 
enthusiasm and honesty and that I could do solid work. I had some clients who 
initially were not familiar with me. Eventually, they accepted me and trusted me. 
Slowly I developed these relationships.  
 
The social commonality triggers a recall of the past and the discovery of common 
experiences and mutual friends. This reminiscence brings emotional bonds and facilitates 
envisioning mutual goals, thus instantly connecting two parties and boosting trust (Chen 
& Chen, 2004). In the Chinese context, potential parties get familiar with each other 
typically via self-disclosure of their birthplace, school, and work organization. FPX’s 
case exemplified how this method was used to shorten the interpersonal distance and 
pave the way for instant tie formation:   
I tried to talk to a company in Shanghai directly, the communication was so 
difficult. However, a guy who was in charge of the technology told me that there 
was another person working in Beijing, who also graduated from the University of 
Science and Technology. Then he gave me his ?the person working in Beijing?
phone number. I called him, he said we would try it together. So we started from a 
very small business?only dozens of yuan. Now, our products have become their 
major sources. 
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To enhance the quality of the relationship with their pre-existing ties and new ties, 
respondents were engaged in the following expressive interactions to cultivate affective 
trust: joining social events, reciprocating, and expressing genuine concerns.  
Many respondents took social events as an opportunity to build and enhance 
personal relationships. Through dining and having tea together, respondents nurtured 
affective trust and commitments. For example, WM obtained much support from her 
hometown fellows and friends during the initial business stage. As a return and to further 
consolidate these relationships, she frequently invited these people for meals at home: 
 
We always invite them to our home for meals. This is the way we maintain 
contacts and draw people closer. At the same time, we discuss how to improve the 
business. I am still very appreciative of their help. Actually, we just dined together 
a couple of days ago.  
 
This reciprocal exchange fosters strong feelings of affective attachment and 
commitment. The initial giving sends signals of the actor’s trustworthiness, lays the 
foundation for future exchanges, and eventually develops the basis on which trust is 
established (Molm, Takahashi, & Peterson, 2000). ZRQ described himself as an 
“Engineer of the Weekend” because during his previous work in a state-owned electricity 
meter enterprise, he offered free technical services to his entrepreneurial friends on 
weekends. When he started up his own business, these friends trusted him and offered 
business deals: 
At the very beginning, they had some difficulties in techniques. So they came to me 
for help. I accumulated a deep friendship with them. At least, they recognized me 
as a good friend. For example, one had a problem with the equipment in Ningbo 
and then he came to me. I didn’t take any salary and I even didn’t ask for travel 
reimbursement.  
….
After a couple of times, they thought about whether I had some difficulties. They 
wanted to reciprocate toward me. I said, “You don’t need to thank me, we could 
cooperate if there is an opportunity.” So they gave me a couple of 
projects….During their firm’s development, he gave the business to me instead of 
?giving the business to?his branch. He trusted me very much!   
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Affective trust develops when respondents form emotional bonds and demonstrate a 
genuine concern for exchange with a partner’s welfare. If respondents have the 
opportunity to get familiar with a partner’s family, then the trust is even more 
consolidated. As XJF explained:  
After we got familiar with each other, he recognized me. I also felt that he was a 
nice person. Then I got the chance to know his family and I kept chatting with 
them from time to time….. I got his good suggestions and ideas. 
CA: maintaining and using old ties in P2  
The majority of CA members still maintain and conduct business with their old ties 
and use these ties to bridge other connections. Respondents’ old ties established in P1 
create a path dependent network environment which shapes the formation of subsequent 
partnerships and the evolution of networks in P2. This inertia in tie formation is mainly 
due to the following processes and mechanisms: maintaining a long-term orientation in 
guanxi cultivation, following existing rules in informal exchange, and relying on old ties 
to bridge new ties.  
Establishing connections and developing trust relationships requires following the 
social norms of guanxi cultivation: maintaining a long-term relationship, mutual 
commitment, and obligation (Chen & Chen, 2004). For CA respondents, the appropriate 
way to build their guanxi network is to show their sincerity, affection, and commitment to 
the relationships through a gradual and subtle process of exchange. Mixing instrumental 
and expressive interactions and ensuring their congruence also needs to be a long-term 
perspective of the relationship. Once guanxi has been formed, start-ups further 
consolidate these ties through a virtuous cycle of frequent interaction. When this strong 
particularistic trust has been cultivated, the commitments and obligations still persist in 
later institutional periods, as WJS described: 
After long time, the business can be developed into a friendship. They have helped 
you before. Interest does exist, strategies are not pure, you have to think about the 
Jiaoqing (obligation). You need to strike a balance.   
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Subtle, informal relational norms and rules were also established in specific 
exchange relationships. In P2, respondents still conform to them to secure trust and 
exchange relationships, avoiding disapproval from their old ties. For example, in P2, FPX 
was still doing business with a third party via an intermediary and he did not “cross the 
line” to connect the business directly by himself (see page 99-100). 
Trust cultivated with their strong personal connections facilitates the transference 
process and bridges some new connections. This may also partially explain why CA 
members still largely maintain their old ties and do not invest much effort to seek out and 
form new market connections. XJF described it as “after some years of accumulation, 
with good guanxi networks, you can easily go around.” FC also trusted his referrals to 
bridge new ties: 
 
There is a degree of trust. For example, I knew a boss of a firm with 2000 
employees and I had a cooperation with him before….His referrals are more 
reliable because I know his personal character. In this case, we don’t need a long 
time to get right into our relationship.  
 
Although some respondents established new ties by themselves, there was a 
tendency that they were still engaged in expressive interactions. HDS illustrated how he 
used “common hobbies and interests” to build a relationship:  
I think I can develop guanxi in any environment. Having a chat over tea and 
cherishing the kindred spirit. We primarily get together not for business, but for 
hobbies and interests. We are very happy….Cherishing hobbies and interests also 
helps to establish guanxi. The business will come naturally. This seems very 
important in China.  
 
CA: establishing new ties and trust development 
In chapter four, I described the within-cohort variation for CA’s network 
configurations (see page). The linkage with international partners differentiates some 
respondents from their cohort peers regarding network configuration. Some respondents 
(N=5) formed new partnerships with international firms, and several respondents (N=4) 
formed new ties with domestic business partners. Most of these ties were formed through 
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industrial exhibitions, symposiums, the internet, word-of–mouth, and individual searches. 
Those respondents share some similarities with CB members (this will be discussed in 
the following text) in tie formation and trust development: Unfamiliar business associates 
can be trusted but cognitive trust needs to be developed. For example, when they were 
doing business with those new business partners, they developed a trust relationship by 
emphasizing business health and competence; they were more engaged in instrumental 
interactions, rather than affective interactions.  
The data suggests that there is an emergence of general trust and cognitive trust, as 
is demonstrated by some CA respondents. It can be regarded as an adaptation to the new 
institutional environment; however, the traditional norms and cultural schemes still 
appear to have some persistent influence in CA respondents which continue to influence 
their tie formation and trust development. For example, although XJF and FC follow 
international standards and conduct business with international partners, when they do 
business with domestic partners, they still emphasize reciprocating and affective 
interactions as important aspects of cultivating particularistic and affective trust.  
 
CB: tie formation and trust development in P2  
Forming new ties. In contrast to CA, CB respondents’ perception of the institutional 
environment in P2 is more positive. This makes CB’s tie formation propensity more 
directed toward adding new ties (see table 5.3); they invest less time and effort in 
utilizing pre-existing ties to pursue their entrepreneurial goals. Only a small number of 
respondents (N=4) reported that they obtained information, financial support, and 
customer resources via pre-existing ties, such as personal friends and previous colleagues. 
The majority of CB members (N=13) reach out to new individuals and organizations and 
form new ties that they have not worked with before. In the initial stage of tie formation, 
CB respondents mainly focus on three networking activities: expanding their search 
scope, evaluating the health of prospective partners, and targeting powerful players. 
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Younger start-ups expand the partner search scope by attending industry 
symposiums and conferences, alumni meetings, and informal get-togethers to explore 
opportunities to form new ties. As YX depicted:  
Almost in every season, there were VC gatherings. At those gatherings, I actively 
contacted venture capitalists. I handed my business plan to them. In most cases, 
they liked to read it and help me analyze its feasibility. If they were interested in it, 
they would contact me and establish a partnership.    
 
In order to find the right business partners, younger start-ups search, collect, and 
evaluate information about the potential partner’s companies, and check whether it might 
fit with the partnership and bring added value. After they identified the potential 
partnership opportunity, based on complimentary resources and skills, some respondents 
approached the potential partners via cold calls. HDT said that, “I contacted other 
companies and asked them to engage in the project together.” WB explained, “When I 
know some other companies are providing personal financial services, I call them 
directly.” 
During the partner search and selection process, respondents center on the criteria of 
a partner’s technological capability, managerial skill, and market power. For example, 
ZQ, WB, and ZD strategically chose alliance partners with high status and market 
positions. This partnering increases the new venture’s legitimacy in the eyes of potential 
partners. WB explained that the regulations of the financial market were still restricted; 
the business model of financial outsourcing was not well accepted and trusted. However, 
he strategically initiated the alliance with foreign banks, after his firm obtained a 
relational legitimacy, his business model was more acceptable among domestic firms (see 
page 78-79).   
Negotiation, value creation, and trust development. After making the initial contact, 
respondents negotiated specific details of the exchange. The first challenge is how to 
attract a prospective partner’s attention and interest, because small start-up firms are not 
well known or recognized in the market. For them, the negotiation provides a good 
opportunity to showcase their skills and reliability of being a preferred partner. During 
the negotiation phase, respondents underline how their technologies and services can 
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create a business solution and add value. YMP offers elite education courses for “smart 
kids” with a high price. His customers were reluctant to register their kids for the courses. 
To convince his potential customers, he described his market positioning strategy and 
promised to sell value-added courses (see page 78).  
Cognitive trust further develops as the dyadic interaction increases knowledge of the 
start-up’s competence (Smith & Lohrke, 2008:319). Rather than spending much effort in 
cultivating affective trust with certain parties, CB members mainly seek to invoke the 
cognitive process and signal their capabilities, trustworthiness, and reputation through a 
multitude of connections. 
The first possible way of developing cognitive trust is via strategic partnering. 
Strategic partnering sends signals to other market players that the new start-up is a viable 
partner because of the relational link with powerful market players (e.g., WB). The 
second way is to use their team networks. As has been reported in the preceding text?
CB respondents formed teams with people from diverse backgrounds and network 
resources. They also used these links to obtain trust from potential market partners. As 
WB illustrated:   
I think the trust is not based on me alone, it is based on my team. My team 
members have many contacts with banks. Just like Lenovo Venture Capital, they 
know your team members, and they have a high trust in us. They know that I won’t 
blow their money, so they would like to help me.   
 
The third way of developing cognitive trust is to simply focus on every business 
transaction and use it to gradually build one’s reputation. Respondents care about their 
reputation a lot, because they think it is important to secure trust, sustain cooperative 
exchanges, and expand their inter-firm relationships. YBQ emphasized the importance of 
reputation for developing inter-firm trust:  
 
At the initial stage, word-of-mouth is very important. It's always difficult to start 
with, however, if you have a good start, other parties get to know your company, 
not you personally. They recognize what this company can do and whether it can 
be trusted. After this stage, you can attract better talent and better customers. 
Only in that way, the company is able to achieve substantial growth.    
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Respondents’ endeavors to develop trustworthiness and a good reputation pay off in 
the establishment of relational legitimacy, which increases the likelihood of forging new 
ties, shortens the time, and reduces the cost in expanding connections. As they form new 
ties and bring value to these new partners, they also increasingly utilize network 
resources embedded in these ties with alliance partners, customers, and suppliers. 
Respondents learned and developed the skills of leveraging these network resources to 
attract potential partners. YX exemplifies this strategy: 
From 2006 and 2007, I adopted another business strategy. At the very beginning, 
with the financial support from VC, I accumulated customers and a reputation. 
After I got customers and a reputation, then I negotiated with content providers. 
They didn’t sell you their content simply because I offered a high price. However, 
once I had a certain amount of customers and a good reputation, then I talked to 
them, the chances ?of cooperation?are much higher.   
5.5  Institutional Change, Start-Up Cohorts, and the Evolution of 
Networking Styles 
Table 5.4 theorizes the major differences between CA and CB in their networking 
actions. I now elaborate these major differences and frame the propositions for future 
exploration. The high institutional uncertainty increases the likelihood of using 
pre-existing ties. In the organizational emergence stage, old cohort members confronted 
with the problem of inefficient property rights protection and the underdevelopment of 
market mechanisms started up their business by forming teams with family members, 
relatives, and friends. Teaming up with these pre-existing ties that they are familiar with, 
on the one hand, can help to reduce opportunistic behaviors, lower the effort of 
monitoring others (Gruenfeld, Mannix, Williams, & Neale, 1996), and reduce anxiety and 
unpredictability (Parise & Rollag, 2010); on the other hand, it helps generate high social 
identity, a strong commitment, and trust. In contrast, younger cohort members started up 
their business in a more favorable institutional environment? low institutional 
uncertainty, diverse market resource flows, and widespread entrepreneurship?in which 
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they could seek out and team up with new partners who have diverse backgrounds and 
skills. Thus:?        
Proposition 1. At the respective founding period, during the team formation process, 
old cohort members are more likely to draw on their pre-existing ties, while younger 
cohort members are more likely to form new ties or mix pre-existing ties and new ties.  
In the early institutional period, the initial discrimination of private firms and 
insufficient private property rights meant that political networking was of paramount 
importance (McNally, 2008) in obtaining resources and business opportunities. Start-up 
members used their pre-existing ties (e.g., family members, relatives, and former 
colleagues and students) who were working in the government as a short-cut to access 
these resources. For those who did not have these connections, they actively formed new 
political connections to reach their entrepreneurial goals. Starting up in a new 
institutional environment, younger cohort members established fewer political ties. The 
government encourages entrepreneurship and provides administrative support, especially 
for technology-related start-ups, thus increasing opportunities for networking with 
government agencies with whom they have not worked with before. Thus:  
Proposition 2. At the respective founding period, during the process of political tie 
formation, old cohort members are more likely to both use pre-existing ties and form new 
ties, while younger cohort members are more likely to form new ties. 
Table 5.4 
The Evolution of Networking Styles 
 
?  Network deepening  Network broadening 
Institutional 
antecedents 
  
 Formal institutions Unfavorable  Relatively favorable 
 Informal institutions Strong commitment and obligation  Competence and relational legitimacy 
Major orientation  Risk reduction Value creation 
Tie formation Mainly rely on old ties  Proactively form new ties 
Trusting type Particularistic trust and affective trust General trust and cognitive trust 
Focus of trust 
building 
Particularistic trust and affective trust Cognitive trust 
Consequences Small size of networks, strong and 
homogenous ties 
Larger size of network, weak and 
diverse ties 
 
When founded in the earlier institutional period, start-ups mobilize resources and 
seek support from their pre-existing ties (former colleagues and business partners), 
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because a commitment has been cultivated through previous interactions. Start-ups also 
actively form new ties to get access to diverse resources and opportunities. For younger 
cohort members, market institutions and factors are more developed. As such, these 
cohort members focus more on establishing new ties with market individuals and 
organizations. Thus:    
Proposition 3. At the respective founding period, during the process of market tie 
formation, old cohort members are more likely to both use pre-existing ties and form new 
ties, while younger cohort members are more likely to form new ties. 
 
The process of trust development is closely related to the propensity of tie formation. 
Under high institutional uncertainty, actors seek to establish interpersonal commitments 
to produce security and reduce opportunism. Start-ups have nurtured particularistic trust 
and affective trust during previous social and economic exchanges. This trust relationship 
provides critical support in an environment where trust in strangers is low. In forming 
new ties, start-ups mainly focus on the following aspects in developing particularistic 
trust: characteristic fit, benevolence, honesty, interpersonal bonds, informal agreements, 
and so on. They underline the following aspects in developing affective trust: forming 
emotional attachments, reciprocating, joining social events, and so on. For younger 
cohort members, the favorable institutional environment has increased their confidence 
that most people will not breach a transactional or cooperative contract (either written or 
psychological). The major task for them in attracting potential partners and forming 
connections is to develop cognitive trust: evaluating the health of a business, signaling 
value creation, strategic partnering, and building a reputation. That is:   
Proposition 4. In three types of networking?team formation, political networking, 
and market networking, old cohort members are more likely to focus on developing 
particularistic and affective trust, while younger cohort members are more likely to have 
higher general trust and focus on developing cognitive trust. 
Previous studies argue that with the decrease in institutional uncertainty, actors will 
transform from strong-tie-based networks to weak-tie-based networks (Peng & Zhou, 
2005), and from closed networks to open networks (Molm et al., 2000). This study 
demonstrates that because of the informal institutional pressures which emphasize 
expressive interactions, a long-term orientation, and tie obligations, and because of the 
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informal exchange agreements already established in past relations, old cohort members 
still reinforce old ties, add new ties via existing ties, and maintain and develop particular 
trust and affective trust relationships. That is: 
 Proposition 5. When founded in the earlier institutional period, in three types of 
networking, old cohort members are likely to maintain old ties and focus on preserving 
and developing particularistic trust and affective trust, thus demonstrating inertia in 
networking action in the current institutional period.  
This study also reconciles Beckman et al. (2004)’s categorization of two strategic 
focuses regarding networking actions. They propose that firms form additional ties with 
existing partners as a form of exploitation, and form new ties with new partners as a form 
of exploration. Similarly, Vissa (2010) differentiated between two types of strategic 
orientations in tie formation: network deepening and network broadening. The former 
refers to strengthening and maintaining existing ties, and the latter refers to reaching out 
and establishing new ties. During conditions of institutional change, the founding 
institutional environments of start-ups shape different networking styles. The networking 
style of old cohort members can be characterized as network deepening: relying on and 
consolidating old ties with the development of particularistic trust and affective trust; for 
the younger cohort, it is network broadening: seeking out and adding new ties with the 
development of cognitive trust. Thus: 
  Proposition 6. The founding institutional environment imprints on networking 
styles. The network style for old cohort members can be characterized as network 
deepening; while for younger cohort members, it can be characterized as network 
broadening.   
 
 
 
 
 
120 
 
 
CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
6.1  Summary of the Study 
How organizations and their founders respond to fundamental environmental change 
has been a frequent research topic for organization scholars. Although existing research 
provides some insight into this topic, competing theories and even contradictory 
arguments do not provide us with a clear picture of how actors respond to fundamental 
environmental change like institutional change in transitional economies. One stream of 
scholars argues that these unprecedented changes facilitate the organizational 
transformation and strategic adaptations (Danis et al., 2010; Guthrie, 1998; Keister, 
2002a; Peng, 2003; Peng & Heath, 1996). Another stream of scholars appeals for the 
attention to strategic inertia during institutional change (Child & Yuan, 1996; Czaban & 
Whitley, 2000; Kogut & Zander, 2000; Kriauciunas & Kale, 2006). 
In chapter two, I outlined the theoretical foundations of both streams. For the first 
stream, the underlying assumption is that in transitional economies, institutional 
structures?especially formal institutions?move and will move toward converging with 
those of developed market economies (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2006). Although a complete 
convergence seems unlikely, scholars from this camp generally believe that with the 
development of regulative institutions, firms and their founders make and will make the 
strategic shift to realign themselves to fit into new environmental demands. Another 
stream of scholars argues that firms and their founders are constrained in their ability to 
adapt to changing conditions; therefore, they demonstrate a tendency to preserve their 
initial strategies and resist change. As I identified in the introduction chapter, the puzzles 
are: How do entrepreneurs make strategic choices during the institutional change phase? 
Do they adapt to fit with the changing institutional environment or do they exhibit 
strategic inertia? If inertia is pervasive, why do we still observe adaptation? If change is 
pervasive, why do we still notice inertia? Who is involved in these processes? What are 
the underlying processes and mechanisms? How does change and adaption become 
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possible in transitional economies? 
The massive changes in China over the last three decades are undeniable. I frame the 
proceeding questions as research puzzles because even when we notice such changes, 
why do we still observe inertia? The real disagreement in the two streams of research is 
not whether there is change or inertia during the environmental changes, but rather how 
individual organizations respond to such changes and what might differ in their 
responses.  
Stimulated by these research puzzles, I embarked on this research project to seek 
answers. Adopting the institutional perspective, I extended the theoretical debate 
centering on the environmental effects regarding general strategies to network strategies 
and outlined three critical research gaps in the existing literature: 1) Scholars tend to 
privilege one or another institutional pillar; few studies have empirically explored the 
specific combination and interactions among pillars, and how the specific combination at 
different periods shape networks. 2) Extant studies mainly examine or propose the 
evolution of network structure; they have not closely investigated actual networking 
actions and evolutions. 3) Scholars have rarely explored how firm and entrepreneurial 
cohorts might differ in their network configurations and networking actions. 
To fill these critical gaps and solve the puzzles, this study applies a start-up cohort 
comparative approach. The objectives of this study are: 1) to explore how entrepreneurs 
construct and evolve their networks and networking actions during the institutional 
change phase; 2) to examine the effects of the founding institutional environment and the 
changing institutional environment on networks and networking; and 3) to unpack the 
processes and mechanisms of network evolution?network inertia and network change.  
Two empirical chapters are devoted to understanding the evolution of networks and 
networking during the period of institutional change and the underlying processes and 
mechanisms. Chapter four focuses on the evolution of network configurations and the 
effects of the founding and changing institutional environments. The empirical findings 
refute the argument that firms make strategic adaptations regarding their networks during 
the institutional change phase regardless of their origins. After demonstrating the 
distinctions between two start-up cohorts’ network configurations?the old cohort shows 
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network inertia while the younger cohort shows a novel network configuration?I dive 
into the data and unpack the processes and mechanisms that lead to such differences. One 
major finding is that the founding institutions at a given period comprise a specific 
combination of three pillars (regulative, cognitive, and normative). The exposure to the 
respective founding institutional environment impacts the two cohorts’ initial network 
configurations and continues to affect subsequent network trajectories.  
After revealing the power of the founding institutional environment, chapter four 
proposes that we need to bring back the institutional origins to investigate the full range 
of resources and relationships that contribute to the characteristics of firms and their 
founders in the founding period (Johnson, 2007), and examine how this initial link affects 
their subsequent strategies. This study suggests that institutional pillars have different 
mechanisms in affecting networks and networking; therefore, we need to give an equal 
balance to the three pillars and pay more attention to the effect generated by the 
combination of the three pillars. This chapter concludes with the proposition that the 
alignment of regulative, cognitive, and normative pillars of various natures during 
different periods creates alternative pressures and incentives for entrepreneurial cohorts 
to adopt legitimate networking behaviors. These institutional pressures and 
entrepreneurial responses need a closer examination in future research.  
Naturally and closely related to the evolution of network configuration is the 
evolution of networking actions, which unfortunately has received much less attention 
from scholars. Chapter five highlights two aspects of networking action?tie formation 
and trust development?and analyzes how and why two start-up cohorts differ in their 
networking action during the institutional change period. The empirical findings 
demonstrate that in three types of networking?team formation, political networking, and 
market networking: old cohort members tend to maintain and consolidate pre-existing 
ties, and develop particularistic and affective trust; younger cohort members tend to forge 
new ties and develop cognitive trust with higher general trust backed up by the 
development of regulative institutions.  
Chapter five can be regarded as an extension of chapter four, in which the process 
and mechanisms for the differentiations between the two cohort’s network configurations 
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are traced in greater depth and are further elaborated. Chapter five confirms and 
reinforces the findings in chapter four in proposing that institutional uncertainty (mainly 
engendered by regulative pillars) has a significant influence on tie formation propensity 
and trust development: higher uncertainty leads to adding ties with pre-existing ties and 
developing particularistic trust; lower uncertainty leads to forming new ties with a higher 
general trust. Informal institutions (norms, values, and schemas engendered by cognitive 
and normative pillars) also have a great impact on trust development: traditional informal 
institutions emphasize developing and consolidating affective trust; the diffusion of new 
informal institutions during the marketization and globalization period underlines 
developing cognitive trust. These findings lead me to theorizing on two distinctive 
networking styles: the old cohort uses the network deepening style; the younger cohort 
uses the network broadening style. By shedding light on the process of networking, we 
now have a clearer picture and more thorough understanding of the network differences 
beneath the network configurations and have enriched the theory of how founding 
institutional environments affect concrete networking actions.    
6.2  The Evolution of Chinese Entrepreneurship and Networks 
When a formerly planned economy was transformed into a market-oriented 
economy, many institutions underwent dramatic reforms (Lau, Tse, & Zhou, 2002; Peng, 
2003). Phase transitions in transitional economies produced generational differences 
among customers (Hung et al., 2007), managers (Egri & Ralston, 2004), and 
entrepreneurs (Tan, 2007; Yang, 2007). Chinese entrepreneurship has been a key catalyst 
in China’s rapid growth in the past three decades (Xiang & Teng, 2008). However, 
current studies on Chinese entrepreneurship have been too general in their accuracy. 
Considering the diversity of entrepreneurs and their historical backgrounds, researchers 
proposed the framework of classifying entrepreneurs into different generations. For 
example, Yang (2007: 203-219) identifies two entrepreneurial generations in China 
during the institutional change period based on their start-up age, institutional 
environment, and coping strategy. The first generation opened their business near the end 
of the 1970s; most of them started their business careers in their 40s and 50s. They had to 
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deal with changing state policies and employ corresponding strategies to reduce risks and 
avoid potential penalties. Those strategies include building guanxi with government 
officials and increasing media coverage to legitimize their private businesses. Yang refers 
to the “second generation” as those who started their business after the first generation, 
for example, those who “step into the sea” in the early 1990s or later. Xiang and Teng 
(2008) have a similar categorization of the first generation, but they further divide 
entrepreneurs who started their business after the early 1990s into two generations. 
Despite the different categorizations, these studies suggest that the interaction between 
institutional rules and the market shapes Chinese entrepreneurship and makes the 
evolution of entrepreneurial strategies possible.   
This study reconciles these researchers’ historical perspective, but differs from these 
studies in two aspects. First, this study employs a start-up cohort approach, compared to 
the generational perspective that is mainly based on a birth cohort; the former can better 
capture the relationship between entrepreneurs and their founding institutional 
environment and examine how the founding and changing institutional environments 
influence their entrepreneurial behaviors. Second, rather than examining the general 
entrepreneurial strategies, this study focuses on one important strategy?networks and 
their evolution during the institutional change phase. This is a novel attempt; however, 
this study could only examine the differences between two cohorts (starting up the 
business after 1992) because of the following two reasons.  
First, previous studies have examined general entrepreneurship. They do not specify 
private entrepreneurship; furthermore, these studies mainly stay at the conceptual level 
without using first-hand data to analyze the evolution of entrepreneurship. As I reviewed 
in chapter two, although Chinese institutional changes have experienced three stages, 
private entrepreneurship has only been boosted since the second stage (since 1992). In the 
first stage (1978-1991), entrepreneurs employed a hybrid form of ownership (combining 
both state and market elements) to access financial resources and overcome government 
indifferences (Nee, 1992; Wank, 1999); however, they were still confronted with high 
risks and uncertainty. Thus, the small scale of private entrepreneurs makes sampling very 
difficult. Second, most first generation entrepreneurs started their business when they 
were in their 40s and 50s. By now, most of them have either retired or are approaching 
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retirement, or have simply exited from the market. Selecting them for the comparison 
may create a selection bias, because they might not be proactive in their business and 
networking strategies.   
Even though the first generation of private entrepreneurs is not the focus of this 
study, it is still worth observing and comparing them. Some studies and anecdotes 
indicate that the first generation of entrepreneurs and managers demonstrate strategic 
inertia because of the past socialist imprinting and cultural influence. For example, Egri 
and Ralston (2004) found that managers of the Republican era generation (born in 
1911-1949) are significantly more conservative in changing their values because they are 
highly influenced by Confucianism, which emphasizes the virtues of benevolence, 
propriety, respect for social hierarchy, and a commitment to collective interests; even 
though they are later exposed to Western management values, the influence of Western 
values seems very limited. Yu (2009), a Chinese financial journalist, studied venturing 
stories of 23 Chinese entrepreneurs from 1978 to 2009 and analyzed the reasons behind 
the failures of these entrepreneurs. One of the reasons is that entrepreneurs stuck to their 
old strategies and failed to adapt to the market economy. During the initial reform period, 
due to the insufficient legal framework (e.g., lack of property rights protection and 
market regulation), entrepreneurs had to hit the ball within the limits of the court in order 
to survive and accumulate capital. However, when the legal system was enhanced and 
market factors were more developed, they still stuck to the old informal and illegal 
practices and failed to follow the new legal procedures, which ultimately led to their 
failures.  
To date, no scientific studies have been conducted to investigate how the first 
generation of entrepreneurs have established and evolved their networks during the 
institutional change period. A business commentator, Wang (2008), noted that most of the 
first generation entrepreneurs spent 90% of their energy pulling guanxi, and invested only 
10% in their business operation. This might be an exaggeration. However, it depicts the 
prevalence of guanxi practices during the initial reform period and may explain the 
failure of first generation entrepreneurs. The younger generation had to look for 
opportunities in the market. Entrepreneurs from the first generation who attached too 
much importance to interpersonal connections have gradually faded away or retired. A 
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new generation exhibiting a focus on customers and products have been rising on the 
stage and seeking competitive advantages. As this study shows, networks are still 
continuing to play important roles for business venturing. However, the type of 
connections have been undergoing a transformation from interpersonal relationships 
(guanxi) to strategic networks. The entrepreneurial generations and entrepreneurial 
networks have been co-evolving with Chinese institutional changes.        
 
6.3  Implications for Theory and Practice 
By specifying how and why different start-up cohorts demonstrate distinctive network 
configurations and networking styles during the institutional change period, this research 
makes significant contributions in the areas of studying institutional change, 
organizational populations, and network evolution.   
Implications for the institutional study of the founding environment 
This research has three major implications for studying the effect of the founding 
environment from the institutional perspective. First, the research findings shed light on 
how the founding institutional environment imprints on network configurations and 
networking styles. This study reveals that founding institutions in different periods confer 
different resources, opportunities, and constraints on entrepreneurial cohorts, delineating 
and legitimizing the appropriate networking actions and network constructions. Founding 
institutions lead to network inertia for old cohorts. When the founding institutions are 
embedded in the changing conditions with the diffusion and actors’ perceptions of new 
norms, values, and practices, they facilitate distinctive networking styles and thus 
network configurations for the younger cohort. This result contradicts the argument that 
younger organizations are more likely than older organizations to develop cohesive 
networks because of the liability of newness (Kim et al., 2006; Stinchcombe, 1965). 
Without denying that new ventures usually lack specific sets of resources and capabilities 
that more established firms have accrued (Stinchcombe, 1965), I suggest linking the 
liability of newness with different founding institutional conditions and examining how 
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younger firms might benefit from the new institutional environment in terms of resources, 
opportunities, new norms, values, and schemas.  
Second, this research offers a rich and process-oriented institutional study to 
understand the underlying processes and mechanisms that lead to network differentiation. 
Institutional change is a compressed and rapid environmental change (Newman, 2000; 
Peng, 2003). In transitional economies, institutional change punctuated by different 
phases significantly influences entrepreneurial processes, available resources, and 
strategies. Thus, the effects of institutions on inertia and change are probably stronger in 
a changing institutional environment than they are in a relatively stable institutional 
environment (i.e., developed economies) because of the alignment effect of the 
institutional pillars at the founding period, even if such a period is relatively short. Not 
only are the pillars contested but their sources are also subject to change. The underlying 
mechanisms lie in the alignment of regulative, cognitive, and normative pillars of 
different natures during different periods, which creates dissimilar pressures and 
incentives for emulating and practicing legitimate networking behaviors.   
This process and mechanism-oriented study also offers implications for institutional 
theory on change (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). Inertia and evolutionary change (if any) 
is likely to exist among the old cohort because of this group’s exposure to the alignment 
of unfavorable regulative institutions with strong traditional cognitive and normative 
elements. Revolutionary change is more likely to be exhibited by the younger cohort 
because of their exposure to the alignment of more favorable regulative institutions with 
the new cognitive and normative elements.   
Third, this study also enriches our understanding of the relationships among 
institutions, cognition, and networks. The uncertainty and incoherence perceived and 
experienced during the institutional change phase anchors entrepreneurs’ interpersonal 
networks and constrains strategic adaptation. The relational embeddedness with domestic 
networks limits the alertness and cognition of external institutional change as well as the 
willingness and ability to adapt and modify behaviors. These two structures (networks 
and cognition), in turn, are largely defined and influenced by the founding institutional 
environment. For a new entrepreneurial cohort, changes in the founding institutions 
facilitate the perception of the cost of close coupling with the intricate traditional 
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relational system and the benefits of coupling with a new business system, which lead to 
a novel network configuration. Thus, rather than examining the general response to 
institutional change, researchers should study the interrelations among institutions, 
cognitions, and networks to understand how each one influences, facilitates, or constrains 
the others (Beckert, 2010).    
Implications for organizational population theory 
This study demonstrates the cohort differences of entrepreneurial networks during 
the institutional change phase. This has implications for organizational population theory. 
Organizational ecologists provide a classic example of a cohort effect?density delay. It 
occurs when population density (the number of organizations of a particular type) during 
the founding period affects subsequent life chances (Carroll & Hannan, 1989). 
Organizational ecologists found that population density?has a non-monotonic effect on 
organizational founding and failure rates (Carroll & Hannan, 1989; Hannan & Freeman, 
1989). The small number of organizations within a population increases the legitimacy 
for the whole population and encourages the founding rates. When the number rises to a 
certain level, the competition for resources discourages the founding behavior and 
increases the failure rate (Hannan & Carroll, 1992; Hannan & Freeman, 1989). Although 
the population density argument informs the relationship between the population of 
organizations and its institutional environment, the direct influence of these relationships 
has not been investigated (Baum & Oliver, 1992; Zucker, 1989). This study shares Baum 
and Oliver’s (1992) view about the relationship between population density and the 
institutional environment: conforming to the norms and social expectations of an 
institutional environment can improve survival chances (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The 
more links an organization establishes with its institutions and adheres to institutional 
prescriptions of appropriate behavior, the more legitimacy and status it can gain (Baum & 
Oliver, 1992; Meyer & Scott, 1983; Singh, Tucker, & House, 1986). This study not only 
confirms the interconnections between the organizational population and the institutional 
environment, but also enriches this interconnection by focusing on the founding 
institutional environment and the powers it engenders by combining three institutional 
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pillars. Future studies could explore how the interconnections (their fit or a lack thereof) 
with regulative, normative, and cognitive pillars impact the performance of start-ups of a 
certain population.   
This research also confirms that start-up cohort members tend to exhibit similar 
structural features when they enter the market during the same period (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1984; Stinchcombe, 1965), even if there is a certain degree of variation in 
industrial engagement. This may be even more plausible in transitional economies than in 
developed economies, because each institutional period conveys different resources, 
opportunities, institutional pressure, and ranges of solutions (Peng, 2003; Scott, 2008). 
This study suggests that organizational populations likely co-evolve with institutional 
change. A new founding institutional environment increases the diversity of 
organizational forms (Romanelli, 1991) and new types (populations) of organizations are 
likely to be established by a younger cohort rather than by an older cohort. The initial 
founding conditions make network inertia a prevailing reality for an old cohort, whereas 
the new cohort is likely to be the source of diversity in business communities (Aldrich & 
Ruef, 2006: 132). However, unlike the idea that new organizational forms must draw on 
existing stocks of resources and structures and thus are constrained by their founding 
environment (Romanelli, 1991), this study proposes that a new institutional environment 
can provide a new population with a different opportunity structure and distinct 
institutional pressures to conform to, which may facilitate the diffusion of new norms and 
innovative practices (such as decoupling and coupling). This implies that radical change 
at a societal level is likely to occur through the succession of younger entrepreneurial 
cohorts during institutional change. A future study could apply the cohort comparative 
approach to investigate how organizational populations evolve and how the succession of 
populations shape and update the business field.    
Implications for network theory 
This study contributes to network theory and research in three aspects. First, this 
study contributes to the development of network theory and future empirical orientations 
by nesting relational embeddedness in institutional embeddedness. The former refers to 
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the types and strength of relationships in which ties are embedded (Uzzi, 1996). The 
latter refers to the interconnections between a population and its specific institutional 
environment (Baum & Oliver, 1992). The latter may reinforce the former and lead to 
over-embeddedness. For example, closed networks, also found in other post-socialist 
societies, limit access to new opportunities and lead to network inertia during the 
institutional change period (Ledeneva, 1998; Rose-Ackerman, 2001a). Although this 
study only examines the networks of the younger cohort for a short period, I emphasize 
that embedding in a new institutional environment creates a path for divergent change 
(Greenwood & Hinings, 1996).  
The second insight underscores the logic of “appropriateness” in network formation, 
evolution, and dissolution, which has been noted elsewhere (Burt, 1987). Similar to Scott 
(2008: 68), this logic asks “given my role in this situation, what is expected of me for my 
network behavior?” Strategic network behavior might be perceived as appropriate and 
necessary in some contexts by some actors who share similar values, whereas in other 
cases, it may not be appropriate. Thus, the rational calculation and strategic management 
of networks needs to be validated in different contexts and with different actors. 
The third contribution lies in its illustration of networking action which is 
insufficiently studied in the previous literature (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003a; Slotte-Kock & 
Coviello, 2010). This study integrates the outcome oriented approach and process 
oriented approach, offering the critical link between network configuration and 
networking action by using the mixed method design. Furthermore, this study echoes the 
recommendation of scholars in exploring the environmental contingences of network 
processes and dynamics by identifying two distinctive entrepreneurial networking styles 
during the institutional change phase. The insights drawn from the inductive data on the 
relationship among the core theoretical constructs (institutions, entrepreneurial processes, 
networks, and cohorts) generate the testable propositions for future research.      
Boundary conditions and alternative explanations 
In interpreting the theoretical insights, certain boundary conditions and alternative 
explanations need to be noted. First, the respondents are engaged in small- and mid-sized 
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businesses, thus, the results may not apply to large firms. The study of the effect of firm 
size remains ambiguous in the literature. Some scholars suggest that, due to structural 
inertia, larger organizations may reduce the speed of dissolving old ties and establishing 
new ties in a changing environment (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Haveman, 1993; Kim et 
al., 2006). Others suggest that large firms demonstrate more sensitivity and a greater 
ability to adapt?that is why they grow big (Dittrich, Duysters, & de Man, 2007; 
Romanelli & Tushman, 1986). This study suggests that the effect of firm size on network 
behavior may be contingent on the firms’ and founders’ exposure to the founding 
environment, especially in the context of transitional economies. For example, compared 
to the firm sizes of CA, those of CB are even smaller; however, members of CB have still 
more proactively formed strategic networks from the beginning of their ventures.  
The second alternative explanation, which is also related to the previous one, is that 
an emerging market (a new industry and business model) requires strategic action from 
the new cohort, whereas a traditional market requires less adaptation from the incumbents 
(Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). As argued above, I suggest that it is the institutional change 
that facilitates the emergence of new market fields and allows new norms, values, and 
practices to emerge and diffuse, and together they stimulate new network configurations. 
This insight merits further examination of this causal relationship.  
The third alternative explanation of network differences between cohorts might be 
due to an age effect in that older cohorts are less proactive than younger cohorts. The 
“age effect” suggests that younger entrepreneurs are generally more proactive and likely 
to take risks than older ones (Cassar, 2006; Harada, 2003; Lynskey, 2004). By comparing 
network configurations of a younger cohort in the contemporary period with an older 
cohort during an earlier period, I have shown that even at the similar age when they 
founded their business, the younger cohort still demonstrates distinctive features. This  
suggests that the younger cohort is not simply young, rather their proactiveness is 
significantly more facilitated by their embeddedness in a new institutional environment.  
Implications for practice   
This study enriches the understanding of how strategic choices are made during the 
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fundamental institutional change period and how to deal more effectively with challenges 
associated with such environmental shifts. Managerial practices should focus not only on 
economic performance but also on the organization-level structures which are reactions to 
the institutional environment (Guthrie, 1999). Firms and entrepreneurs should be aware 
that their environmental origins and relational embeddedness might trap them in their 
own networks and impede the adaptation during the institutional change period. 
Entrepreneurs from the old cohort should be aware of the potential negative effect of their 
relational embeddedness. They may reduce network inertia by linking up with 
international partners and/or with those of younger start-ups, learning and adapting to 
new relational norms, values, and practices. 
Entrepreneurs from the younger cohort should take advantage of the new 
institutional environment and practice the strategic management of their networks. They 
may also need to be sensitive and flexible when interacting with entrepreneurs from the 
old cohort where certain expressive interactions may be still needed. They also need to be 
conscious of the fact that networks may be “easy come, easy go.” Finding a good match 
and securing exchanges with partners are both important in effective network 
management. Long-term cooperative relationships and reciprocal exchanges can also 
consolidate the network and enhance trust.  
For international partners who want to achieve business success in China, the 
conventional wisdom of establishing guanxi (in the traditional sense) prior to a 
transaction might not work when interacting with younger entrepreneurs. Foreign firms 
and managers are strongly advised to build relationships first before a commercial 
transaction (Ambler, 1994). This golden rule is challenged in contemporary China, 
especially in metropolitan cities like Shanghai where the norms of instrumental 
interactions in business are widespread. As Möllering and Stache (2010) suggest, there is 
no fixed model that foreign managers can simply follow when they are doing business in 
“Rome.” They need to get to know the “Romans,” keep an open mind, and set up 
common rules that work best in the specific context. I suggest that foreign managers need 
to realize the differences among entrepreneurial cohorts when engaging in networking 
and other business activities. It is advisable to contextualize and legitimize networking 
actions when dealing with Chinese partners of different cohorts.   
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6.4  Limitations and Future Research 
There are several limitations of this study. First, despite the in-depth qualitative 
interviews combined with the quantitative design, the relatively small sample size may 
limit its generalizability. Although this study provides theoretical insights into 
relationships among institutions, entrepreneurial processes, networks, and entrepreneurial 
cohorts, the causal relationship needs further testing and validation. Therefore, I call for 
future research to test the propositions with a larger sample using the quantitative method 
employed here. 
Another limitation is that it is a retrospectively-based study since strict longitudinal 
data (over two decades) was difficult to obtain. According to life course theorists, 
retrospective data is valuable in analyzing the influence of historical events. However, the 
quality of data depends strongly on the memory of respondents (Levy, Ghisletta, Le Goff, 
Spini, & Widmer, 2005). This retrospective data may create recall bias in reporting ties in 
the way that it may result in an under-representation of weak ties (Lin, 2001a), especially 
for the old cohort members. This limitation was discussed in chapter three (mixed method 
design and data collection) and chapter four (page 64). Certain techniques were employed 
to minimize this limitation, such as “event tracking” interview techniques and the 
triangulation of qualitative and quantitative data. Nevertheless, this limitation needs to be 
noted and a future longitudinal study could serve to diminish the impact of a retrospective 
bias (Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975; Mayer, 2008; Scott & Alwin, 1998). 
The third limitation is that this study could only examine the networks of the 
younger cohort in the contemporary institutional period, which was a relatively short 
period compared to that of the older cohort. Although the network configuration of the 
younger cohort in the current period is different from that of the older cohort in both 
periods, we still need to further test the propositions to understand how members of the 
younger cohort evolve their networks in the future: Is there continuous adaptation or does 
stability and inertia set in with the passage of time? If so, how might these be different 
from that of the older cohort? For the older cohort, does the imprinting effect decrease or 
increase over time if the cohort members remain in business? Considering these 
conditions, this study should be regarded as an exploratory one. I call for future 
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longitudinal panel studies to validate my findings. 
The proposed institutional perspective of network evolution suggests important 
research issues for future explorations. First, future explorations could test the 
relationships among institutional change, the development of market fields and 
organizational forms, and network dynamics. In addition, in contrast to their appeal for 
cross-industry investigations (Elfring & Hulsink, 2007; Madhavan et al., 1998), I propose 
that future studies could focus on one industry to examine how the entry of 
entrepreneurial cohorts at different industrial stages during the institutional change phase 
influences their initial networks and the subsequent trajectories of their networks. 
Second, a future study could devote more attention to “failure” cases and employ the 
longitudinal panel design to further examine the role of the founding institutional 
environment on network evolution. In this research, only successful and survival firms 
and entrepreneurs were sampled. It remains intriguing to examine the following questions: 
Why did others fail? Is it because of the persistence of old ties and traditional networking 
practices, or because of abrupt changes without stabilizing the connections, or because of 
the confusion and delayed response during the institutional change period? Future 
research could follow different cohorts of firms and entrepreneurs over time. This would 
generate more rich and complete data for hypothesis testing and theoretical advancement.  
Third, future research could also enhance the measures and include information on 
the inter-organizational networks when the ego-centered network analysis technique is 
adopted. This will generate richer data on both the informal and formal networks and 
would facilitate a comprehensive examination of network dynamics during the period of 
institutional change.  
Fourth, since this study was initially inspired by life course studies, it is worth 
highlighting the implications for this perspective. Life course researchers use the 
Age-Period-Cohort model to study the influences of aging, time period, and cohort 
membership on social change (Mason & Fienberg, 1985). It is usually impossible to 
cleanly disentangle age effects, period effects, and cohort effects using cross-sectional 
data, even with a longitudinal data set. It is still difficult to disentangle these effects 
because these effects are interwoven to produce the focal phenomena in question (Alwin 
& McCammon, 2003). Although this study could not clearly disentangle these effects and 
135 
 
 
separately test the explanatory power of each effect, it does strongly confirm the cohort 
effect. (1) The institutional change does not have universal influence (period effect) on 
Chinese entrepreneurs. The distinctive formative experience (Mannheim, 1970) that 
members of the start-up cohort share during the founding period persists throughout 
subsequent business activities. The specific networking style and configuration that was 
adopted at the founding period continues to influence and differ in subsequent response 
patterns to the institutional change (cohort effect).  
(2) The age effect, as discussed in the preceding text, could not simply be used to 
explain the network inertia for the old cohort (see page 132) and the distinctive networks 
for the younger cohort. The age effect suggests that people change or do not change as 
they grow older due the combination of biological, psychological, and social mechanisms 
(Alwin & McCammon, 2003). This study does not find a strong influence of aging on 
network behavior, but it does suggest that the duration of ties (long) and the extent of 
relational embeddedness (high) have more direct effects on network inertia. The younger 
cohort is not simply young, their proactiveness is facilitated by their embeddedness in a 
new institutional environment.  
Although the cohort effect has been supported to explain network differences, 
nevertheless, more advanced data (longitudinal panel data) and techniques (Alwin & 
Scott, 1996; Duncan & Kalton, 1987) are needed to investigate, disentangle, and refine 
the relationships among age, period, and cohort effects. To examine population-level 
transformations, we need to embed the interpretations in a historical context. One 
implication for future research is that we should view aging not only as an 
organizational-level process, but also view it as embedded in the context of the 
population and community (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006: 167). For example, being a young 
venture in an emerging population is different from a young venture in a mature 
population (Barnett, Greve, & Park, 1994; Ingram & Baum, 1997). The account of the 
“liability of newness” (Stinchcombe, 1965) and the “liability of smallness” (Aldrich & 
Auster, 1986) (age effect) needs to be linked with the historical origins (cohort effect) and 
re-examined in different institutional contexts (period effect). This study suggests that the 
“liability of newness” could be mitigated by a new institutional environment, while there 
is a “liability of oldness” that is surprisingly ignored in current research. 
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Last but not least, future explorations might also investigate how older and younger 
cohort members interact and influence one another: Does the older cohort transmit its 
experience and tactics to the younger cohort, or does the younger cohort inject a new 
mind-set and nourish the old cohort? Regardless, new norms, values, and beliefs are 
diffused and institutionalized in contemporary China, as “the new cohorts provide the 
opportunity for social change to occur” (Ryder, 1965: 844).  
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Appendix C. English Semi-Structured Interview Guidelines 
 
These guidelines list the topics and questions posed to the interviewees. The actual 
interview questions were adapted based on respondents’ cohort membership and network 
information (e.g., established new connections or maintained old connections) mentioned 
during the interview. 
 
For Cohort A (Period 1: 1991-2001) and Cohort B (Period 2: 2002-2009) 
 
Can you tell me why you wanted to start up your own business? 
 
Can you describe the external environment you were confronted with when you started 
up your business? You can start from the political and policy environment. 
 
How about the market environment? 
 
How about the social environment?  
 
What kind of problems were you confronted with during your business venturing in this 
period? 
 
From whom or from which organizations did you ask for help to solve these problems? 
 
How did you develop relationships with them?  
 
How did you develop trust with them? 
 
For Cohort A (Period 2) 
 
Can you describe the external environment you were confronted with in this period? 
 
What kind of problems were you confronted with during your business venturing in this 
period? 
 
From whom or from which organizations did you ask for help to solve these problems? 
 
How did you develop relationships with them?  
 
How did you develop trust with them? 
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Why did you still maintain relationships with your old connections?  
 
 
For Cohort A and Cohort B  
 
What is the role of networks in your business? 
 
Some people say that there are three types of entrepreneurial networks: social-cultural 
networks, political networks, and market networks; how much of a role do social-cultural 
networks play in your business venturing? 
 
How much of a role do political networks play in your business venturing? 
 
How much of a role do market networks play in your business venturing? 
 
Do you want to develop any one of these types of networks for your future business? If 
yes, which one? 
 
During the development of the market economy, some entrepreneurs think networks 
become more important for their business, others think networks become less important. 
How have they been changed according to your business experience?    
 
 
It has been argued that there have been different generations of Chinese entrepreneurs. 
For example, the first generation who started up their business in the 1980s; the second 
generation who started up their business in the 1990s, and the third generation who 
started up their business after 2000. Do you agree with this categorization?  
 
Do you think you differ from other generations of entrepreneurs, for example, in network 
behaviors? 
 
When dealing with relationships with others, what kind of values do you hold?  
 
Did the financial crisis have any impact on your cooperation with other business partners? 
If yes, in which aspects? 
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Appendix D. Chinese Semi-Structured Interview Guidelines 
 
????????????????????? ???????????????
?????????????????? 
 
??? A ??? 1? 1991-2001????? B ????2002-2009?
 
??????????????? 
 
???????????????????? ?????????????? 
 
??????? 
 
????????? 
 
??????????????????? 
 
????????????????? 
 
?????????????? 
 
????????????????? 
 
??? B??? 2?2002-2009?
 
???????????????????? ?????????????? 
 
??????? 
 
????????? 
 
??????????????????? 
 
????????????????? 
 
?????????????? 
 
????????????????? 
 
???????????????? 
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??? A???? B  
???????????????????? 
 
????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????? 
 
??????????????????????? 
 
??????????????????????? 
 
???????????????????????????????????? 
 
????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????? 
 
????????????????????????????????????
???????2000?????????????????? 
 
????????????????????????????? 
 
??????????????????? 
 
?????????????????????????????????? 
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Appendix G. Codes List 
Accumulating networks 
Achievement motivation 
Acquaintance 
Adaptation 
Advertising 
Affection 
Aging 
Alliance 
Alliance consequence 
Alliance governance 
Ambitious 
Arm's length 
Association 
Authority relationship 
Avoid risk 
Background 
Background change 
Bad environment 
Balancing the stakeholder 
Bank 
Banquet 
Becoming professional 
Being flexible 
Being networked 
Being practical 
Being selective 
Benchmarking 
Blind chance 
Branding 
Brave 
Bribing 
Bridging 
Bring benefit 
Broker 
Build wealth 
Building networks 
Building new networks 
Building trust 
Business content 
Business model 
Business school 
Business strategies 
Business strategies, change 
Business transition 
Cadre 
Capabilities 
Challenge and problem 
Challenge and problem P1 
Challenge and problem P2 
CHANGE environment 
CHANGE environment 
favorable 
CHANGE environment 
relaxing 
CHANGE environment 
tightening 
CHANGE environment 
unfavorable 
CHANGE industry 
CHANGE network 
CHANGE policy 
Character 
Chinese social-culture 
Clients 
Closeness 
Closeness increase 
COHORT entrepreneurship 
general 
COHORT networks 
Cold calling 
Collective vision 
College 
Commercial based 
Commercial integrity 
Common interests 
Competitor 
Congruence with Western 
Conservative 
Consumerism 
Convertible 
Cooperation 
Cooperative firms 
Cooperative growth 
Cooperative network 
governance 
Cooperative network with 
government 
Corporatism 
Cost 
Coterie 
Creating value 
Credibility 
Cultural-cognitive pillar 
Customer channel 
Customer lost 
Customer relationship 
Dealing with people 
Deputy to local People's 
Congress 
Deputy to People's Congress 
Develop responsibility 
Developing business 
Digging people 
Dining together 
Discriminated 
Discussion network 
Dislike to comply with the 
government 
Distributors 
Diverse tie 
Do it alone 
Do not violate the law and 
discipline 
Doing business with 
oversees enterprises 
Drop tie 
Dynamic reciprocity 
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Eager for quick success and 
instant benefit 
Easing strain 
Education 
Effect indirectly 
Effect negative 
Effect not very much 
Effect positive 
Emotional support 
Enjoy accomplishment 
Enthusiastic 
Entrepreneurial capability 
ENVIRONMENT adapting 
to 
ENVIRONMENT 
comparison 
ENVIRONMENT disordered 
ENVIRONMENT don't care 
ENVIRONMENT favorable 
ENVIRONMENT general 
ENVIRONMENT market 
ENVIRONMENT not 
important 
ENVIRONMENT P1 
ENVIRONMENT P2 
ENVIRONMENT political 
ENVIRONMENT 
social-cultural 
ENVIRONMENT 
unfavorable 
ENVIRONMENT volatile 
Essential 
Establishing a friendship first 
Evaluating the values of tie 
Event 
Exhibition 
Experience growth 
Expressive interaction 
Extending 
External strength 
Fair competition 
Familiarization 
Family member and relative 
Family oriented 
Family support 
Favor giving 
Female entrepreneurship 
Financial crisis influence 
cooperation 
Financial crisis influence 
general 
Financing 
Financing bank 
Financing network 
Financing self 
Financing social 
Financing team 
Financing trade 
Finding customers 
Finding the key person 
First barrel of gold 
First cohort entrepreneurship 
First cohort networks 
Follow the rules of the game 
Forming new ties 
Forum 
Founding institutions 
Frequent interaction 
Friends 
Friends, and business 
Friendship 
Frown upon 
Frustration with previous job 
Fulfill myself 
Functional diversity 
Gain experience 
Gathering 
Generations 
Getting the order 
Gift giving 
Give and take 
Good opportunity 
Good quality 
Government 
Government local 
Government official 
Government organization 
Grasp information 
Growth temperately 
Guanxi bridging 
Guanxi consequence 
Guanxi deepening 
Guanxi governance 
Guanxi in China 
Guanxi individual 
Guanxi maintaining 
Guanxi no 
Guanxi organizational 
Hard working and tolerant 
Harvest Resources 
Help content 
Help content stable 
Hitting line balls 
Homogenous tie 
Homophily 
Human resource 
Icing on the cake 
Idealists 
Imitation 
Imprinting 
In red hat 
Inconvertible 
Increasing competition 
Incremental reform 
Incubate 
Industry 
Information 
Initiating 
Initiating and building 
Initiating networks 
Instrumental 
Integrity 
Interest-based relationships 
Intermediary 
Internal strength 
Internet 
Isomorphism 
Keeping low profile 
Key person 
Knowledge 
Knowledgeable 
Labor legislation 
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Lack of means of production 
Lack of resource 
Lay the foundation 
Learning 
Legitimacy 
Legitimacy lack 
Less competitive 
Less experienced 
Less power tactics 
Less significant 
Let it be 
Leveraging 
Liability of newness 
Light-asset 
Long-term accumulation 
Long-term investment 
Look for and accumulate 
customer 
Looking for projects 
Lose contact 
Lose control 
Low acceptance 
Lower profile 
Macro control 
Maintaining 
Maintaining network 
Make money 
Management 
Management training 
Manufacturing 
Market advantage 
Market behaviors 
Market capability 
Market competition 
Market development 
Market element 
Market entry 
Market exchange 
Market irregular 
Market network inter 
personal 
Market networking 
Market networks 
Market-oriented 
Market positioning 
Marketing 
Marketization 
Media 
Membership 
Mimicking 
Money management 
More cohesive 
More difficult 
More effective 
More motivation 
More profit 
More significant 
Mutual understanding 
Needs improvement 
Negotiation 
Network actions 
Network and interest 
NETWORK association 
NETWORK averse 
NETWORK bridging 
NETWORK broadening 
NETWORK change 
NETWORK changing 
significance 
NETWORK 
choice-within-structures 
NETWORK configurations 
Network configurations 
during institutional change 
NETWORK customer 
NETWORK decrease 
NETWORK decrease reason 
NETWORK deepening 
NETWORK dependence 
NETWORK differentiations 
between CA and CB 
NETWORK difficulty 
NETWORK duration 
NETWORK dynamics, 
reason 
NETWORK formal 
NETWORK governance 
NETWORK industry 
NETWORK inertia CA 
NETWORK informal 
NETWORK inter-firm 
NETWORK 
inter-organizational 
NETWORK intra-firm 
NETWORK investment 
practical 
NETWORK investment, 
according to the stage 
NETWORK investment, less 
political 
NETWORK investment, 
more market 
NETWORK investment, 
more political 
NETWORK investment, 
social-cultural 
NETWORK lacking 
NETWORK no 
NETWORK norms 
NETWORK opportunity 
NETWORK perceived 
NETWORK Period 1 
NETWORK Period 2 
NETWORK persistence 
NETWORK persistence 
reason 
NETWORK position 
NETWORK precondition 
NETWORK preparing 
NETWORK propensity, less 
market 
NETWORK propensity, less 
political 
NETWORK propensity, 
market 
NETWORK propensity, 
political 
NETWORK propensity, 
reason 
NETWORK propensity, 
social-cultural 
NETWORK resourceful 
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NETWORK risk 
NETWORK roles and effects, 
general 
NETWORK roles and effects, 
market 
NETWORK roles and effects, 
political 
NETWORK roles and effects, 
social-cultural 
NETWORK TYPE 
comparison 
NETWORK TYPE mixed 
NETWORK TYPE 
transformation 
NETWORK types 
NETWORK uppermost 
NETWORK Western 
NETWORK with foreign 
companies 
Networking difficulty 
Networking indeliberately 
Networking investment 
Networking process 
Networking selectively 
Networking strategies 
Networking strategy learning 
Networking type 
Networking values 
Networking with people at 
the same lever 
No objection 
No strong feelings 
Nonprofessional 
Normative conformance 
Normative creation 
Normative pillar 
Normative selection 
Not being bootlicker 
Not too economic driven 
Not using existing network 
Objection 
Open and upright 
Opportunistic to strategic 
planning 
Optimistic 
Out of the reach 
Over-embedded 
Overseas business 
Partner selection 
Partnership 
Party membership 
Party school 
Passing information 
Passion 
Patient 
Peer 
Performance 
Personal relationship 
disinclined 
Personality 
Vision 
Pioneering spirit 
Planned economy 
Plunge into the commercial 
sea 
Police college 
Policy 
Policy ambiguous 
Policy easing 
Policy implementation 
Policy non-standard 
Policy prohibiting 
Policy standardization 
Policy support 
Policy tight 
Policy unfair 
Policy unstable 
Policy unsupportive 
Political networking 
Political networks 
Political risk 
Position and role 
Positioning 
Positive thinking 
Predatory state 
Premises 
Previous work 
Private enterprise 
Production 
Professional 
Professional agencies 
Professional expertise 
Professional training 
Professionals 
Providing the solution 
Provocative 
Prudent 
Pursue ideal 
Pursue innovation 
Real estate 
Realize interests 
Realize value 
Reciprocity 
Reciprocity low 
Recruitment 
Reduce cost 
Reducing tie 
Reform and open policy 
Regulative pillar 
Relational legitimacy 
Relationship change 
Relationship government and 
private enterprises 
Reputation 
Resource exchange 
Resource platform 
Respectful 
Responsibility 
Risk averse 
Sales 
Sales down 
Second cohort 
entrepreneurship 
Second cohort networks 
Seek breakthrough 
Self-centered 
Self-determined 
Self-reliance 
Self blamed 
Self realization 
Self reflection 
Sentiment 
170 
 
 
Service 
Service industry 
Setting up example 
Shallow 
Similar value 
Sincere 
Small role 
Small volume of business 
SME 
Social-cultural networks 
Social environment 
SOE 
SOE reform 
Solitary share 
Spin-off 
Standardization 
Start 
Start-up for better life 
Start-up important 
Start-up intention 
Start-up more cautious 
Start-up more important 
Start-up planned 
Start-up process 
Start-up relational aspect 
Start up by the side of edge 
job 
State welfare 
Staying in touch 
Still significant 
Strategic planning 
Strong tie 
Students 
Supplier, partner and related 
Surviving 
Tactics 
Take opportunity 
Talents 
Taxation 
Teacher 
Team formation 
Teamwork 
Technological breakthrough 
Technology 
Theory: the alignment of 
founding institutions 
Third cohort 
entrepreneurship 
Third cohort network 
Tie diversity 
Tie formation 
Tie strength 
Too much VC 
Trade association 
Trial 
Trouble shooter 
TRUST affective 
TRUST cognitive 
TRUST development 
TRUST general 
TRUST Particularistic 
Turing point stage 
Turn into private enterprise 
Turning point period 
Uncertainty 
Undertake social 
responsibility 
Undisturbed 
Unfair treatment 
Unfavorable 
Unintentional 
Unstable 
Unsupportive 
Untactful 
Upgrading tie 
Using existing ties 
Using networks 
Using old ties 
Value share 
Variations, environment 
Variations, network 
Variations, relationship 
VC 
Very significant 
Way of thinking 
Weak tie 
Well-behaved 
Well experienced 
Well prepared 
Wholesale loosening 
Win-win 
Word of mouth 
Work for enterprise 
Young 
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